VZCZCXRO1912
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0503/01 0941458
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041458Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5808
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0510

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU EUN UN CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOTS UNDERWHELMED BY FIRST UN-BROKERED 
"TECHNICAL" MEETING 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 454 
 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 352 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) The Turkish Cypriots were "disappointed" by the first 
UN-brokered meeting to discuss the way ahead on technical 
talks, according to "President" Talat's Under Secretary Rasit 
Pertev.  Held in Nicosia on March 31, the meeting brought 
together UNFICYP Chief and SRSG Michael Moeller, ROC 
Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos Tzionis, and Pertev. 
The three representatives agreed to meet again "as soon as 
this week," Pertev told us -- but had promised not to discuss 
the March 31 meeting with outside parties. 
 
¶2. (C) Talat's Private Secretary Asim Akansoy (please 
protect) gave us a more extensive "off the record" debrief, 
however, reading from what looked like Pertev's report to 
Talat.  According to Akansoy, the Turkish Cypriots used the 
meeting (as well as a March 27 conversation between Talat and 
Moeller -- ref A) to underscore their position that 
working-level talks on the pre-agreed list of ten "technical" 
topics could begin at any time (ref B).  But the Turkish 
Cypriots would not discuss "substantive" matters related to a 
final settlement deal unless the Greek Cypriots presented a 
clear and prioritized list of changes they sought in the 
Annan Plan, "as the UN and others have been demanding since 
2004." 
 
¶3. (C) Tzionis, however, reportedly insisted on "bottom-up" 
negotiations that must/must include "other matters with 
political implications" (such as a population count, the 
development of Greek Cypriot property in the north, and other 
unspecified economic issues).  Otherwise, according to 
Akansoy, the Greek Cypriots would refuse to engage even in 
technical talks.  When Pertev pushed back on this point, 
Tzionis reportedly reiterated that the Annan Plan was "not on 
the table" and that the Greek Cypriots would therefore not 
propose any amendments, prioritized or otherwise.  Instead, 
according to Akansoy, Tzionis had said the parties should 
dust off the 1977 "High Level Agreement" as a point of 
departure for negotiations.  An incredulous Akansoy commented 
that this was ridiculous -- the main elements of the 1977 
agreement (that a solution should be based on a bizonal, 
bicommunal federation) had been accepted by both sides for 
decades, while the text of the accord was "too vague on too 
many issues" to serve as a realistic settlement blueprint. 
 
¶4. (C) According to Akansoy, the March 31 meeting broke up 
without any agreement on whether to include "political" 
issues in the talks -- and therefore without any progress on 
the agenda or shape of technical discussions.  He reiterated 
Talat's "firm position" that there would be no discussion of 
any subject beyond the ten agreed technical points until and 
unless the Greek Cypriots presented their list of changes to 
the Annan Plan.  Given Tzionis's apparent unwillingness to do 
so, Akansoy noted that Talat was pessimistic that the next 
meeting would accomplish much. 
 
¶5. (C) Although he avoided describing the March 31 meeting in 
detail, Pertev nonetheless echoed Akansoy's general pessimism 
about the prospects for these talks.  He implored the United 
States, specifically, to "give a strong message to Moeller" 
that the technical talks must go ahead and that the UN should 
not allow Papadopoulos to hold these talks "hostage" to 
progress on a deadlocked political track.  At the same time, 
he asked us to reinforce the message that the Turkish 
Cypriots would not consent to discuss substance until they 
had the list of Greek Cypriot changes to the Annan Plan.  "As 
long as Papadopoulos is unwilling to do this," Pertev 
contended, "it is clear he is not serious about real 
negotiations." 
 
¶6. (C) After giving us his readout, Akansoy went on to 
describe the Turkish Cypriots' "continued worries" about SRSG 
Moeller's suitability as a mediator, calling into question 
his grasp of the complexities of the Cyprus problem.  Using a 
Turkish proverb, he compared the enthusiastic Moeller to a 
child who has bitten off more than he can chew, dirtying his 
face and choking on his food in the process.  For example, 
Moeller supposedly told Talat on two occasions that the Greek 
Cypriots "had already given" their desired changes to the 
Annan Plan -- insisting that "he had seen somewhere" a much 
more specific list than the vague "areas of concern" given by 
Tzionis to U/SYG Prendergast in 2005.  "This is clearly not 
true," Akansoy said, pointing to Tzionis's unwillingness to 
discuss the Annan Plan on March 31.  "What's he talking 
about?" Akansoy asked rhetorically.  The Turkish Cypriots had 
repeatedly asked Moeller to share the purported list of 
changes, he continued, but to no avail. 
 
 
NICOSIA 00000503  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (C) Akansoy also repeated the Turkish Cypriot suspicion 
that Moeller was not an honest broker.  As an example, he 
noted the claim by GOC Spokesman Lilikas that Papadopoulos 
and Talat had agreed to meet to discuss the work of the 
Committee on Missing Persons (CMP).  This was not true, 
Akansoy stressed.  Pointing out that Talat was willing to see 
Papadopoulos "in the context of" the CMP (perhaps at a future 
reception to honor the appointment of the UN's third member), 
he had "definitely not agreed" to discuss the substance of 
the Committee's work with the Greek Cypriot leader.  The CMP, 
Akansoy said, was the "one thing on this island working well" 
so there was "nothing to discuss."  According to Akansoy, 
Moeller had agreed to issue a press release clarifying what 
Talat had actually agreed, but had later "backed down under 
Greek Cypriot pressure." 
 
¶8. (C) Pertev recounted essentially the same story, adding 
that any meeting between the two leaders in the context of 
the CMP would be a "frosty photo op" devoid of substance. 
Pertev added that the Turkish Cypriot side would probably, 
however, give its consent to the UN's candidate for the third 
member slot on the CMP "in a couple of days." 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT: Ambassador Schlicher will see SRSG Moeller on 
April 6 -- and we are also seeking readouts from Greek 
Cypriot sources -- to triangulate a more complete picture of 
what happened on March 31 and get a sense of where the 
process will go from here.  Even considering the 
one-sidedness of the Turkish Cypriot readout, it seems clear 
that the parties are still far from agreement on even the 
most basic procedural issues.  For their part, the Greek 
Cypriots are still enjoying the sense that they continue to 
have momentum created by the February 28 Paris meeting, and 
by bumbling Turkish Cypriot reactions thereto.  The Turkish 
Cypriots would do well to find ways to avoid letting 
Papadopoulos paint them into the naysayer's corner.  The UN 
definitely has its work cut out for it.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER