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O 111517Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5839
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4608
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3555
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1166
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0448
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0521
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000536 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2021 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: GETTING OUR MESSAGE THROUGH TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT 
MEDIA, WITHOUT CHANGING OUR POLICY 
 
REF: A. EMAIL INGMANSON-MILLER 4/7/06 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 1585 (2005) 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD L. SCHLICHER; REASONS 
1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Greek Cypriot media is consistent to the 
point of Pavlovian response.  Certain phrases -- even 
particular words -- in the mouth of a U.S. official will 
elicit very predictable results.  Our Cyprus policy is the 
right one, but we need to tweak our public diplomacy message 
in ways that open ears and minds on both sides of the island. 
 Getting the message right entails careful handling of the 
most emotive issues. For example, the most 
emotionally-charged phrases in our Cyprus vocabulary are, 
without a doubt, "the Annan Plan" and any of the phrases we 
use to modify it, including:  "uniquely balanced," "fair," 
and "workable."  No Greek Cypriots, even those who voted 
"yes" on the plan, believe it had these attributes.  Our 
statements on the Annan Plan, when we must use the phrase at 
all, should steer between the G/C desire to never hear the 
phrase and the T/C desire to freeze it in amber; this can be 
done by expressing strong support for the UN role, while 
noting that both sides actually recognize the need to take 
advantage of the decades of work the UN has done between the 
parties.  Whenever possible, post recommends that we frame 
our policy statements to look forward rather than backward, 
and work assiduously to minimize specific references to the 
Annan Plan by name.  Other affirmative choices that we could 
make in pursuing our public diplomacy agenda could include 
moderating the concept of "lifting Turkish Cypriot isolation" 
(fighting words for Greek Cypriots who see it as a euphemism 
for "creeping recognition" of the "TRNC") with "expanding 
economic opportunities for Turkish Cypriots to help integrate 
the two communities in a bizonal, bicommunal federation." 
(much harder to argue against).  END SUMMARY. 
 
Greek Cypriot Press Environment 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Cypriot press environment can be understood as too 
many newspapers chasing a single story -- the Cyprus issue. 
The most widely read newspapers tend to follow the lead of 
the government, with indirect influence from the Presidential 
Palace.  Most of the media obsequiously toes the government 
line to the extent that the largest newspaper, 
Phileleftheros, refused to place a USAID advertisement. 
Given the effective government control of the press and a 
populace inclined to believe the official line, President 
Papadopoulos,s often crude or obvious attempts at media 
manipulation are surprisingly successful. Almost 
paradoxically, Papadopoulos is enjoying strong support for 
his handling of the Cyprus issue even though people do not 
believe that they are closer to a solution or that the 
political situation has improved.  Much of this seemingly 
schizophrenic behavior can be attributed to the 
pro-government catechism that passes for journalism in 
Cyprus. 
 
¶3. (C) In addition to ROC sources, statements from U.S. or 
Turkish officials are guaranteed page one material.  Stories 
in Turkish and Turkish Cypriot papers are often picked up in 
the south the next day and vice versa.  Turkish Cypriot 
"officials" in particular often react to the media spin on 
statements rather than to the actual statements themselves, 
as witnessed by the controversy over the joint communiqu 
between President Papadopoulos and Secretary General Annan. 
Because the Cyprus issue fuels the media industry here, with 
many journalists focusing exclusively in this area, U.S. 
officials, statements are parsed very carefully with 
journalists filling in gaps and searching for a significance 
that was not necessarily intended by the speaker.  For us, 
neutral (or even factual) coverage is a victory.  Positive 
press coverage is rare and usually attributable to statements 
that can be seen as somehow critical of Turkey. 
 
What Works 
---------- 
 
¶4. (C) Many in the Greek Cypriot media and the public have 
been pleasantly surprised by recent statements from U.S. 
officials that they see as more nuanced and forward-looking 
on the Cyprus issue.  FM Iacovou told the Ambassador on April 
7 that this "change" in tone had been both noticed and 
appreciated.  The following are some sound bites which state 
our policy and resonate well with the Greek Cypriot media. 
 
¶A. "Bizonal, bicommunal federation solution supported by 
majorities of both sides" 
 
-- Leadership on both sides has supported this idea since 
¶1977.  It is mother's milk and spinach pie (so to speak) but 
worth reaffirming nonetheless.  Here we note that the 
"supported by majorities on both sides" language is heard on 
the G/C side as recognition of their contention that 
substantial changes to the Annan Plan will have to be 
negotiated.  We also note that the concept of a bizonal, 
bicommunal federation may be losing support among the 
populace, particularly among young people.  A poll published 
last week indicated a drop from 67% of Greek Cypriots 
supporting the idea of living together with Turkish Cypriots 
two years ago to only 45% supporting this idea today. 
 
¶B. "Policy of reunification (not separation)" 
 
-- Emphasizing this point counters suspicions on the Greek 
Cypriot side that the U.S. could recognize the "TRNC" at some 
point if Greek Cypriots do not yield to outside pressure in 
accepting the Annan Plan with marginal changes. 
 
¶C. "We do not recognize the TRNC; Talat viewed by the U.S. 
not as president but as leader of Turkish Cypriot community" 
 
-- Talat,s meeting with the Secretary in Washington, the 
U.S. Ambassador's meetings with Talat at the "Presidential 
Office," the visits of U.S. Congressmen to the north via 
Ercan, and U.S. efforts to get the UNSC to endorse the Annan 
Plan were seen as steps towards creeping recognition of the 
north and a deliberate attempt to "punish" the Greek Cypriot 
side for rejecting the Annan Plan.  Recent statements by U.S. 
officials emphasizing that we do not and will not recognize 
the "TRNC" have received widespread, favorable press coverage 
in the G/C community, without costing us appreciably in the 
T/C community. 
 
¶D. "Solution based on democratic principles; acceptance of 
previous "No" vote by Greek Cypriots" 
 
-- Statements that make clear we understand that the Greek 
Cypriot side did not find the Annan Plan to be an adequate 
solution play exceptionally well in the south.  This is 
particularly true if accompanied by a statement recognizing 
that there will need to be changes to the plan if it is to be 
made acceptable to both sides.  Greek Cypriots fear being 
pressured to swallow a "new" plan that includes only a few 
cosmetic changes. 
 
¶E. "Need to move forward" 
 
-- Statements that, regardless of what happened in 2004, all 
sides need to be forward-looking and engage in serious 
discussions that will lead to a solution are well received. 
We have noticed positive press coverage when U.S. officials 
urge both sides to sit down with the UN to determine the 
process that will enable the leaders to have substantive 
negotiations leading to a final product to be approved by 
both communities. 
 
¶F. "Up to the Cypriots themselves to solve the problem" 
 
-- Turkey's role in the Cyprus issue continues to grate on 
Greek Cypriot nerves.  This line works for us to the extent 
that Greek Cypriots understand it as meaning that Turkey's 
role in a United Cyprus will be minimized.  It is less well 
received if it is spun as an attempt to help Turkey slough 
off its responsibilities to the ROC. 
 
¶G. "Work for a settlement which will benefit everyone" 
 
-- GCs fear our sole interest in the Cyprus issue is helping 
Turkey advance smoothly on its EU course.  It is important to 
explain why a solution is in everyone's interest, including 
that of Cyprus and Greece. 
 
¶H. "Turkey needs to fulfill its European obligations" 
 
-- Recognizing and rebutting this central GC concern is 
always a public affairs positive for us. 
 
 
What does NOT work 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Statements that hark back to the traumatic times of 
the referenda on the Annan Plan only inflame public opinion 
on the Greek Cypriot side.  It is difficult to overemphasize 
how radioactive the term "Annan Plan" has become in the 
south.  Politicians would rather be known as embezzlers or 
tax cheats than supporters of the Annan Plan.  The media 
itself has become more polarized as reporters who supported 
the Annan Plan have left pro-government Phileleftheros and 
detractors have left pro-settlement Politis. Mentioning the 
Annan Plan distracts attention from the issue of a forward 
looking settlement. The media is stocked with Cyprus 
"experts" -- self-appointed guardians of the "true facts" -- 
who weigh every word and compare it to our spokespersons, 
statements over the past several years.  Because of this, the 
messages on Cyprus coming out of Washington, Nicosia, Ankara, 
and Athens have to be clear and consistent. When different 
U.S. officials are quoted by the Greek Cypriot media as 
saying contradictory things about the same issue, it is 
viewed as proof that the U.S. is disengaged or insincere. 
 
¶A. "The "A" word - Specific mention of the Annan Plan" 
 
-- Mention of the Annan Plan by name simply causes Greek 
Cypriots to tune out on our specific points. The plan has 
been demonized by the present government, and polls indicate 
that if put to referendum again, an even higher percentage of 
Greek Cypriots - over 80% according to recent polls - would 
reject the plan.  This said, we can get our message through 
to both sides by expressing strong support for the UN's 
negotiating role, while noting that each side has a strong 
interest in taking advantage of the decades of work the UN 
has done between the parties, which in fact has resulted in 
agreement on many issues (which agreement was embodied in the 
Annan Plan). In addition to this general message, we can 
tweak our comments on various common descriptors of the Annan 
Plan. 
 
¶B. "The Annan Plan was fair and balanced" or, even worse, 
"uniquely balanced" 
 
-- Even the vast majority of those who voted in favor of the 
 
plan do not share this position.  The media and public 
perceived the plan and the U.S. motivations to support it as 
pro-Turkish.  Papadopoulos regularly slams this view publicly 
and is clear against whom his ire is directed. 
 
¶C. "The Greek Cypriot side is responsible for the lack of 
progress since 2004" 
 
-- Insistence on the ball being in the Greek Cypriot court is 
not helpful.  This is not a tennis match.  This metaphor only 
reinforces the GOC,s position that the U.S. favors Turkish 
Cypriots.  Many point out that the UNSYG agrees with 
President Papadopoulos, position that any negotiations 
should be prepared carefully. 
 
¶D. "By accepting the Annan Plan, the Turkish side is now 
absolved of its responsibilities on the Cyprus issue" 
 
-- Greek Cypriots believe that it was very easy for the 
Turkish Cypriot side to accept the plan since they see it as 
pro-Turkish.  Voting "yes" in 2004 was, therefore, not a 
noteworthy accomplishment, but rather further proof that the 
plan itself was unbalanced. 
 
¶E. "Turkish Cypriots are pro-solution since they voted for 
the Annan Plan" 
 
-- This type of statement implies that Greek Cypriots are 
anti-solution. Greek Cypriots reject this position outright 
because they have been saying all along that their "no" was 
not against a solution in principle, but against the Annan 
Plan in the specific. 
 
¶F. "The Greek Cypriot side should put its objections on the 
table before new negotiations can begin" 
 
-- The majority of Greek Cypriot media outlets argue that 
this should happen only when negotiations resume.  In 
addition (albeit in seeming contradiction), most people 
believe Papadopoulos when he says that his special envoy, 
Ambassador Tzionis, has already presented the Greek Cypriot's 
objections to UNSYG Annan. 
 
 
¶G.  Support for "Direct Aid, Direct Trade, and Direct flights" 
 
 
-- Support for direct engagement with "TRNC" officials and 
institutions is understood as part of our campaign to punish 
the Greek Cypriots for their "no" to the Annan Plan.  The 
general belief is that our goal is to upgrade the status of 
the Turkish Cypriot state rather than promote a settlement. 
Moreover, the concept of direct trade is something of a 
misnomer and is often understood as meaning non-stop flights 
and shipping routes between the U.S. and the north.  We 
strongly suggest that the word "direct" not be used when 
discussing trade between U.S. and Turkish Cypriot business 
people.  The fundamental trade questions have more to do with 
tax status and customs duties than docking privileges.  It 
would be more effective for us to focus on a goal of 
"increasing trade opportunities" with the Turkish Cypriots 
rather than promoting "direct trade." 
 
Adjusting our message 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  Our policy on the Cyprus issue is in the right place, 
but the specific language we have been using may not be 
helping us achieve our goals.  Solving the Cyprus problem 
will require majority support for a specific solution from 
both communities.  The language we use should reflect that 
reality and advance our objectives.  Our most effective core 
message, which states our policy while avoiding most 
sensitivities among both the G/C and T/C communities, would 
be something along the following lines: 
 
-- The United States strongly supports a fair and workable 
settlement of the Cyprus problem that reunites the island and 
promotes reconciliation of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot communities within the framework of a bizonal, 
bicommunal federation. 
 
-- We strongly support UNFICYP, the UN SRSG and the UNSYG's 
mission of good offices.  The central UN role in pursuing a 
Cyprus settlement is vital and indispensable. 
 
-- The United States stands ready to do everything we can to 
support the parties in reaching agreement acceptable to 
majorities in both communities.  The ultimate responsibility 
for solving this problem, however, lies with Cypriots -- not 
the U.S., the EU, the UN, or any other third parties.  A 
settlement would benefit everyone, but first and foremost it 
would benefit Cypriots. 
 
-- We need to move forward and work with the two parties and 
the UN to re-start serious negotiations on a settlement. 
 
-- The technical talks process is an important step in this 
direction.  It has our full support and we encourage the 
parties to do everything they can to ensure that this process 
succeeds. 
 
-- Meanwhile, we will continue our efforts to expand economic 
opportunities for the Turkish Cypriots, including through 
enhanced opportunities for trade.  It is our belief that 
doing this will further the cause of a settlement, including 
by helping reduce the costs of reunification, and make it 
easier to integrate the two communities in a viable bizonal, 
bicommunal federation. 
SCHLICHER