VZCZCXRO9115
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0593/01 1101307
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201307Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5895
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0983
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0526

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000593 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI EUN CY
SUBJECT: READING TEA LEAVES: POLLS SHOW MIXED FEELINGS 
ABOUT LIVING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS, CYPRUS PROBLEM 
 
REF: A. SIPNET DAILY REPORT (04/13/06) 
 
     ¶B. 04 NICOSIA 2997 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  A recent CyBC poll suggesting that only 45 
percent of Greek Cypriots are willing to live together with 
Turkish Cypriots (down from 67 percent when the Green Line 
checkpoints opened in 2003) has raised serious questions in 
the minds of many local pundits over whether a solution to 
the Cyprus problem may be increasingly out of reach.  A more 
nuanced reading of the poll suggests, however, that this 
apparent Greek Cypriot animosity toward the Turkish Cypriots 
is neither as severe or clear-cut as it appears at first 
glance.  Survey results indicating that Greek Cypriots are 
content with Papadopoulos's strategic foot-dragging on the 
Cyprus issue are more worrying, however, and suggest that 
most voters in the south see no urgent need for their 
government to engage in the difficult give-and-take that will 
be required if a comprehensive settlement is to be reached. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD WEEK 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) With May 21 legislative elections drawing closer, 
Greek Cypriot media is awash with public opinion polling. 
Although most polls focus squarely on the likely outcome of 
the elections (and suggest little change is imminent in the 
Greek Cypriot political landscape), a lengthy survey 
published April 3 and 4 by the state-run CyBC has drawn 
particular attention.  The most eye-catching claim made by 
the poll was that 48 percent of the Greek Cypriots did not 
want to "live together" with Turkish Cypriots.  This 
represents a twenty percent rise in negative opinion since 
the 2003 opening of the Green Line checkpoints.  At that 
time, polling data suggested that a majority (67 percent) of 
Greek Cypriots were willing to live together with Turkish 
Cypriots (ref a).  According to CyBC, the number of Greek 
Cypriots now in favor of living together with Turkish 
Cypriots has dropped to 45 percent. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The CyBC poll has dominated conversation among 
chattering classes on both sides of the Green Line for the 
past two weeks. A Greek Cypriot bi-communal activist lamented 
in one paper that his compatriots were "settling into the 
partition of the island geographically, emotionally, 
psychologically, politically, and sociologically," and 
suggested that the poll results indicated an overall drop in 
support for the reunification of Cyprus. 
 
¶4. (SBU) One particular cause for worry is the fact that 
Greek Cypriot youth appear to have the most reservations 
about living with Turkish Cypriots.  The CyBC poll confirms 
earlier research showing decreased support among younger 
Greek Cypriots for living together.  Those under the age of 
35 were most wary, with 63 percent of the 18-24 year-olds and 
59 percent of 24-34-year-olds saying they would rather not 
live with Turkish Cypriots.  The 35-55 age group, many of 
whom have clear memories of the 1974 war, were split 50-50. 
Only those over 55 were clearly in favor of living side by 
side with Turkish Cypriots. 
 
¶5. (C) The apparent dislike many Greek Cypriot youth feel 
toward Turkish Cypriots is not news; pro-settlement observers 
have long wondered "what's the matter with kids today?" (ref 
b).  Critics of President Papadopoulos lay the blame squarely 
on the current administration.  One publicly accused the 
president of "failing to promote a vision of reunification," 
and "creating a hostile climate for Greek Cypriot youth."  It 
is probably an exaggeration to lay all the blame on 
Papadopoulos's doorstep, however, even though his hard line 
certainly resonates with many Greek Cypriots.  The poll 
nonetheless supports the idea that the uncompromising 
attitude of younger Greek Cypriots (who have no memory of 
bi-communal co-existence and have been fed a regular diet of 
Turcophobia at school) is growing more dominant with the 
passage of time. 
 
YOU SAY POTATO, I SAY BIZONAL 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Not all observers agree, however, that the CyBC poll 
represents a major shift away from public support for 
reunification -- even if it might suggest a decrease in 
sympathy for Turkish Cypriots.  Former Attorney General 
Alecos Markides was one of many who pointed out to us the 
ambiguity of the survey's questions about living together. 
It was not clear whether "living together means in the same 
 
NICOSIA 00000593  002 OF 003 
 
 
bed, the same flat, the same village, or what," he said. 
Turkish Cypriot journalist Simon Bahceli agreed, noting that 
everyone who supported the long-standing goal of a bizonal, 
bicommunal federation accepted the idea that the two 
communities would be segregated to some degree.  "Not wanting 
to live together does not mean being against a solution," he 
insisted, since living apart is implicit in the idea of 
bizonality.  According to Markides, the "naughty" CyBC poll 
did not get at the real meat of Greek Cypriot attitudes 
toward coexistence because it asked "absurd questions." 
 
