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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 NAHA 000103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/26/2031 
TAGS: MARR PINS JA CH TW
SUBJECT: OKINAWAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE CHINA THREAT OR LACK THEREOF 
 
REF: A. A.  TOKYO 1301 
     ¶B. B.  TOKYO 1153 
     ¶C. C.  EMBASSY TOKYO TRANSLATION OF FEBRUARY 24 SANKEI SHIMBUN ARTICLE. 
     ¶D. D.  FUKUOKA 17 
     ¶E. E.  NAGOYA 11 
     ¶F. F.  TOKYO 822 
 
NAHA 00000103  001.2 OF 008 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas G. Reich, Consul General, Consulate 
General Naha, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.     (C) Summary: Despite China's rapidly expanding economic 
and military activities, including in waters near Okinawa, 
Okinawans claim they do not share America's or Japan's sense of 
threat from China.  While many mainland Japanese officials and 
influentials say they recognize China as a potential threat to 
regional security and stability, even most conservative 
Okinawans do not believe a Chinese threat to Japan (or 
elsewhere) necessarily means a threat to Okinawa.  Many 
Okinawans identify with China culturally and believe China sees 
them as a separate people from the Japanese.  Some also say 
Okinawa, over the centuries, has received better treatment from 
China than from Japan or the United States.  These attitudes 
combine to produce an Okinawan perspective that is markedly 
different from that of mainland Japan, and which is a factor in 
local attitudes toward U.S. military bases in Okinawa.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------ 
China Rising 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) In recent years, China's economic expansion and growing 
military capabilities have attracted a great deal of attention 
in Japan, although somewhat less in Okinawa.  The two leading 
Okinawan newspapers generally appear reluctant to feature 
articles about the potential negative impacts on regional 
security associated with China's rise, mostly because the 
newspapers fear this line of thought will serve as an implicit 
justification for the continued existence of U.S. military bases 
on the island. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Nevertheless, Okinawans who make the effort to read 
mainland Japanese newspapers can find ample coverage of Japan's 
concerns.  Some widely reported Chinese activities have a very 
direct connection to Okinawa.  For example, Japan, China and 
Taiwan have competing claims to an island chain 250 miles west 
of Okinawa, known as the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China. 
The governments of Japan and China have disputed the islands' 
sovereignty for years and more recently have both made moves to 
develop undersea resources near them (see, e.g., refs. A, B). 
The media have reported China has erected drilling platforms in 
the disputed territory. 
 
¶4. (SBU) China has also stepped up military air and sea 
activities in the area, prompting Japanese Self Defense Forces 
to respond.  According to national broadcaster NHK, Japan Air 
Self Defense Forces scrambled to intercept Chinese military 
aircraft above or near the East China Sea 30 times between April 
and September 2005, more than twice as often as they did in all 
of 2004.  Chinese maritime activity also occasionally makes the 
news.  The November 2004 Chinese submarine incursion into 
Japanese waters within Okinawa Prefecture drew a rare Chinese 
apology for a ""technical error.""  The mainland Japanese media 
have suggested this was not the only Chinese submarine intrusion 
near Okinawa. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------------ 
Different Perspectives of ""Mainland"" Japanese and Okinawans 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) In mainland Japan, concern over China's military buildup 
is frequently aired.  For example, in January the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) General Affairs Chairman Akio Kuma noted 
that if China chose to swallow up Taiwan, it would be easy 
enough for it to swallow up Okinawa, too, in the absence of U.S. 
forces.  In February the opposition Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) issued a statement that it was ""inevitable that China's 
military buildup and its moves to line up marine interests from 
the viewpoint of the Japanese people are recognized as an actual 
threat to Japan"" (ref. C). 
 
¶6. (U) Typical of many Japanese academics' views was a February 
9 article by (Japan's) National Defense University Professor 
Tomohide Murai stating that the most efficient way for the 
United States to project power throughout the world was to link 
with regional partners, and that Japan, by its very location, 
was a key partner in the Pacific.  Murai noted the Chinese 
recognized the strategic importance of Okinawa, calling it (as 
does the United States) the ""keystone of the Pacific."" 
 
¶7. (SBU) In Okinawa, however, many - probably most -residents 
have a substantially different assessment of China.  In general, 
Okinawans perceive little potential threat from China; many 
people here note China and the Ryukyu Kingdom had peaceful 
relations for centuries prior to the 19th Century Meiji 
Restoration in Japan.  To be sure, there are Okinawans who are 
as concerned about China's destabilizing possibilities as are 
many mainlanders, but this is not the prevailing view on the 
island. 

¶8. (C) As vignettes of Okinawa's relaxed attitude toward China, 
we note the following conversations.  During a September 2005 
office call, reformist Ginowan City Mayor Yoichi Iha told us he 
believed China posed no threat to Okinawa.  In October 2005 Kin 
Town Mayor Gibu underscored his support for the U.S.-Japan 
alliance but complained the GOJ had never explained what threat, 
exactly, the alliance deterred.  In March, former Socialist 
Party Diet Member and candidate for Okinawa City mayor Mitsuko 
Tomon made the same complaint. 
 
¶9.  (C) We asked why a look at a map of the region surrounding 
Okinawa and current stories regarding China's expansion didn't 
provide Okinawans enough information for them to judge for 
themselves.  Tomon replied the GOJ and USG were like the boy who 
cried wolf, pointing to China and claiming that something awful 
might happen, but nothing ever did.  Okinawans were undisturbed, 
Tomon claimed, by Chinese incursions.  Chinese fishing boats 
crossing the sea boundary did not affect Okinawan fisheries as 
Okinawans worked only in its inner seas.  In a separate 
conversation, he Okinawan Federation of Fisheries echoed Tomon's 
claim, but added that their members avoided the Senkakus because 
they were ""politically difficult.""  The Chinese might be 
drilling near the Senkakus, and claim the Senkakus for 
themselves, Tomon noted, but these were essentially peaceful 
activities for the GOJ to settle.  Because of Okinawa's history 
as the Ryukyu Kingdom, it had a very different view of China 
than did the Japanese mainland.  Historically speaking, Tomon 
commented, Japan and the United States had been more harmful to 
Okinawa than China had ever been. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
A Ryukyuan History Primer 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) By entering into close trading relationships with both 
China and Japan in the 14th and 15th centuries, the Ryukyu 
Kingdom enjoyed a lengthy period of prosperity in the years 
before 1609.  As George Kerr notes in his book Okinawa: The 
History of an Island People, ""the islands were independent. 
They were in constant communication and at peace with 
neighboring states.  Okinawans were in the happy position of 
freedom to adopt what they wanted, and to remain indifferent - 
or at best mildly curious - about foreign artifacts and 
institutions for which they felt no pressing need.  China loomed 
as the neighbor of unquestioned superiority, and Okinawans were 
in close and constant communication with Japan, but were 
overwhelmed by neither.""  Many Okinawans today regard this 
period as the Golden Age of their history, and view it as a 
basis for their belief that China sees Okinawa a place entirely 
separate from Japan. 

¶11. (U) The Golden Age ended in 1609, when the southernmost clan 
in mainland Japan (the Satsumas of southern Kyushu) sent an army 
to assert control over Okinawa and extracted increasingly 
burdensome tributes.  The Satsumas then took over the lucrative 
trade with China through Okinawa, continuing it despite the 
Tokugawa Shogunate's closed country (sakoku) policy. 
 
¶12. (U) After Commodore Perry and his black ships helped trigger 
the Meiji Restoration, Japan began vigorously securing and 
expanding its borders.  In 1872 Japan formally abolished the 
Ryukyu Kingdom and annexed Okinawa, over Chinese protests. 
Okinawa pleaded with China and the United States to intervene. 
Four-party discussions dragged on for decades until the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, which settled the issue in Japan's 
favor as far as the western powers were concerned. 
 
¶13. (U) Japan instituted a top-down assimilation program for 
Okinawa that gained momentum when met by a bottom-up 
assimilation movement following Japan's success in the 
Sino-Japanese War.  Practical-minded Okinawans became convinced 
they would benefit from closer identification with Japan.  Early 
editorials of the Ryukyu Shimpo, dating as far back as 1893, 
asserted that Okinawa could develop only by fully assimilating 
with Japan. 
 
¶14. (U) Over the following 50 years, many Okinawans saw military 
service, including during the battle for Okinawa, as a chance to 
prove they were true Japanese.  However, the battle, which 
killed perhaps a third of the Okinawan population, came as a 
shock to most of the survivors, who experienced or heard stories 
of atrocities against Okinawans by Japanese troops.  In the 
years after the war, a home-grown historical interpretation of 
the battle took solid root in Okinawa, which holds that Tokyo 
had always intended to sacrifice Okinawa in a battle designed to 
consume as many U.S. forces as possible, to stall and weaken an 
eventual attack on the mainland. 
 
¶15. (U) The United States directly governed Okinawa through a 
military high commissioner from 1945 to 1972, 20 years longer 
than the rest of Japan.  During this period, U.S. forces 
forcibly seized land for bases.  By the early 1960s, a movement 
advocating reversion to Japan began among Okinawans, leading to 
large-scale demonstrations against the U.S. administration in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Okinawa reverted to Japan May 
15, 1972. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The reunion was a victory for all Okinawans (though 
many were dismayed at the remaining numbers of U.S. facilities 
and forces), and anti-U.S. protests were dramatically reduced 
following reversion.  With reversion, the GOJ sharply increased 
infrastructure development, and the general standard of living 
greatly improved.  However, in the years since 1972, many 
Okinawans have called for lessening the island's economic 
dependence on GOJ transfer payments.  Okinawa remains the 
poorest prefecture in Japan, with the highest unemployment rate 
in Japan, and many argue that Okinawa needs to become more 
economically independent. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------------- 
Okinawan Analysis: Split Identity, Affinity with China 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The above history still shapes Okinawans' world views, 
including their sense of identity.  In December 2005 the 
University of the Ryukyus announced the results of a telephone 
survey of Okinawans, in which 40% of respondents, when asked how 
they identified themselves, said they were Okinawan.  A smaller 
percentage said they were both Okinawan and Japanese (36%), and 
just over one in five identified themselves as Japanese (21%). 
 
¶18. (SBU) This history also shapes how Okinawans view the GOJ 
and actions that are presented in the world press as 
provocations to China, most notably visits by the Prime Minister 
to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine.  While many mainland Japanese are 
reportedly uncomfortable with the visits, if push comes to shove 
between China and Japan, opinion polls show that most side with 
Japan's right to do as it pleases.  We believe most Okinawans 
side with China.  Typical of this attitude is Masaru Yamada, 
treasurer of Okinawa City, who recently criticized Koizumi's 
visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He told us he doubted China would 
ever accept Koizumi's explanations of the visits, any more than 
he himself did.  Okinawans and Chinese held similar views of the 
visits, he explained, because they shared the experience of 
having been ""prisoners of war"" of the Japanese. 
 
¶19.  (U) Local newspaper editorials have also pointed to the 
Yasukuni visits as unnecessary barriers to bilateral and 
regional cooperation that the GOJ could, and should, remove. 
Although an exaggeration, a recent Ryukyu Shimpo article 
reporting on the study of Okinawan identity concluded with a 
warning that GOJ policies, particularly as they related to bases 
and transformation, could influence Okinawans' opinions on 
whether to remain part of Japan. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Many Okinawans believe that China sees them 
differently, and more warmly, than it sees the rest of Japan. 
They point out that Taipei International Airport, when posting 
place names in Chinese characters, lists flights to/from 
""Ryukyu,"" not Okinawa.  A May 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo report claimed 
that, because of Okinawa's history, it could become an 
intermediary peacefully linking China and Taiwan.  By offering 
an independent, international contribution, Okinawa could 
renounce its title of ""(strategic) keystone of the Pacific"" and 
become a ""keystone of goodwill.""  A June 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo 
opinion piece contrasted the hospitality the Chinese granted 
Okinawa Governor Inamine and his party when they visited Beijing 
with Beijing's snubbing of PM Koizumi.  ""The extreme attention 
provided Okinawa, with its deep historical connection to China, 
was conspicuous in its contrast.  To look at it the other way 
around, it was an intense dig at the GOJ,"" commented the Shimpo. 
 
