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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMOS #0047/01 1101151
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P 201151Z APR 06
FM REO MOSUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0475
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0012
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0069
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0052
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0056
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0494

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: TURKOMAN TRIBAL LEADER ON TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH THE 
KURDS, AND NEW GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN BAGHDAD 
 
MOSUL 00000047  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jerome P. Hohman, IPAO, Provincial Reconstruction 
Team Ninewa, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Sheikh Seyh Beyatli, leader of the Turkoman Beyatli 
tribe, believes Turkey is meddling in Turkoman affairs in Iraq. 
He claims Turkey's main goal is to remove any sort of historical 
allegiances between the Kurds and Turkoman people to keep 
federalism from taking hold in Iraq.  Beyatli claims Turkey 
fears a separate Kurdish-controlled unit in Iraq might entice 
Turkish Kurds to seek a similar end.  While there are tensions 
between the Kurds and Turkoman over "Kurdization" policies in 
Kirkuk where the two groups are in the majority, Beyatli claims 
there are relatively no problems between the two minorities in 
Ninewa.  Beyatli says the impasse over government formation in 
Iraq is the fault of both Prime Minister Ibrahim Al Ja'afari and 
those seeking to end his candidacy.  The most important issue is 
to have a central government to ensure the country's stability 
and security, he says.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) PRT PolOff met with Sheikh Seyh Abdulhamit Ahmet 
Beyatli, leader of the Turkoman Dignitaries and Tribes of Iraq 
(TDTI) party in Mosul on April 13. 
 
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TURKISH INFLUENCE IN IRAQ SPLITTING TURKOMAN 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Begun on February 6, 2004, the Turkoman Dignitaries and 
Tribes of Iraq (TDTI) party claims to be a more independent and 
secular-minded than rival Iraqi Turkoman Front (TF).  Originally 
aligned with TF, Beyatli moved away from that party believing it 
was "too controlled by Turkey," and formed his own independent 
organization, TDTI, which aligned with Ayad Allawi's secular 
coalition for the December 2005 national election.  After the 
fall of the regime Beyatli worked with TF for "one year and two 
months," he claimed, until the relationship soured over what 
Beyatli said was the party's unusually close ties to Turkey.  As 
a tribal representative, Beyatli said he always needed to act in 
the best interests of the Turkoman people.  With TF, on the 
other hand, he did not believe that this was the case.  Turkoman 
Front was receiving funding and direction from Turkey, claimed 
Beyatli, and he did not want to be an "agent for Turkish 
influence."  Turkey was against federalism, especially for the 
Kurds, he said, and so was TF.  He claimed this issue caused a 
split within the Iraqi Turkoman community that had "historically 
aligned" itself with the Kurds, or at least sympathized with 
their plight.  Turkey did not want to see the Kurds get their 
"rights" or the same might happen in Turkey, said Beyatli. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
GOVERNMENT FORMATION FOR STABILITY IN IRAQ 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Beyatli said Iraqis were unhappy with the security 
situation in the country, especially after the bombing of the 
Golden Mosque in Samarra in February.  He claimed former 
Baathists and foreign insurgents were stirring the pot, so to 
speak, of ethnic tension throughout the country.  Beyatli 
accused the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and Iraqi National 
Dialogue Council (INDC), Iraq's two largest Sunni Arab political 
parties, of "covering up" for the activities of terrorists. 
"For decades these guys had the government in their hands," said 
Beyatli, "but now they were causing chaos."  Four months without 
a government was too long to wait, all because Prime Minister 
Ibrahim Al Ja'afari would not step aside and opposition groups 
would not stop insisting Ja'afari do so, he said.  The result 
was a complete breakdown of Iraqi faith in the democratic 
process.  TDTI, on the other hand, although limited in funding 
and support, was pushing both sides to work for the interests of 
Iraqi society, he said.  Beyatli said TDTI outreach included 
convincing the people that it did not matter who sat in the 
leadership position so long as there was a government that could 
provide security and stability. 
 
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KIRKUK AND "KURDIZATION" 
------------------------ 
 
 
MOSUL 00000047  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Beyatli claimed Kirkuk was a "Turkoman city."  Saddam 
Hussein's Arabization policy forced the Turkoman out, but since 
the fall of the regime the Kurds had been reversing the process, 
he said.  As a result, the "topography had changed," claimed 
Beyatli, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was now 
giving money (up to 4,000 dollars) and employment assistance to 
entice Kurds to migrate to Kirkuk.  The Kurds numbered 23 
percent historically, according to Beyatli, but were now around 
35 percent of the population.  The third largest group was the 
Arabs, he said.  Beyatli claimed that Turkoman and Arabs were 
now joining together to fight Kurdization in Kirkuk, but that 
they were having a tough time due to Kurdish control of the 
provincial and city governments, and security forces in the 
area. 
 
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TURKOMAN AND KURD RELATIONS IN NINEWA 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) In Ninewa, however, Turkoman and Kurds did not number 
more than 20 percent of the population, said Beyatli.  And since 
Sunni Arabs made up the majority it could be expected they would 
win most of the seats in any provincial election, he said. 
Between Mosul and Tal Afar, for example, there were 450,000 
Turkoman, 350,000 of which lived in Tal Afar [NOTE: these are 
unusually high estimates.  Although predominantly Turkoman Sunni 
and Shia, Tal Afar's total population numbers far fewer than 
200,000].  Beyatli thanked Coalition Forces (CF) for 
counterinsurgency efforts in Tal Afar last year, but said once 
CF departed terrorists would take control of the city.  He 
blamed outsiders and foreigners for causing problems in Tal 
Afar, believing Turkoman would "never attack one another." 
Beyatli discounted claims of friction between Turkoman and the 
Kurds in Ninewa saying the two groups were minorities and 
therefore had more in common; a very different scenario than 
Kirkuk.  Although he believed the Kurds had tried to occupy Tal 
Afar in 2004, Peshmerga forces were "pushed out" by Turkoman 
residents.  There had been relatively no problems in Ninewa 
between the two groups since, he said. 
 
---------------------- 
BACKGROUND AND COMMENT 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Beyatli was a deputy commander in the Iraqi Army (IA) 
during the former regime.  He served as an independent national 
assemblymember during the former regime.  In 1996 Beyatli served 
in the national assembly as an independent from Ninewa.  In 2000 
he ran again and won.  He was proud of the fact that he was one 
of five independents to win from Ninewa since at the time 
independents competed amongst each other for a small number of 
seats from Ninewa, while Baathists competed on a separate 
ballot.  He claimed he was asked by the CPA to play a role 
during the formation of the country's first provincial council 
in Ninewa in May 2003.  Beyatli aligned with former Prime 
Minister Ayad Allawi's secular list for Ninewa province last 
year, but that his seat was quite low, number 15, and the list 
won only two seats from the provincial ballot.  Although 
uncertain about the Turkoman's future in Iraq, Beyatli remains 
steadfast in his work to move his people away from what he 
claims is "Turkish meddling" in their affairs.  We are uncertain 
how influential he is within the Iraqi Turkoman community, and 
how valid his claims are regarding are regarding Turkish 
influence in the country. 
GRANT