¶7. (C) Other survey responses were equally ambiguous, 
suggesting that Markides is right to criticize CyBC for 
sloppy questioning.  For example, one question asked "how 
much do you like" Turkish Cypriots (with 41 percent saying a 
little, 33 percent saying moderately, and 26 percent saying a 
lot), but offered no option to express dislike.  Another 
question asked Greek Cypriots about their opinion of Turkish 
Cypriots since the opening of the checkpoints.  18 percent of 
respondents said their opinions of Turkish Cypriots had 
improved, 17 percent said they had worsened, and 61 percent 
said they had "stayed the same" -- although no indication was 
given of the pro- and anti-Turkish breakdown within this 
61-percent majority.  Survey results showing that only 55 
percent of Greek Cypriots have crossed north suggest that 
some in the south are happy to keep their distance from 
Turkish Cypriots, and it is common knowledge that many Greek 
Cypriots do not cross the Green Line because they do not want 
to show their ID papers to officials of the "occupation 
regime."  But the CyBC survey offered no follow-on data to 
quantify these feelings; it remains unclear how many of those 
45 percent who do not cross are motivated by antipathy -- or 
just plain apathy. 
 
GETTING COMFORTABLE WITH THE STATUS QUO? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Less noticed, but perhaps more significant, was a 
series of other questions in the CyBC survey reflecting not 
so much a dislike of Turkish Cypriots as a Greek Cypriot 
willingness to tolerate the status quo and/or support the 
GOC's current foot-dragging on its strategic bottom line of 
reunification of the island.  In response to one question, 78 
percent of Greek Cypriots felt that their community's 
position in the international arena had either held steady or 
improved over the past year.  Responding to a question on the 
EU, 66 percent said they were opposed to Turkish accession. 
In a private conversation with the Ambassador, DISY leader 
Nicos Anastassiades expressed concern that (should Turkey 
continue to slow-roll on implementing its EU obligations) 
such strong popular opposition to Turkish EU membership might 
eventually force Papadopoulos to exercise his threatened 
veto.  This could snuff out any hope of a Cyprus settlement. 
 
¶9. (C) Especially worrying are results showing that, while 56 
percent of Greek Cypriots feel that they are not getting any 
closer to a Cyprus solution, a nearly equal majority (61 
percent) support President Papadopoulos's current Cyprus 
policy.  As one observer pointed out, these apparently 
contradictory results only make sense if most Greek Cypriots 
are happy with the status quo. 
 
WE TOLD YOU THEY HATE US 
------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) The CyBC poll has received prominent press coverage 
in the north, where commentators generally view it as 
confirmation that Greek Cypriots are neither particularly 
eager for a settlement nor particularly fond of Turkish 
Cypriots -- a belief that has been gaining currency since the 
rejection of the Annan Plan in the south.  While many in the 
north initially blamed Papadopoulos for his community's "no" 
vote, it is increasingly common to hear Turkish Cypriots 
complain that the "problem" (i.e., hatred of Turks) runs deep 
in the Greek Cypriot national psyche and is not the fault of 
just one man.  Perhaps as a result of this, a recent survey 
in the northern city of Guzelyurt (Morphou) confirmed a 
serious deterioration in support for the Annan Plan among 
Turkish Cypriots there, while other polling suggests that 
Turkish Cypriots elsewhere are increasingly skeptical that 
the two sides could live together. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) That many Greek Cypriots neither particularly like 
Turkish Cypriots nor want to live with them is nothing new -- 
and surveys in the north taken since the Annan Plan suggest 
that for many Turkish Cypriots, the feeling is mutual.  If 
bizonality is accepted by most people on each side, however, 
 
NICOSIA 00000593  003 OF 003 
 
 
this need not be an impediment to a settlement deal.  As one 
AmCit resident of Cyprus quipped: "Afterall, how many New 
Yorkers want to live among Texans?" 
 
¶12. (C) What is remarkable about the CyBC survey are the 
questions it poses about just how eager Greek Cypriots are to 
see their government engage in the real give-and-take 
negotiations required for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. 
 Although 80 percent still say the division of the island is 
their top political concern, the poll gives little indication 
that Greek Cypriots feel any sense of urgency on the matter 
-- while the 66 percent who oppose Turkish EU membership do 
not appear to see a link between progress toward Turkey's 
accession and a potential Cyprus settlement.  Former UN 
Cyprus envoy Hugo Gobi reportedly once said that "the drama 
of Cyprus is the absence of drama."  This appears to be truer 
than ever.  Absent any dramatic change in the geopolitical 
landscape, most Greek Cypriots seem content to nod 
approvingly at their president's policy of slow-motion EU 
brinksmanship with Turkey -- and then get back to their 
generally pleasant, prosperous daily lives.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER