VZCZCXRO8329
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0641/01 1181423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281423Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5942
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0529

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000641 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2006 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT PLEASED WITH SECRETARY'S REMARKS; STILL 
PESSIMISTIC ON TECHNICAL TALKS 
 
REF: NICOSIA 503 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  "TRNC President" Talat told Ambassador that 
he appreciated the Secretary's "balanced" remarks on Cyprus 
during her recent visit to Athens.  He doubted the technical 
talks would start in earnest any time soon, however, and 
blamed the Greek Cypriots for tying down the process by 
insisting substantive issues also be addressed in that forum. 
 Greek Cypriot refusal to engage in a dialogue on changes to 
the Annan Plan -- as well as UNFICYP Chief Moeller's apparent 
willingness to "go along" with Papadopoulos's "delaying" 
tactics -- did not bode well for the resumption of 
comprehensive settlement talks.  Absent comprehensive talks, 
little progress on substance would be possible, since the 
Turkish Cypriots could not accept a piecemeal approach (for 
example a mini-deal involving Varosha).  Frustrated, Talat 
nonetheless acknowledged the need to keep working with the UN 
and Moeller -- as well as the wisdom of meeting Papadopoulos 
in the context of the Committee on Missing Persons, even 
though he did not expect this meeting to accomplish much. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) In an April 28 meeting with Ambassador, Turkish 
Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat expressed appreciation 
for the Secretary's "balanced" and "helpful" remarks during 
her recent visit to Athens.  He praised U.S. commitment to 
advancing a settlement to the Cyprus problem through the 
easing of Turkish Cypriot isolation -- and for U.S. support 
for Turkey's EU candidacy.  He had not gotten an "official" 
readout from Turkey about how the Secretary's visit to Ankara 
had gone, but felt from the press and "informal" sources that 
it had been a success from the Turkish point of view. 
 
¶3. (C) Turning to the Cyprus settlement process, Talat 
expressed continued frustration over what he termed Greek 
Cypriot "delaying tactics."  The ongoing three-way 
discussions between his "Under Secretary" Rasit Pertev, ROC 
Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos Tzionis, and UNFICYP 
Chief Michael Moeller concerning the start of technical talks 
(reftel) were being bogged down by the Greek Cypriot 
insistence that the sides also address issues of substance in 
the technical talks forum.  (Pertev, who accompanied Talat in 
his meeting with the Ambassador, chimed in to joke that the 
ROC seemed to want to "solve the Cyprus problem before 
technical talks could begin.")  Talat said he did not object 
to discussing substantive issues, but insisted that the Greek 
Cypriot side first present a clear and complete list of what 
changes they would seek to the existing "plan on the table" 
(i.e., the Annan Plan).  Piecemeal discussions on individual 
subjects (such as Varosha) would only serve to delay an 
overall deal, and therefore could not take place outside the 
context of comprehensive settlement talks. 
 
¶4. (C) Talat expressed anger at how the Greek Cypriots had 
abandoned their previous acceptance of the Annan Plan as a 
"basis" for renewed talks.  Imperfect though it may be, Talat 
said, the Annan Plan nonetheless represented a compromise. 
As such, it was a better starting point than the two sides' 
respective fall-back positions ("osmosis" for the Greek 
Cypriots, confederation or two states for the Turkish 
Cypriots).  Greek Cypriot "demonization" of the Annan Plan, 
without offering a corresponding counterproposal, showed that 
the Papadopoulos administration was hoping negotiations would 
drag on indefinitely.  Recent Greek Cypriot demands that 
negotiations be conducted with "no time limit" (a hardening 
of their previous concern about "asphyxiating" deadlines) 
only supported this interpretation of Greek Cypriot 
motivations, he said. 
 