¶21.  (SBU)  Chinese Ambassador to Japan Ki Ou (phonetic from 
Japanese pronunciation) visited Okinawa April 24, on a trip 
sponsored by the OPG, Okinawa Economic Association, and Okinawa 
Visitors and Convention Bureau.  Ou masterfully played to 
Okinawans' sense of exceptionalism and desire for a new golden 
era of lucrative Sino-Okinawan relations.  Ou cited the 
historical and cultural links between China and the Ryukyus and 
said he immediately felt comfortable on this first visit to 
Okinawa.  Over the past 25 years China's economic expansion had 
far outpaced its military expansion, Ou claimed, and its defense 
capabilities were reasonable for a country of China's area and 
population.  China alone, of the five original nuclear powers, 
had offered to eliminate all nuclear weapons if the others would 
only agree to do the same.  Okinawa and China should again 
travel together the path of peaceful development, Ou stressed, 
and tens of thousands of Chinese tourists annually were sure to 
follow. 
 
----------- 
Caveats 
----------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Okinawa's exceptionalism is not based entirely on 
history and feeling; it is used to practical effect.  Okinawans 
claiming to feel no threat from China often use this to bolster 
arguments that bases should be eliminated from Okinawa.  For 
example, when asked specifically about Chinese military 
activities near Okinawa, such as the November 2004 submarine 
incursion, former Diet member Tomon grudgingly admitted that the 
incident was regrettable.  She hastened to add, however, that it 
alone did not justify the concentration of U.S. forces and 
facilities in Okinawa. 
 
¶23. (SBU) The claim of exceptionalism is useful even for 
conservatives who support the alliance and those who profit from 
our base presence.  Conservative Okinawans could be seen as 
playing good cop to reformists' bad cop, in order to squeeze the 
maximum concessions from the GOJ and USG. A number of Okinawan 
leaders probably assert this exceptionalism because they believe 
it useful in leveraging concessions from the USG and GOJ in 
return for Okinawan shouldering the burden of U.S. military 
bases. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Economic self-interest also helps explain Okinawa's 
keenness to engage China.  In this, Okinawan governments and 
businesses have motives similar to those of other provinces now 
scrambling to find new sources of income as Koizumi's reforms 
reduce the outward flow of GOJ largess.  The former Secretary 
General of the LDP in Okinawa, Kenjiro Nishida, told us his main 
motivation for founding the Okinawa-China Friendship Exchange 
Association was to boost the number of Chinese tourists to 
Okinawa.  He noted his Chinese counterparts met him more than 
halfway, being well funded by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 ConGen Fukuoka and Consulate Nagoya have identified identical 
local motives to engage China, as well as signs of China's 
welcoming this engagement (Refs. F, G).  The Chinese leadership 
may remember Sun Tzu's maxim, ""when he is united, divide him."" 
Regardless of how cool relations are between Tokyo and Beijing, 
there is no evidence this has had an effect on Okinawa's ties 
with China. 
 
¶25. (SBU) That being said, Okinawan businesspeople whose 
interests directly conflict with China are not as relaxed about 
Chinese expansion.  Local developer Tadashi Zayasu told us he 
owned part of an interest in a drilling application in the East 
China Sea near the Senkaku Islands.  Zayasu said the GOJ had 
approved a drilling application filed by the partnership, d.b.a. 
Teikoku Oil.  The application was filed in 1970, but the GOJ did 
not approve it until July 2005.  Zayasu mused that the GOJ 
seemed bent on helping the Chinese at the expense of Okinawans. 
Why else, he asked, would the GOJ have funded a Chinese pipeline 
to support their exploitation of the fields while sitting on a 
Japanese company's application for over thirty years? 
 
------------------------------- 
Comment/Conclusion 
------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (SBU) The above caveats notwithstanding, Okinawa's sense of 
affinity with China and feeling of distance from Japanese 
interests give this place a unique perspective on Sino-Japanese 
relations, and it shapes the local environment for U.S. military 
bases.  Due in part to this, many Okinawans are unconvinced that 
our bases in Okinawa are needed to defend Japan -- or at least 
not to defend Okinawa.  Some in the GOJ leadership may value the 
domestic political benefits of appealing to Japanese nationalism 
over the benefits of improved Sino-Japanese relations (ref. F). 
The Yasukuni visits, and Chinese reactions to them, are having 
the opposite effect on attitudes in Okinawa.  Such acts 
strengthen the sense in Okinawa that the LDP leadership, and the 
GOJ more broadly, ignore the victims of militarism.  Okinawans' 
cultural identification with China, combined with a sense of 
serial betrayal by the GOJ, fuels local suspicion of GOJ motives 
on current political-military issues. 
REICH