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R 110619Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
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INFO RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1072
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MINSK 000390 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUMBO PREL BO
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION COALITION TO STAY TOGETHER 
 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4(B,D 
) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary: In recent days Poloffs and Ambassador have 
spoken with a number of senior members of Milinkevich's 10 
Plus coalition.  All agreed that the coalition will continue 
to exist and will keep Milinkevich as the leader, despite 
some resistance from one coalition party.  Post election the 
coalition is in the embryonic stages of building a new 
"social movement," designed to keep the populace interested 
in politics and supporting change.  At a minimum, this 
movement will try to plan at least one public demonstration a 
month.  With so many coalition members only recently released 
from jail, or abroad traveling, the coalition has not yet 
developed its strategy.  Meanwhile, some in the coalition are 
calling for trying to attract new members, such as the youth 
groups that actually drove the post-election demonstrations. 
Despite the difficulties they face, these coalition leaders 
are optimistic that they have helped change the mood in the 
country, and believe Lukashenko will not last his full 
five-year term 
.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Poloffs and Ambassador met separately with several 
senior figures in the Belarusian opposition's main coalition, 
10 Plus, the week of April 3.  Emboffs met with Sergey 
Kalyakin, leader of the pro-democracy Belarusian Party of 
Communists and head of opposition presidential candidate 
Aleksandr Milinkevich's campaign headquarters, Ludmila 
Gryaznova, deputy leader of the United Civic Party (UCP), and 
with Ales Yanukevich and Ales Mikhailevich, deputy leaders in 
the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF). 
 
 
The Coalition and Milinkevich Will Survive 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) All interlocutors agreed that the 10 Plus coalition 
would endure, largely in its current form, and that 
Milinkevich would remain nominal head of the coalition. 
Kalyakin explained that the coalition's political council had 
met twice since the March 19 presidential election and agreed 
to maintain the coalition, although with some tinkering.  The 
October 2005 Congress of Democratic Forces created three 
leadership organs within the coalition, a national committee, 
a political council, and an election headquarters.  The 
election HQ will be disbanded, but currently is working with 
human rights groups to provide assistance to arrested 
activists, expelled students, and is paying fines for many 
coalition members.  The HQ is also preparing legal challenges 
to the election results.  Most recently, the Supreme Court 
threw out a challenge on April 5. 
 
¶4. (C) Kalyakin strongly argued the importance of keeping 
Milinkevich as the coalition's leader.  He said Milinkevich 
had an estimated 20% support in the country and was an 
established brand.  To choose someone else now to head the 
coalition would destroy the previous eight months' work. 
Even though the UCP's Gryaznova stated she would have 
preferred if her party's leader, Anatoly Lebedko, had been 
chosen the coalition's presidential candidate, she said it 
would be a "nightmare" to replace Milinkevich now. 
Milinkevich has high name recognition, and she said, 
attracted the support of 31% of voters. 
 
¶5. (C) All described a new "social movement" the coalition is 
forming, but none were very clear on what the movement would 
do other than vaguely working with the population.  All 
explained the intra-coalition travails surrounding naming the 
movement.  After what seems to have been serious debate, the 
coalition rejected the name, "Za Milinkevich (For 
Milinkevich)" in favor of "Za Svobodu (For Freedom)". 
Mikhailevich (who is well connected with the NGO community) 
explained that this movement is an attempt by the NGO members 
of the coalition to reshape, centralize and streamline the 10 
Plus.  He complained the coalition now is an extremely 
ponderous and inefficient bureaucracy, stemming from the fact 
that each member party feels the need to provide input and 
clearance.  Mikhailevich stated it was this 
over-bureaucratization which caused the coalition to miss the 
deadline to get Milinkevich's platform published for free in 
state media.  The NGOs are frustrated, he said, and are 
trying to change the 10 Plus away 
from a loose coalition of parties and into a real 
organization with strong local organizations. 
 
 
Future Actions, at Home and Abroad 
---------------------------------- 
 
MINSK 00000390  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Yanukevich claimed that too many of Milinkevich's 
people are still in jail or traveling abroad with Milinkevich 
for the coalition to have developed a strategy.  However, he 
believes that the team must organize at least one 
demonstration a month to keep up people's interest.  The next 
such will be on April 26 for the 20th anniversary of 
Chernobyl.  Kalyakin noted that the coalition also plans a 
demonstration for May 1, against the state's labor contract 
system.  Kalyakin believed that the March 19 demonstration 
needed to attract ten times as many people to have made a 
difference.  He does not expect enough people on April 26 or 
May 1 to challenge the regime, but thinks the post-election 
protests succeeded in reducing the people's fear of 
demonstrating. 
 
