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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSUL 000039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
JUSTICE FOR: CARL ALEXANDRE AND KATHLEEN OCONNOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/1/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR KCRM
SUBJECT: NINEWA RULE OF LAW ISSUES PART I: NINEWA CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COMMITTEE OFF TO POSITIVE START (CORRECTED COPY) 
 
REF: MOSUL 37; A) MOSUL 17; B) MOSUL 16 
 
MOSUL 00000039  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron  Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
[CORRECTED COPY -- SUBJECT LINE] 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) In recent months we have heard criticism of the Iraqi 
criminal justice system in Ninewa.  Even officers at the 
Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) say they are "tired" 
of seeing terrorists released by "cowardly judges" or "corrupt" 
military and police officials.  Corruption and cowardice aside, 
problems now tend to be centered on poor communication and 
coordination among the Iraqi judiciary and the security forces. 
The impetus for the Ninewa Criminal Justice Committee (NCJC) is 
to serve as an effort to acknowledge these problems and work 
towards solutions collectively to improve the criminal justice 
system in the province.  The first meeting, held in late March, 
exceeded expectations by both the parties involved as well as 
PRT and MNF-N officials observing.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) PRT Rule of Law Coordinator and PolOff met with 
Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) BG Wathiq Al Qudir, Ninewa 
Chief Judge Faisal Sadeeq Hadeed, Investigative Judge Amer 
Rasheed Hammedi and Iraqi Army (IA) 2nd Division Commander MG 
Jamaal, and MNF-N at One West Iraqi Police (IP) headquarters in 
Mosul on March 25. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
DIAGNOSIS OF A PROBLEM: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) The public is frustrated with the effectiveness of the 
criminal justice system in Ninewa.  During a conversation with 
two colonels from the Provincial Joint Coordination Center 
(PJCC) on March 24, Col Ismael Hussein Khader told PolOff he and 
his colleagues at the PJCC had been working hard over the past 
three years -- at risk to their own personal safety -- to make 
Iraq safer.  However, he claimed, they felt their work was 
negated when "well-known terrorists" were released from prison. 
He and Col Khaled Suleiyman believed these events damaged the 
public's faith in government institutions.  Khader believed 
there had to be some sort of collusion between terrorists and 
judges, and members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).  Even 
Coalition Forces (CF) were complicit since they were not doing 
enough to keep the bad guys behind bars, he said.  "The 
terrorists have the streets," he exclaimed.  He and Suleiyman 
asked for USG assistance to rid local government and security 
forces of corruption and help restore the public's faith in the 
government.  "We think America could do something to leave a 
good impression," they said. 
 
------------------------------ 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Over several meetings with IA, IP, and judicial 
officials similar complaints arose: there was little or no 
communication, and a great deal of distrust, among institutions. 
 Chief of Police Al Qudir told PRT officials on several 
occasions he recognized the need to increase the public's trust 
of the police.  Since there had been corrupt officers in the 
past, he admitted, it caused a large rift with constituents. 
Such problems were complicating the force's ability to improve 
since they were not receiving information tips, for example, 
from concerned citizens about terrorist activities in their 
neighborhoods.  More importantly, was that the public thought 
the IP was complicit with the release of terrorists from prison. 
 This made him angry and fostered his own distrust of Ninewa's 
judges with prosecuting cases (ref a).  Chief Judge Hadeed and 
Investigative Judge Hammedi saw the problem from another angle. 
While the IP and IA commanders could "go public" and "blame" the 
judiciary for releasing terrorists (ref b), judges were 
forbidden to defend themselves in the press.  Even more 
frustrating, according to Hadeed, was that the "truth" was not 
getting out: although some judges were corrupt, most were 
working hard to hear terrorist cases with missing evidence, 
 
MOSUL 00000039  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
crimes scenes not protected, and ISF investigators not allowed 
to testify by their commanders.  "The system cannot continue 
that way it's going," said Hadeed.  "We have to do something to 
figure this out with the army and police."  Here was where the 
PRT's Rule of Law unit stepped in. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
THE RESULT: NINEWA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The first meeting of the Ninewa Criminal Justice 
Committee served as a chance for the PCOP, IA, and judiciary to 
begin honest dialogue and work on issues to improve coordination 
on criminal investigations and evidence collection.  Chief Judge 
Hadeed began the meeting by spelling out the local judiciary's 
frustration with IP and IA investigative information.  He 
chalked up the problem to poor communication and a lack of 
education by ISF investigators on criminal case reporting 
procedures.  "There was no contact" with ISF on cases and 
therefore they could not be tried.  With Ministry of Interior 
commandos, for example, the judiciary had "very little contact." 
 ISF was acting like they were above the law, he said.  Even CF 
was guilty since they did not know Iraqi law, claimed Hadeed. 
One of the biggest problems was when ISF were transferring 
suspects to CF custody.  "Judges should be involved and given 
all documents," he said.  Admitting the judiciary was also to 
blame Hadeed said some judges were "being lazy," for not quickly 
moving through cases.  But most upsetting, said Hadeed, was when 
the IA would not allow their agents to testify. 
 
