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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
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P 081605Z APR 06
FM REO MOSUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0464
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0058
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0041
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0045
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0483

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/8/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY ON SECURITY 
 
MOSUL 00000042  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron  Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
------------------- 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) leaders in Ninewa want a more 
representative Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and a reduced role of 
Coalition Forces (CF).  They claim the Kurds are meddling with 
security and politics in the province.  IIP reps believe they 
should play a larger role with helping CF and ISF on cases 
involving imams and religious leaders.  They claim they can help 
CF "win hearts and minds" by bringing suspected terrorists to CF 
and ISF for questioning, rather than have CF and ISF conduct 
nighttime raids on houses.  Even if the IIP's aims are 
altruistic, we are not sure how effective the party could be on 
this issue given the fractured nature of Sunni Arab political 
and tribal allegiances in Ninewa.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) MNF-N joined by PRT Leader and PolOff met with Iraqi 
Islamic Party (IIP) Ninewa Director Dr. Mohammed Shaker Al 
Ghanam, Ninewa Deputy and Political Director Younis Hashim, 
provincial councilmembers Momtaz Mahmood Al Arajy and Hassan, 
and Leadership Officer Faris Younis at IIP headquarters in Mosul 
on April 1. 
 
--------------------------- 
CAUSES OF SECURITY PROBLEMS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) IIP reps believe different actors in and outside of Iraq 
perpetrate terrorism in Ninewa.  The view from the local IIP has 
been consistent over the past few months, especially when 
fingering Iraq's neighbors for problems in Iraq.  Members of the 
IIP said they believed "Tekfiri" ("foreigners") kept interfering 
with affairs in Mosul, since Moslawis were truly a peaceful 
people that had lived together for thousands of years.  Ninewa 
director Al Ghanam accused Iran of playing a large role with 
terrorist activity in Iraq, and indirectly implicated the Kurds 
with trying to manipulate politics in the province. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
MORE REPRESENTATIVE SECURITY FORCES NEEDED 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Al Ghanam thanked Coalition Forces (CF) for helping 
secure the city and province, but also requested more CF and USG 
assistance to make the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) more 
representative.  "The police and army should be made up of 
people from the city," claimed Al Ghanam.  He believed the 
public needed to personally care for Mosul's security or 
conditions would not improve.  Al Ghanam said all ethnic groups 
in Ninewa should be represented proportionally in the ISF.  Only 
then, he cautioned, would the people of the province fully 
respect ISF.  It was tough for the people to support the police 
in predominantly Sunni Tal Afar, for example, when he claimed 
the force was "mostly Shia."  And many members of the Iraqi Army 
(IA) forces stationed in eastern Mosul were Kurds from outside 
of Ninewa, said Hashim.  Hashim claimed that the IIP sent a 
letter several years ago to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in 
Baghdad with a list of potential Sunni candidates for the ISF, 
but that no response was ever received.  Another important 
aspect, according to Al Ghanam, was to better educate the public 
on reporting insurgents and terrorist activities.  The IIP, on 
the other hand, had been doing its part by "going public" to get 
their followers to respect the police and to participate in the 
democratic process. 
 
------------------------ 
WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Al Ghanam claimed that CF could do more to win the 
hearts and minds of the populace in Mosul.  Speaking on the 
recent arrest of a local imam, Al Ghanam suggested that IIP play 
a larger role with helping CF and ISF when conducting 
counterinsurgency efforts.  He requested CF and ISF contact the 
party directly when receiving intelligence information 
implicating a religious scholar or imam.  The IIP would bring 
the suspect in to ISF and CF for questioning, he said.  Al 
Ghanam claimed the public in Mosul was becoming displeased with 
nighttime raids on houses, especially when religious leaders or 
"innocent" people were arrested.  The process he described would 
 
MOSUL 00000042  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
place less attention on the negative aspects of raids and 
arrests and help concentrate efforts on battling terrorism.  Al 
Ghanam also said the IIP would not stand in the way of CF and 
ISF work to locate and arrest "known terrorists," however.  He 
asked that CF reduce the number of armored vehicles in Mosul, 
and leave patrolling up to the ISF.  Al Arajy claimed poor 
security in Ninewa was caused by the large presence of CF 
vehicles in the city and an "imbalance of power" in the ISF.  Al 
Ghanam also called for more recruiting of ISF serving the former 
regime, since it would provide jobs and create stability in the 
area. 
 
---------------------------------- 
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS AND THE KURDS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Regarding provincial elections slated for later this 
year, Al Ghanam said: security was "critical" especially for 
protecting the integrity of the vote.  Using Kurdish or Shia 
forces to provide security at the polls would only make the 
situation worse and allow for foul play, he said.  Even local 
governments were being run by the Kurds, said Al Ghanam, 
especially in places like Sinjar, and Zumar in the west.  He 
claimed IIP was seeing tensions build in these and other areas 
under Kurdish control, which was causing "gaps" for outside 
terrorists to enter.  Al Arajy said local governments in western 
Ninewa were pleased with the support they were receiving from 
the KRG, for example, but that the KRG was only "trying to buy 
votes." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The views shared by the IIP reps in Ninewa are 
consistent: the creation of more representative security forces, 
the reduction of Coalition Forces, and tensions with the Kurds. 
Fingering of Iran as the root of all security problems in Mosul, 
and Iraq, is a constant theme as well but does little to address 
allegations of Iraqi and neighboring Arab government involvement 
in Iraq's tenuous security situation.  Theirs is a one-sided 
view, blaming others for the insurgency.  Further, the fractured 
nature of Sunni politics here makes us skeptical of the IIP's 
ability to represent an overall "Sunni" position. 
MUNTER