¶7. (C) Mikhailevich explained that the civil society side 
(rather than the parties) of the 10 Plus will be organizing 
many small demonstrations and will pass out pro-democracy 
literature.  Their strategy is based on the understanding 
that police can arrest one or two people passing out 
leaflets, but if 50 people start passing out leaflets in one 
place, the local police patrol will have to call on 
reinforcements before making any arrests.  Mikhailevich 
estimates this gives the opposition up to 30 minutes to pass 
out material before they have to disperse.  The coalition 
will also use the internet more to spread information, as it 
was very successful during the post-election protests. 
 
¶8. (C) Kalyakin complained that non-coalition activists, such 
as Olga Karach, have been speaking at international 
conferences on the state of the Belarusian opposition.  Even 
though many of these people are active in promoting 
democracy, Kalyakin dismissed them as knowing nothing because 
they are not in the coalition.  Therefore, the coalition must 
continue its international lobbying efforts to counter such 
people.  On the other hand, Gryaznova complained that 
Milinkevich is spending too much time lobbying in European 
capitals instead of greeting his activists as they are 
released from jail and planning the coalition's next steps. 
 
 
Local Elections Next 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The last local elections in Belarus were held in March 
¶2003.  Mikhailevich, who won a seat on the Minsk city 
council, explained that by law the next local elections must 
be held by December 2006.  He thinks Lukashenko will call 
them for either October 2006 or early 2007 (despite the law), 
as it is not feasible to hold elections in the winter when 
the budget is being prepared.  Mikhailevich stated that the 
10 Plus is preparing a national campaign to mobilize voters 
and find strong candidates for these elections, although he 
expects the regime to make sure few, if any, opposition 
members are elected. 
 
 
No New Congress? 
---------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Gryaznova stressed the need for a new Congress of 
Democratic Forces.  She said that several of the groups which 
helped create the 10 Plus, such as the Belarusian Party 
"Greens", Belarusian Party of Women's Hope (Nadezhda), and 
the unregistered Party of Freedom and Progress played no role 
during the campaign.  She felt they must be replaced with 
other groups that have become very active.  Gryaznova listed 
four main groups that need to be attracted to join the 
coalition: 1) the youth groups, specifically Malady Front, 
which organized the tent city, 2) student internet activists, 
3) entrepreneur groups such as Perspektiva, and 4) active 
analytical centers.  Mikhailevich did not call for a new 
congress, but said that Protestant groups had been actively 
helping the coalition.  Kalyakin was strongly against a new 
democratic congress, claiming it would be a waste of 
resources. 
 
 
Poor Cooperation with Youth Groups 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Kalyakin and others reinforced the impression that 
the coalition does not have strong contact with many youth 
groups.  When asked about the tent city that challenged 
Lukashenko for several days in Minsk's main square, Kalyakin 
stated that the coalition only knew the youth groups which 
put up three of the nearly twenty tents.  He improbably 
claimed that Russia's FSB has erected the rest of the tents 
 
MINSK 00000390  003 OF 004 
 
 
to put pressure on Lukashenko.  Gryaznova stated that 
Milinkevich's campaign team was surprised that so many people 
turned out to protest the elections, and was not prepared. 
On the other hand, she said the youth groups knew what to 
expect, largely because their members had participated in 
Ukraine's Maidan.  Therefore the youth essentially controlled 
the post-election protests.  (Note: She added that her own 
party's leadership did not go to the tent city until Renatas 
Juskis of the Lithuanian MFA called and told them to go.) 
 
¶12. (C) Kalyakin stated that Zubr refused to cooperate in any 
post-election demonstrations, even though some Zubr people 
did demonstrate.  Gryaznova said that some Zubr members were 
present in the tent city, but that Malady Front was the most 
active youth group throughout the campaign. 
 
¶13. (C) Mikhailevich and several others have told Emboffs 
that the arrested youth spent their time in prison forging 
close ties with people from other regions.  This networking 
opportunity strengthened the opposition and those arrested 
are leaving jail determined to keep fighting for democracy. 
 
 
Power Struggles in the Coalition 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Yanukevich commented on several power struggles 
within the coalition.  He claimed that Lebedko and the UCP 
are not happy with Milinkevich and do not trust him.  He 
claimed the UCP has always operated somewhat independently, 
even while in the coalition.  Yanukevich opined that Lebedko 
will not take his party out of the coalition, as they have 
nowhere to go, but stated this divide will lead to many 
arguments over strategy and tactics.  Mikhailevich also 
claimed the UCP may quit 10 Plus, but believes this is 
unlikely as the UCP's local structures are now too firmly 
enmeshed with the 10 Plus' local organizations. 
 
¶15. (C) Yanukevich also described a battle for control of his 
own BPF.  He stated that Ales Mikhailevich is trying to wrest 
control from party leader Vintsuk Vyachorka, and would ask 
for a vote on new leadership at the party's next meeting. 
Yanukevich estimated that Mikhailevich does not have the 
support to topple Vyachorka, and added that Mikhailevich has 
always tried to use his position to push party funds towards 
his friends and supporters in NGOs, rather than keeping it in 
the party. 
 
 
No Cooperation with Kozulin 
--------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) According to Kalyakin, the coalition has regular 
contact with rival presidential contender Aleksandr Kozulin's 
campaign team.  He claimed his coalition is open to Kozulin's 
Belarus Social-Democratic Party Narodnaya Gramada joining the 
coalition, but did not expect Kozulin to do so.  Yanukevich 
stated that UCP deputy Jaroslav Romanchuk is trying to bring 
Kozulin into the coalition, but that UCP leader Anatoly 
Lebedko opposes this move as that would knock Lebedko from 
number two to number three in the coalition. 
 
 
Opposition is Optimistic 
------------------------ 
 
¶17. (C) All expressed their optimism that Lukashenko is 
nearing the end of his rule.  Kalyakin claimed that the mood 
in the country is different after the election, that people 
are for the first time publicly discussing Belarus after 
Lukashenko.  People know how the regime rigged the elections, 
and many know that the economy is facing serious troubles. 
Therefore, Kalyakin estimated that Lukashenko would not last 
more than two years.  Mikhailevich believes Lukashenko will 
fall within 12 to 18 months because he is quickly losing 
popular support.  He added that Lukashenko has recently made 
many mistakes.  His propaganda especially is backfiring, as 
many Belarusians now question why most of the outside world 
is portrayed on television as Belarus' enemy. 
 
¶18. (C) Mikhailevich stated that he has many friends in 
government, and he believes at least half of the GOB's 
bureaucrats and police voted for Milinkevich.  Police 
officers between sergeant and colonel are strongly for 
reform, while more senior officers receive too many perks 
from the regime to want change.  Mikhailevich said he gets 
intensively searched every time he crosses the border, but 
frequently the Customs officials take him into the back, ask 
him a pro forma question or two, and then tell him they 
 
MINSK 00000390  004 OF 004 
 
 
support democracy.  Mikhailevich also maintained this feeling 
has spread to the courts.  Reportedly, when it came time to 
try one of the organizers of the October Square tent city, 
the judge closed the court to all but himself and the 
defendant.  The judge told the defendant he thought the tent 
protest was the best thing to happen to Belarus in recent 
years, but that he would be fired if he sentenced the 
defendant to anything less than seven days in jail.  (Note: 
most of those arrested at the tent city rec 
eived 10 or 15 days sentences.) 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶19. (C) Milinkevich's 10 Plus coalition concede they made 
many mistakes during the campaign, and many Belarusians who 
want democratic change are also quick to point these out as 
well.  However, the coalition held and so far no other 
credible organized opposition force has appeared in Belarus 
to fight for change and challenge the Lukashenko regime. 
Mikhail Statkevich's European Coalition collapsed after he 
was arrested, and Kozulin's campaign, which appears to be 
largely a mercenary structure, does not appear to have legs 
or much organization.  Milinkevich and the coalition have 
acquired credibility and respect from more Belarusians, but 
they recognize that to succeed in ultimately changing Belarus 
they need to take advantage of the latent dissatisfaction 
with Lukashenko prevalent in society, keep people interested 
in politics, provide independent sources of information, and 
avoid petty partisan bickering--all while facing continued 
repression from the regime.  It's a big challenge, but so far 
they seem on th 
e right track. 
Krol