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Viewing cable 06NEWDELHI2655, A/USTR HARTWICK DISCUSSES WAY FORWARD ON CSLA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NEWDELHI2655 2006-04-20 10:36 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy New Delhi
VZCZCXRO8877
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHNE #2655/01 1101036
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201036Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2744
INFO RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 5467
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2718
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7759
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 4774
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 4807
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3120
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1533
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7913
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9431
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 2403
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 3249
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 3138
RUEANAT/NASA HQS WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2500
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0255
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002655 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR AMBASSADOR HARTWICK, ALSO FOR 
OES/SAT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ETRD KSTC ETTC KSPA KNNP IN
SUBJECT: A/USTR HARTWICK DISCUSSES WAY FORWARD ON CSLA 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 1220 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: Awsistant US Trade Representative Doug 
Hartwick heard Indian objections to the draft Commercial 
Space Launch Agreement (CSLA) and explained USG reasoning 
behind the draft in a meeting with MEA and Indian Space 
Research Organization (ISRO) interlocutors on April 18. 
Ambassador Hartwick noted that the market oriented US draft 
CSLA was much more forward-looking and non-proscriptive than 
the Russia/Ukraine type of CSLA originally envisaged as part 
of NSSP.  The GOI requested USG consideration of an interim 
agreement to allow immediate launch of third party satellites 
containing US components, with negotiations to conclude a 
broader CSLA to follow, and underline that this would 
facilitate further progress and help to preserve a positive 
atmosphere around our revived space relationship.  Ambassador 
Hartwick agreed to consider Indian suggestion but urged 
Indian side to re-examine U.S. draft in light of these 
discussions.  End Summary. 
 
INDIAN OBJECTIONS TO CSLA 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishankar 
started the discussion by outlining two Indian concerns about 
the CSLA.  First, India does not understand the need for a 
CSLA, as the Technical Safeguards Agreement (TSA) should 
resolve any security concerns related to space launch. 
Second, the US has launch arrangements without agreements 
with other countries including Japan and the EU, and India 
believes that it should be treated as those countries.  He 
also questioned why commercial satellite services should be 
linked to the space launch provisions, as satellite services 
were not specified as part of the Next Steps in Strategic 
Partnership (NSSP) plan. 
 
US IS TREATING INDIA BETTER THAN IT DID OTHER COUNTRIES 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Ambassador Hartwick explained that while the NSSP 
originally prescribed a CSLA along the lines of the 
agreements negotiated with Russia or Ukraine, USTR's January 
2006 draft was much simpler and clearer: rather than an 
"intrusive" text detailing authorized numbers, charges, and 
types of launches, the current proposal would simply agree on 
market principles, creating a favorable climate for trade and 
investment in space launch.  However, because India's space 
sector consists only of a single parastatal organization, 
some sort of market oriented agreement would be necessary as 
specified by the NSSP.  If India preferred to stick to the 
letter of NSSP, USTR would be prepared to negotiate a 
prescriptive text such as the agreements worked out with 
Russia and Ukraine, Ambassador Hartwick offered, but USTR 
believes that the growing positive US-India space 
relationship would be better served with a simpler agreement. 
 
4.  (SBU) In response to GOI concerns that satellite services 
were not part of the original scope for launch agreements, 
Ambassador Hartwick explained USTR's responsibility to 
encourage trade broadly, and noted that while US space launch 
companies with heavier load capability would not compete 
directly with ISRO or ISRO's commercial spinoff Antrix for 
launch services, other US satellite services firms would like 
to enter India's satellite services market, which is largely 
closed to foreign service providers and controlled by ISRO. 
The USG would like to use this CSLA to point the direction 
for a new, collaborative relationship between the US and 
 
NEW DELHI 00002655  002 OF 003 
 
 
India in space which would grow the satellite use market, 
Ambassador Hartwick concluded.  As this relationship matured 
and as confidence grew, a CSLA might become redundant, 
perhaps as soon as three of four years from now. 
 
GOI: MOVE AHEAD ON SATELLITES WITH US COMPONENTS? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5.  (SBU) ISRO Scientific Secretary V Sunderamaiah and Antrix 
Executive Director Sridhara Murthi pointed out that India's 
immediate concern was to allow Indian launches of foreign 
satellites containing US components.  One objective of NSSP 
from ISRO's standpoint was to make this possible, 
Sunderamaiah claimed, and ISRO was concerned by proposals 
that a satisfactory CSLA could take one to two years of 
discussions.  Even though it had agreed to the TSA, India had 
already recently lost launch contracts because the payloads 
contained US components.  He proposed reaching quickly some 
sort of interim understanding that would allow only the 
launch of third party satellites with US components, pending 
completion of a full CSLA agreement.  Murthi emphasized that 
commercial opportunities would accrue to US electronic 
component manufacturers through a quick agreement.  He 
pointed out that Anthrix had spent two years trying to work 
out a viable deal to jointly market a satellite bus with 
Boeing, but was stymied by US export and launch restrictions. 
 Anthrix later decided to work with a European satellite 
builder instead and has already made two sales, he reported. 
 
LOOKING FOR A WAY TO MOVE FORWARD 
--------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) After Deputy Scientific Secretary Rajiv Lochan 
objected that US commercial interests should not become a new 
factor in CSLA discussions two years after the NSSP process 
was put in motion, Ambassador Hartwick assured the GOI 
interlocutors that while he understood that ISRO would prefer 
to move ahead on space launches without any agreement, the 
NSSP and the nature of India's state-run space sector 
required some agreement to start off and ensure a fair 
commercial playing field.  He welcomed further Indian 
proposals for a workable CSLA, and promised to consider the 
ISRO suggestions with the goal of blending the two sides' 
positions to create a forward-looking document to enable 
useful commercial space cooperation.  Eventually, he 
reiterated, the relationship may stabilize to the point where 
the CSLA would no longer be required. 
 
7.  (SBU) Jaishankar welcomed Ambassador Hartwick's 
presentation of USTR's perspective, but noted he intended to 
raise again with State Department interlocutors New Delhi's 
judgment that satellite services were beyond the scope of 
NSSP and we had shifted the goal posts.  He requested 
Ambassador Hartwick to prepare a response to the GOI concerns 
raised in the meeting in time for Jaishankar's planned May 
8-9 visit to Washington.  Jaishankar also noted that with the 
anticipated May 8-11 visit of NASA Administrator Griffin, the 
Indian press would likely ask the status of progress on 
commercial space launch.  From a "political management" 
perspective, it was important to show some progress, and at a 
minimum avoid any appearance of a reversal in the process, he 
emphasized.  He proposed that an agreement to allow Indian 
launch of third party satellites with US components would 
demonstrate interim progress while the full CSLA was being 
finalized.  Ambassador Hartwick agreed to consider 
Jaishankar's suggestions, but noted that the press should be 
told we were pursuing active discussions to reach a 
 
NEW DELHI 00002655  003 OF 003 
 
 
satisfactory agreement.  He cautioned that it was more 
important to work out a good CSLA than to meet an 
artificially imposed deadline to show progress. 
 
COMMENT: LOOKS MORE FEASIBLE NOW 
-------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Ambassador Hartwick's interaction with ISRO gave a 
much-needed push to break the logjam that had stalled any 
forward progress on the CSLA (reftel).  Having begun the 
process of narrowing our respective starting points, we 
anticipate we will be able to resume discussions in the 
coming weeks with a much better (if still uncertain) prospect 
for reaching speedy agreement. 
 
Participants 
------------ 
 
9.  (U) US participants were: 
 
-- Ambassador Hartwick 
-- Geoff Pyatt, PolCouns 
-- Jai Nair, Poloff (notetaker) 
 
10.  (U) Indian participants were: 
 
-- V. Sunderamaiah, Scientific Secretary, ISRO 
-- S. Jaishankar, Joint Secretary (Americas), MEA 
-- Ashutosh Jindal, Joint Secretary (Foreign Trade), MEA 
-- Rajeev Lochan, Deputy Scientific Secretary, ISRO 
-- Jacob Ninan, Head of International Affairs, ISRO 
-- Santosh Jha, Deputy Secretary (Americas), MEA 
-- Jayant Khobargade, Under Secretary (Disarmament and 
International Security Affairs), MEA 
-- K. R. Sridhara Murthi, Executive Director, Antrix 
Corporation Limited, Department of Space 
-- Viraj Singh, Under Secretary (Americas), MEA (notetaker) 
 
11.  (U) Ambassador Hartwick has cleared this message. 
 
12.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
BLAKE