¶5. (C) At the same time, Talat was astonished and worried at 
the UN's apparent willingness to "play along" with the Greek 
Cypriot delaying game.  SRSG Moeller had (perhaps 
inadvertently, perhaps out of bias) accepted Greek Cypriot 
arguments (for example, by insisting that even use of the 
term "Annan Plan" was a bad idea, or his reported claim that 
elements of the Plan "were against international law.")  At 
the same time, Moeller appeared to be ill informed about some 
basic facts, Talat said -- such as when he mistakenly 
insisted to Pertev that the ROC had already presented a 
written list of desired changes to the Annan Plan.  Talat 
hoped that his April 4 letter to SYG Annan would prompt the 
UN to clarify its position, and that the UN would state 
unequivocally that the Annan Plan remained the basis for 
future talks.  After all, Talat reasoned, the Plan was 
written by the UN so the SYG should still support it. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador stressed to Talat the importance of 
engaging with the UN and with SRSG Moeller, and underlined 
that personal criticism of Moeller and his approach was 
 
NICOSIA 00000641  002 OF 002 
 
 
counterproductive.  It was in the Turkish Cypriot interest to 
see the UN process move forward, first on the technical track 
and later -- if all parties agreed -- on substance.  This 
must involve an honest effort by the Turkish Cypriots to 
improve their relationship with Moeller.  Talat countered 
that it was Moeller's responsibility to prove he was an 
impartial mediator, especially since Moeller had "cooked up" 
the Paris Declaration, which was so disastrous for the 
Turkish Cypriot side.  The Ambassador reminded Talat that the 
Greek Cypriot press had seriously inflated the importance of 
the Paris meeting; the Turkish Cypriots should not shape 
their relationship with the UN in response to spin doctors in 
the Greek Cypriot media.  Ambassador praised Talat for 
publicly reiterating his willingness to find a solution that 
would allow the two communities to live together (most 
recently in a speech marking his 1-year anniversary as 
"president").  Staying "one step ahead" in his public 
rhetoric, rather than bickering with Moeller or sniping at 
Papadopoulos, would help demonstrate that the Turkish 
Cypriots were not being intransigent.  Talat acknowledged 
this point, adding that he realized there was no alternative 
to working with Moeller. 
 
¶7. (C) Talat said he was still willing to meet Papadopoulos 
in the context of the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP), but 
expressed doubt that the get-together would be worthwhile 
since the Greek Cypriot leader had insisted he would not talk 
about any subjects other than the missing.  Talat worried 
that such a meeting could politicize the comparatively 
well-functioning CMP -- and allow Papadopoulos to take credit 
for having seen Talat without forcing the Greek Cypriot 
leader to talk about substantive matters.  Talat had agreed 
to meet Papadopoulos at any time and in any context, however, 
and would stick to his word.  Although the UN had not 
hammered out the details, the meeting would probably take 
place, Talat said, after the new Third Member arrived in 
June.  But Talat expected little progress, either on 
technical committees or on a leaders' meeting, until after 
Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections on May 21. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT: Talat seemed genuinely mystified that the 
Greek Cypriots could be successfully painting him as the 
intransigent party for refusing to discuss substance in the 
technical committee context -- when it is so clear (to him, 
at least) that blame for the lack of real progress lies 
squarely with Papadopoulos.  He also seemed to be unaware 
that the shrill and defensive tone of his dialogue with the 
UN is playing badly, though this point was made several ways 
in this meeting.  Neither side has broken the press blackout 
over the technical committee talks, however, so the Turkish 
Cypriots have not aired their frustrations with the process 
publicly -- at least not to the same degree as they have in 
private.  The challenge (especially in light of elections in 
the north scheduled for June, when the ruling CTP may be 
tempted to pander to frustrated public opinion by slamming 
the UN or the Greek Cypriots) will be to encourage Talat to 
keep his temper in check and his eye on the ball.  He must 
resist the temptation to respond to his frustrations by the 
adoption of "Denktash-style" tactics and nationalist bilge, 
the resort to which Papadopoulos will use against him.  To do 
so effectively, he will also need some political space from 
Ankara, which appears to be in short supply.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER