VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0529/01 1001234
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101234Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5832
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4605
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3550
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1162
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0445
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0518
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000529 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2021 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC CY
SUBJECT: SRSG "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR TECHNICAL 
TALKS; GOC EXCEPTIONALLY CAGEY 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 503 
 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 1585 (2005) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  SRSG Michael Moeller told Ambassador 
Schlicher on April 7 that he was optimistic the technical 
talks process would succeed in galvanizing movement on the 
Cyprus issue.  The atmosphere in the talks was positive, even 
"effusive," and the principals had readily agreed to a total 
news blackout.  The parties were closer than they realized, 
or at least closer than they wanted to admit.  The most 
significant hurdle was not the nature of the technical 
committees, but rather the Turkish Cypriot side's insistence 
(at Ankara's behest, Moeller believed) that the Annan Plan 
should be the sole basis for settlement negotiations. 
Moeller recognized that he still had a credibility problem 
with Ankara, though he does say that there has been some 
improvement.  He asked that we weigh-in with the Turkish 
Mission to the UN to underscore that the P-5 supported both 
the SRSG personally and the technical talks process. 
Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot participant in the technical 
talks -- Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos Tzionis -- 
told DCM that his side would not agree to limit the 
discussion to issues of day-to-day concern.  The process 
should be aimed at both building trust between the two sides 
and preparing the ground for the resumption of full 
settlement negotiations.  "Technical talks" was a euphemism 
for political dialogue below the leaders level.  President 
Papadopoulos was prepared to meet Turkish Cypriot leader 
Mehmet Ali Talat in the context of the Committee on Missing 
Persons, but it was probably too early to resume full-blown 
negotiations.  The gap between the two sides was simply too 
great.  End summary. 
 
 
Moeller Typically Optimistic 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) UNFICYP COM and SRSG Michael Moeller told Ambassador 
Schlicher on April 7 that the "technical talks" had gotten 
off to a good start and he was "still optimistic" about the 
direction in which things were moving.  Moeller had so far 
hosted two sessions for a total of eight hours of 
conversation.  A third meeting was tentatively scheduled for 
April 10.  Both sides had agreed to a complete news blackout 
on the process.  There would be no statements and -- it was 
agreed -- no leaks.  UNFICYP spokesman Brian Kelley would be 
the only one authorized to speak authoritatively about the 
process.  Turkish Cypriot representative Rasit Pertev and 
Greek Cypriot representative Tasos Tzionis got on quite well 
personally and so far the atmosphere in the talks was, as 
Moeller described it, "effusive."  The two sides were closer 
than they realized, or at least closer than they wanted to 
admit.  Both Pertev and Tzionis were sensitive to the time 
factor and the need to get something moving on an urgent 
basis.  Both sides had complained to Moeller that he was 
bending over backwards to accommodate the other party, which 
he took as a good sign. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Ambassador asked if the two sides had agreed that 
the technical committees could begin working.  Moeller 
replied that the Greek Cypriot side was not yet on board. 
The real stumbling block, however, was not the concept of the 
committees but rather the Annan Plan.  Pertev clearly had 
instructions -- from Ankara, Moeller believed -- to emphasize 
the Annan Plan as the sole basis for settlement negotiations. 
 The Greek Cypriots supported a very different approach and, 
in fact, did not want any reference to the Annan Plan at all. 
 It was clear, Moeller observed, that the phrase "The Annan 
Plan" was problematic and needed to be jettisoned.  Moeller 
himself preferred "The Cyprus Plan" as a convenient label for 
the objective of new negotiations. 
 
¶4.  (C) Moeller anticipated that managing Ankara would be an 
important but difficult part of the process.  The SRSG 
recognized that, while he thought that the situation for him 
had eased over the past two or three weeks, he still had a 
credibility problem with Turkey and he asked for our support. 
 In particular, it would be helpful if we could deliver a 
message to the Turkish PermRep to the UN that the P-5 backed 
both Moeller personally and the technical talks process he 
was trying to jump-start.  The Turkish PermRep had evidently 
been expressing considerable skepticism about this in his 
conversations in New York.  It was important that Turkey 
understand it was getting something out of this process, and 
 
Moeller believed that might be some expression of openness to 
the Gul Proposal from January.  The SYG had not yet responded 
formally to the proposal.  When he did so, he was likely to 
make two points:  first, that Turkey should fulfill its 
obligations to the European Union, but also that the issues 
specific to Cyprus can and should be addressed in a parallel 
process. 
 
¶5.  (C) Moeller believed it would be better if the number of 
high-level envoys on the Cyprus issue could be kept to a 
minimum.  Senior UK officials had already assured him that 
London had no plans to appoint a replacement for David 
Hannay.  Moeller noted that he intended to travel to New York 
at some point soon and wondered whether it might be useful to 
visit Washington as well.  The Ambassador agreed that this 
would be a good idea.  Moeller mused that, if he did this, he 
would likely have to travel to London, Paris and Moscow as 
well to make clear that he was being even-handed.  (Note:  He 
made no mention of a possible visit to Beijing.) 
 
Tzionis Typically Cautious 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Holding true to the spirit of his agreement with 
Moeller and Pertev, Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos 
Tzionis refused to discuss the specific details of the 
technical talks process in an April 7 conversation with DCM. 
He was, however, willing to discuss the Greek Cypriot 
position.  Tzionis stressed that his side was not prepared to 
countenance a process that would be limited to a discussion 
of day-to-day concerns.  This would succeed only in 
normalizing an abnormal and unacceptable situation.  The 
talks would also have to address issues of substance.  The 
aim of the process under discussion was two-fold: First, to 
build trust between the parties, and second to prepare the 
ground for the resumption of full negotiations on a 
settlement.  This could not be done through limited 
discussions on waste management.  The discussions should also 
include issues specific to a solution of the Cyprus problem. 
Tzionis cited cooperation on energy issues as one topic his 
side wanted to explore.  The GOC decision to provide 
electricity to the north during the Turkish Cypriot energy 
crisis in January was a one-off, ad hoc decision.  It was 
important to consider how energy generation and distribution 
would be handled within a federal arrangement. 
 
¶7.  (C) DCM asked Tzionis if the Greek Cypriot side was 
really ready for the resumption of full negotiations. 
Tzionis replied that it would probably be a mistake to move 
on this too soon.  If Papadopoulos and Talat met now, for 
example, it would only highlight the sizable gap between 
their respective positions.  The gap is there, he 
acknowledged, and we shouldn't fool ourselves about this. 
The concept of "technical talks" was clearly something of a 
misnomer.  Tzionis himself was representing President 
Papadopoulos and Pertev was there as Talat's representative. 
They were not technicians and the talks themselves were 
inherently political.  "Technical talks" really meant simply 
dialogue below the level of leaders.  Indeed, on April 10, 
Moeller noted that, instead of discussing "technical 
committees" or "day-to-day issues," he preferred the process 
to be phrased in terms of "issues that the parties have 
determined should be handled at the technical level."  The 
Greek Cypriot side was ready, however, to go ahead with a 
Papadopoulos-Talat meeting in the context of the Committee on 
Missing Persons (CMP).  This was an opportunity to be 
practical, and the leaders could showcase their commitment to 
progress on this important humanitarian concern and perhaps 
agree on a joint call for international funding.  Since the 
Turkish Cypriot side as of April 10 had not agreed to the 
appointment of the CMP's third member, Moeller judges that 
the meeting of the Leaders likely will not happen before 
early June. 
 
¶8.  (C) Tzionis stressed that as far as the Greek Cypriot 
side was concerned, the technical talks process needed to do 
more than simply produce "movement."  The talks should be 
focused on getting to "yes" on a settlement.  Otherwise, 
there was a real risk of Turkey simply using the fact of a 
dialogue process as an alibi with the EU for not meeting its 
obligations to Cyprus and the 24 other member states.  "We 
don't want to be hostage to Turkey again," he concluded. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Moeller seems to be underestimating the difficulties 
he will face in moving the technical talks process forward. 
There is still a fundamental disconnect between the two sides 
as to what this process is supposed to be.  We think Moeller 
is absolutely right, however, about the need to play-down our 
collective support for "The Annan Plan" as such and by name 
(ref B).  The "A-word" is a red flag to the bull for the 
Greek Cypriot side.  Moreover, our repeated public 
endorsements of a plan that only encourages the Turkish 
Cypriot side to resist the concept of negotiating meaningful 
changes, which in turn Papadopoulos used as a justification 
to avoid serious engagement.  We would also endorse Moeller's 
request that we weigh-in with the Turkish mission in New York 
to underscore our support -- and the support of the P-5 more 
broadly -- for both the SRSG and the technical talks process. 
 For the time being, this is the only game in town and it is 
important that the parties demonstrate that they can engage 
and succeed. 
SCHLICHER