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INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0064
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0047
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0051
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0489

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: SHAMMAR TRIBAL LEADER ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION, 
PROVINCIAL POLITICS AND SECURITY 
 
MOSUL 00000045  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron  Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Western Ninewa Sunni Arab tribal leader Sheikh Abdullah 
Al Yawar believes all ethnic and political groups in Baghdad are 
responsible for failings with the new government formation.  He 
believes the last government's problems were not only the fault 
of Prime Minister Al Ja'afari, but also that of the Kurds, Shia, 
and Sunnis.  He recommends that sectarian parties -- allowed to 
participate he claims "thanks" to the USG -- should put aside 
their prejudices for talks to resume.  Abdullah wants provincial 
elections to occur as soon as possible, but recommends that the 
tribal community -- the "true voice" of the people -- play a 
larger role in the government.  He predicts the Iraqi Islamic 
Party will win the vote in Mosul, and the tribal community in 
western Ninewa.  Abdullah says Coalition Forces cannot leave 
Mosul because Iraqi Security Forces are not fully prepared.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) PRT Leader and PolOff met with Sunni Arab Sheikh 
Abdullah Homaidi Aljeel Al Yawar, Shammar tribal leader in 
western Ninewa, in Rabiya on April 7.  Al Yawar (more commonly 
known as "Sheikh Abdullah") inherited the throne after the death 
of his father (by the same name) in 2003.  Al Yawar's interest 
is in general contracting.  He has had direct ties with local 
politicians and previously supported cousin and vice president 
Sheikh Ghazi Al Yawar, although the relationship has soured over 
the past year. 
 
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TRIBAL PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Sheikh Abdullah said he was confident a solution would 
be found to the impasse over central government formation. 
Prime Minister Ibrahim Al Ja'afari failed, he said, but not all 
of those failings were completely his fault.  Shia and Kurdish 
political parties were to blame too, said Abdullah.  He claimed 
all political parties would need to come together soon to help 
settle the problem or more blood, money, and time would be lost. 
 The USG was also at fault, claimed Abdullah, for allowing 
"religious" parties to participate in the democratic process. 
Such parties should "thank the U.S." for allowing them to exist, 
but also sectarian groups should take the lead with 
reconciliation, he said.  The Kurds did not like Ja'afari, 
claimed Abdullah, because he did not take their side in 
settlement of Article 58 and the "Kirkuk issue."  Sunnis 
disliked Ja'afari too because they accused the Shia of "killing 
Sunnis," he said.  Abdullah said these disagreements could be 
easily overcome if sectarian parties realized they were working 
for the benefit of the new government.  Abdullah recommended the 
USG closely monitor any talks in the formation of the new GOI. 
 
---------------------------------- 
PROVINCIAL POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Abdullah claimed the Ninewa economy was in shambles and 
the provincial government was "nowhere to be found."  Sunnis 
were as much to blame for problems in Ninewa as the Kurds, 
claimed Abdullah.  They could accuse others, such as the Kurds 
and Shia, but not themselves, he said.  He recommended that 
provincial elections take place as stipulated in the TAL, 60 
days after the formation of the new government.  Early elections 
were important because the current provincial government was not 
representative.  Abdullah suggested that any provincial election 
take place over two days instead of one, since it would allow 
more people to get to the polls.  Given the security situation 
in Mosul, claimed Abdullah, it was unreasonable to expect voters 
to travel into unsafe areas in one day to vote.  Abdullah 
claimed that any new Ninewa government should also include 
tribal leaders, since they were the true voice of the people in 
the province.  Abdullah claimed that he had been in talks with 
IIP members who were seeking his support for the provincial 
elections.  [NOTE: Abdullah withdrew his public support for 
cousin Vice President Ghazi Al Yawar during last year's national 
election, claiming Al Yawar reneged on promises to improve the 
province].  Regardless, he said, Mosul would vote in favor of 
the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which he considered the strongest 
 
MOSUL 00000045  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
political party in the province, and tribal leaders would fare 
the strongest in western Ninewa.  However, any new government 
would have to consider representation from Ninewa's extensive 
minority community, such as the Yezidis and Christians. 
 
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SECURITY FORCES IN NINEWA 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Abdullah rejected calls by many politicians in Mosul for 
the immediate removal of Coalition Forces (CF) from the city. 
"Who will protect it?" asked Abdullah.  The time was not right 
for such a decision, he said.  Besides, the Iraqi Army (IA) was 
not ready to take over, claimed Abdullah.  He accused the USG 
made mistakes with formation of the IA by "training militias," 
such as the Badr Brigades and Peshmerga.  As a result many in 
the IA were "not officers," since they were not trained in a 
military academy or training college, he said.  Western Ninewa 
needed CF, said Abdullah.  Even the IIP realized this.  Abdullah 
claimed the Shammar tribe gave a list of potential IA candidates 
to CF to pass to the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad (MOI), but 
that "no one" was contacted.  Abdullah said many Shammar left 
the IA between 1991 and 2003 after the Kuwait War and because 
Saddam Hussein was using the IA to kill the Kurds and Shia, he 
said.  Since the tribal community was asked after the fall of 
the regime to not form militias, members of the tribal community 
should be allowed to serve in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), 
he said.  Abdullah, who claimed he was very close to the Yezidi 
community in Sinjar, said members of that community came to him 
to express their frustration that they could not join the ISF. 
He said the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the area 
prevented the Yezidi from doing so. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶6.  (C) Abdullah, a powerful businessman and tribal leader, 
considers himself the "true" voice of the Shammar (and even 
Yezidi) community in western Ninewa.  His reach into politics is 
mostly centered on the Rabiya city council, but as mentioned 
earlier, he claimed he did play an important role with helping 
Ghazi Al Yawar get elected in January 2005.  His older brother 
Fazil served as Ghazi Al Yawar's staff assistant for some time 
before he was removed from his position late last year. 
Perhaps, for that reason Abdullah switched his allegiance to the 
IIP.  He claims his family has been in talks with the IIP for 
years, and knows IIP provincial leader Dr. Mohammed intimately. 
Abdullah says the IIP is courting him, trying to win his support 
to form a strong coalition for provincial elections slated for 
later this year.  Abdullah represents much of the old Iraq, 
where power brokers reign and deals are made in the interests -- 
not necessarily values -- of each party, regardless of ethnicity 
or allegiance.  If Iraq continues on a path towards democracy 
then anomalies such as Abdullah might find themselves out of 
business. 
MUNTER