¶6.  (C) Chief of Police Al Qudir said the IP was upset as well. 
There were cases where they caught insurgents "red-handed" in 
the act of committing a crime, but that the case was later 
thrown out because the IP did not follow procedures.  He said 
this problem was more pronounced with CF, but that the IP was 
cooperating better with CF, and CF was now waiting until the IP 
finished their investigation before taking custody of the 
suspect.  Al Qudir also claimed that witnesses and informants 
were sometimes difficult to track down. 
 
¶7.  (C)    Iraq Army (IA) 2nd Division MG Jamaal began by 
launching into his frustrations with the judiciary.  He claimed 
if there was no law then only chaos would exist, and as a result 
all sides would have to work together.  He believed terrorists 
were benefiting since judges were not standing firm against 
them.  He blamed lawyers for exploiting the system for personal 
gain.  More importantly, however, Jamaal expressed his strong 
commitment to uphold the law, claiming he was doing everything 
he could to enforce it.  Jamaal did not understand why his 
investigators' testimony was needed if the IA caught terrorists 
in the act of committing a crime or having given a documented 
confession.  His conclusion was that it was the fault of the 
court system that terrorists were released. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
SOLUTION: BETTER COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8.  (C) Jamaal's solution?  Judges had to be firmer and not 
allow lawyers to push them around.  He said the work of the IA 
was becoming increasingly more difficult because most terrorists 
knew they would only have to stay in prison for three to four 
months before being released.  He accused judges of buying off 
on terrorists that pleaded they were coerced into confessing 
under duress.  Using a battlefield analogy, Hadeed reminded Gen 
Jamaal that there were two types of leaders: those on the 
battlefield, and those planning the war from behind a desk. 
Comparing himself to the desk officer, Hadeed claimed the law 
did not allow him much flexibility.  Like Jamaal, too, he was a 
soldier who was limited by the rules of engagement.  Accusations 
that the judges were folding under pressure from terrorists had 
been mitigated, he said.  They now conducted terrorist 
investigations with panels so that any decisions would not 
single out a particular judge.  He said that if a panel had 
received a threat the case would not be prosecuted locally, but 
shifted to the Higher Juridical Council in Baghdad.  Such 
precautionary measures did not allow judges to "fool around" 
with case procedures, he said.  Furthermore, if judges refused 
to hear cases it would only reflect poorly on Hadeed, which 
could also cost him his job. 
 
¶9.  (C) Admitting their forces had committed procedural errors, 
Generals Jamaal and Al Qudir extended an olive branch to Hadeed. 
 
MOSUL 00000039  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 Crime scenes had to be protected, they agreed, and evidence not 
compromised (ref b).  The judges had to see the IA 
investigators, Hadeed requested, since the case would have to 
otherwise be thrown out.  The ISF could not keep moving 
detainees to different courthouses, such as Dohuk, that were 
outside of Ninewa's jurisdiction and could not adequately hear 
the cases, he said.  Al Qudir said the IP would work better with 
IA investigative experts to protect crime scenes and better 
collect evidence.  Moving one step further, Jamaal recommended 
the ISF form a committee for IA agents to meet and work with the 
judges.  There should be cooperation between investigative 
judges and the IA investigators, he said.  Investigative Judge 
Hammedi agreed and said more would need to be done to train ISF 
investigators on interrogation and investigation procedures. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶10.  (C) Building the capacity of the criminal justice system to 
identify, investigate, and successfully prosecute dangerous 
criminals is key to bringing the security situation under 
control.  As the capacity of the ISF to perform their security 
function increases, building their capacity to perform their 
investigative function to assist the courts is of equal 
importance.  Because the courts in Iraq ultimately control the 
investigative process and also act as the prosecuting authority, 
cooperation and coordination with the ISF is critical.  As is 
clear today, an ISF raid that captures an insurgent cell leader, 
for example, is only truly successful if the suspect can be 
taken off the streets and incarcerated consistent with Iraqi 
law.  The NCJC is a small but important step in efforts to make 
such successes the rule rather than the exception.  In addition, 
[consistent with the PRT mandate] the NCJC places the 
responsibility for strengthening the relationship between the 
ISF and courts in the hands of the Iraqis themselves.  However, 
due to the distrust and finger pointing of the past, the 
committee will likely continue to require U.S. facilitation in 
the near term.  In time, the goal is that the police, army, and 
courts will see the value in working together to secure the 
province under the rule of law and will continue to do so after 
U.S. facilitation ceases. 
MUNTER