This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000503

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, NEA/ARPI
THE HAGUE PASS TO AMSTERDAM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR KNNP OTRA IR MU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S ROBERT JOSEPH¥S VISIT TO MUSCAT

REF: STATE 51999

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo.

Reason: 1.4 (b, d).

¶1. (C) Embassy Muscat warmly welcomes you to Oman. We are seeking high-level meetings with senior Omani foreign policy and security personnel with key roles on Iran policy, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and nonproliferation concerns. Your visit comes at a key moment in Oman's efforts to win Congressional ratification of our historic Free Trade Agreement, signed this past January. Our long-standing defense relations remain excellent. The Sultanate was the first Arab state in the region to sign a base access agreement with the U.S. back in 1980. It has been a critical partner in the GWOT, and in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Oman has so far received the first three of its 12 purchased F-16 Block 50 aircraft, with the remainder due to arrive over the next year. U.S. investment in Oman's energy and industrial sector has exceeded $5 billion over the past two years of booming Omani economic growth.

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Proliferation Security Initiative

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¶2. (S) Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi informed then-Ambassador Baltimore on February 27, 2005, that Oman "agrees 100 percent" with the principles and voluntary arrangements embodied in PSI. In typical Omani fashion, however, the Minister was adamant that Oman would not declare its support for PSI principles publicly. Also in February 2005, Oman participated in a PSI-related flight interdiction exercise with U.S., UK and French forces as part of wider military exercises. This marked the first (and thus far only) PSI activity involving Omani military forces.

¶3. (S) Oman's cooperation with PSI was tested in a real scenario in April 2005 when a German-produced crane of dual-use concern was inadvertently loaded on a Norwegian freighter for Iran. As the vessel was due to transit an Omani port prior to arrival in Iran, Germany and Norway sought Oman's help in halting the cargo. The effort was aborted, however, when Germany and Norway could not come to agreement on how to indemnify the parties for any action taken. The Omani Foreign Ministry was resentful at having been asked by Germany and Norway to take action against the vessel and its cargo that the German and Norwegian governments had been unwilling to do themselves. How to address economic and legal consequences of halting commercial cargoes of potential proliferation concern under the PSI or other system remains unresolved.

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Iran

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¶4. (C) As international tensions over Iran's nuclear program have risen in the past year, Oman's diplomatic engagement with Tehran has likewise intensified. Oman has received Iranian ministerial, security and trade delegations, and responded with those of its own. FM Yusuf bin Alawi and the Sultan's special Iran envoy, former Information Minister Abdul Aziz al-Rawas, are Muscat's principle policy interlocutors with Tehran, though military and security personnel have a long-standing dialogue on maintaining maritime security and cooperation in the Strait of Hormuz and littoral waters. The Sultanate, just 35 miles from Iran at the nearest point, believes that engagement with Tehran is the way of tempering its unpredictable foreign policy and folding it into the international community and treaty regimes. The Sultanate also seeks to reinforce economic and trade bonds with its northern neighbor, including studies to purchase or even jointly develop Iranian natural gas. Oman opened a trade mission in Bandar Abbas in 2004, and has invited Iran to reciprocate. Oman enjoys a $500 million trade surplus with Iran, fed mainly be re-exports from Oman's Musandam Peninsula. Iran often complains that "smuggler" boats are avoiding Iranian customs duties, while Oman complains of Iranian boat captains who transport to Omani shores economic migrants from Pakistan and Afghanistan (who mainly seek jobs in the UAE).

¶5. (C) The Omanis have no illusions about the erratic and provocative President Ahmadinejad, but retain hope that those they consider to be more sober-minded -- such as veterans like former president Rafsanjani, perhaps in league with Ayatollah Khamenei -- may succeed in reining him in. Oman has suggested direct dialogue between the U.S. and Iran, and will be keen to hear reiterations of USG policy on pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the current nuclear impasse. A confrontational approach, Oman believes, will solidify political support for Iranian hard-line policies and diminish young Iranian liberals' admiration for Western examples. (Note: Yours will be the first visit by a senior Department official since the start of the Secretary's initiative to open a strategic dialogue with our GCC allies on Iran. End note.)

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CWC Host Country Agreement

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¶6. (C) Efforts five years ago to cement a Host Country Agreement with Oman under the Chemical Weapons Convention foundered when the Foreign Ministry failed to win Ministry of Defense support or even interest in the agreement. When the agreement was brought up again to MFA in 2005, FM Bin Alawi suggested a number of amendments in text and format, to many of which the USG readily agreed. Having won MFA's support, the agreement text is once again with MOD, which controls virtually all of the installations housing USG equipment that might be of CWC demand inspection interest. While MFA fully understands the confidentiality of CWC HCAs, they frequently inquire as to the status of HCA negotiations with other GCC and Arab states.

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Export Control and Border Security

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¶7. (C) A number of USG agencies actively cooperate with Omani authorities to improve its control of land and maritime borders, as well as export and nonproliferation controls. Lying outside the Strait of Hormuz and its higher insurance fees, Oman's leading ports (Salalah for containers, Muscat for general commerce, and soon Sohar for industry and bulk commodities) are rapidly growing in interest to international shippers and witnessing tremendous expansion. At the same time, with a coastline greater than the U.S. West Coast and a population of just 2.4 million, Oman faces tremendous challenges in providing adequate security against human and contraband smuggling (Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan) and possible transit by terrorists.

¶8. (C) To help meet these security needs, Oman and USDH agreed in November 2005 to cooperate in the Container Security Initiative, which has already opened a U.S. Customs-manned facility in Port Salalah to screen certain cargo containers destined for U.S. ports. Under the same agreement, DOE enrolled Oman in the Megaports Initiative, which will place USG-funded radiation detection portals in Oman's main ports (likely by 2007). State DS's ATA program has channeled training and resources, including explosive detection canines and forensics training, to Omani security services to better equip them to handle terrorist incidents. State's Export Control and Border Related Security (EXBS) program has been training Omani customs enforcement and trade regulators on developing a national export control regime, which Oman still lacks. Omani customs agents are eager for practical, hands-on training at detecting WMD and articles of proliferation concern. DOD's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program ($20 million in FY05, $14 million in FY06) concentrates on improving Oman's interdiction capability, including fast boats, radars, communications networks and night vision goggles. The Royal Oman Police (ROP), which includes Oman's customs, immigration, and coast guard services, is a key partner in virtually all of these USG programs.

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New Arrival

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¶9. (U) Having assumed the Chief of Mission mantle in Muscat on March 28 after a five-year hiatus (I previously served here as DCM), I look forward to receiving you and reacquainting myself with senior Omani contacts. I am confident you will find your Omani interlocutors thoughtful, frank, and forthcoming with their assessments of bilateral and regional concerns, and firmly committed to our two countries' strategic partnership.

GRAPPO