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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMOS #0041/01 0971631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071631Z APR 06
FM REO MOSUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0462
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0056
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0039
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0043
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0481

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000041 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/7/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: TAWAFOQ IRAQI FRONT PARLIAMENTARIAN VIEWS ON IRAN 
AND NEW GOVERNMENT FORMATION 
 
MOSUL 00000041  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron  Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Tawafoq Iraqi Front coalition national assemblymembers, 
who are predominantly from the Iraqi Islamic Party, told us that 
U.S. pressure on Iran over nuclear issues is causing Iraq's Shia 
politicians to resist any formation for the new government. 
They said the end of U.S. pressure on Iran might also help 
improve security in Iraq as well, and that the USG should 
communicate directly with the Iranian government to resolve 
tensions.  They said any power sharing agreement in the new 
federal government must include Sunni Arab and minority voices. 
They suggested creating additional layers of bureaucracy in the 
form of committees that would oversee any decisions by the prime 
minister and ministers.  The Tawafoq coalition is planning on 
establishing satellite offices throughout Ninewa province to 
improve communications with constituents.  They claimed the 
remote offices could play a role with the provincial council and 
Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces with claims for damages 
sustained during raids and arrests.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) PRT Leader and PolOff met with Tawafoq Iraqi Front 
national assembly delegates and Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) 
members at IIP headquarters in Mosul on April 5.  In attendance 
were: national assemblymembers Dr. Nawal Majeed Hameed and 
Noredin Hamdoon Abdullah, Ninewa IIP Director Dr. Mohammed 
Shaker Al Ghanam, and Leadership Officer Faris Younis. 
 
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USG MUST END "PRESSURE" ON IRAN 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) According to national assemblymember Abdullah, Iraqis 
were searching for some light after 25 years of war, violence, 
and sectarian strife.  Unfortunately, he claimed, the fall of 
the regime was met with security problems and a lack of basic 
services.  Abdullah said he and his Tawafoq coalition colleagues 
in the national assembly were trying to do their best to move 
Iraq forward and to restore its image on the world stage. 
Abdullah claimed that tensions between Iran and the USG were 
contributing to problems with central government formation in 
Baghdad.  He claimed if Iran perceived it was being pushed too 
hard by the USG on nuclear issues then it would continue, or 
even increase, its terrorist activities in Iraq.  This would 
ultimately stall Shia participation in the new government 
formation, since Iraqi Shia were "taking orders from Iran" and 
would resist moving forward.  Younis said he had heard rumors 
that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ) leader Al Zarqawi -- whom he 
claimed was an "Iran follower" -- would resign if the U.S. 
ceased pressuring Iran.  Once U.S. pressure was lifted, claimed 
Abdullah, it would only take 10 days for the new government to 
be formed. 
 
¶4.  (C) Abdullah said he supported the idea of U.S. Ambassador 
Khalilzad speaking to the Iranian government.  However, he 
thought even higher levels in the U.S. Administration should 
join in as well.  Abdullah compared Iran to an "octopus" that 
had its arms positioned throughout the Middle East.  He 
recommended communicating directly could "cut" the arms.  Any 
work on this issue would need to be done sooner rather than 
later, he claimed, since Iran's power in Iraq continued to grow 
on a daily basis. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
POWER SHARING OPTIONS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Abdullah believed that the democratic process thus far 
had intentionally "left out" certain groups -- namely Sunni 
Arabs and minorities -- and that the country needed balance if 
it was to advance.  The writing of the constitution last year 
was a glaring example since it lacked sufficient input from 
Sunni Arabs, he claimed.  To remedy the issue of power sharing 
at the national level, Tawafoq was proposing a "national 
council" that would share decision-making power with the prime 
minister.  Abdullah claimed such an arrangement would keep 
important decisions out of the hand of one person (most likely 
the Shia majority) who would favor one ethnic group over 
another.  Another step towards true power sharing would also be 
 
MOSUL 00000041  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
the building of a cabinet for the prime minister position, as 
well as smaller committees that would oversee the decisions of 
each minister.  Before this could occur two primary 
organizations would need to be established: the first would be 
the establishment of a committee to interpret the articles of 
the constitution to ensure they were applied transparently to 
all peoples of Iraq.  The second would be the creation of a true 
civil service modeled after the U.S.  A civil service would 
ensure that government positions were based on merit and not on 
cronyism, said Abdullah.  He said he believed that more layers 
of bureaucracy would help ensure that the voices of Sunni Arabs 
and minorities would be heard. 
 
------------------------------------- 
CONSTITUENT OFFICES THROUGHOUT NINEWA 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) In an effort to better address the needs of the people 
outside of Mosul, Tawafoq members said they were planning to 
install satellite offices throughout the province.  Abdullah 
said they would collect information from the field and 
coordinate with the provincial council to compare data and then 
submit the results to Baghdad.  He said results would help shape 
programs and policies from the central government to the 
province.  Hameed appealed for USG assistance.  She said the 
idea for satellite offices was to improve communication with 
constituents and to assist with security issues, such as 
Coalition (CF) and Iraqi Security Force raids on homes, and 
arresting and detaining of suspects.  Hameed believed actual and 
psychological damage was done during each raid.  She said the 
process of filing a claim for damages was "degrading" and asked 
if more work could be done to improve the process and make it 
more humane.  She suggested that Tawafoq satellite offices could 
receive claims information from constituents, and then 
coordinate with the provincial council which could vet the 
claims before passing them to CF for processing and payment. 
She believed this arrangement could expedite the claims process 
and improve relations with the Iraqi people.  Dignity, not 
money, was the impetus for this suggestion, claimed Hameed. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶7.  (C) During our third meeting with members of the Tawafoq 
coalition, the mood was less hostile and more cooperative.  They 
say they look forward to continuing dialogue with the PRT and 
CF.  Abdullah claims the Tawafoq coalition will move forward 
with or without USG help, by providing information on the 
democratic process and seeking to improve security.  The Tawafoq 
leaders seem to prefer warm relations with us, but see the U.S. 
mainly as an occupying power whose impact (mostly negative) 
needs to be blunted. 
MUNTER