VZCZCXRO2626
PP RUEHMR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMR #0184/01 1031505
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 131505Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MASERU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1995
INFO RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI 0001
RUEHMR/AMEMBASSY MASERU 2262

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000184 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INR/I; ALSO FOR AF/S 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/13/2016 
TAGS: PINR PREL LT LY
SUBJECT: LESOTHO AND LIBYA RELATIONS (C-AL6-00526) 
 
REF: STATE 51978 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  We appreciate INR's interest in the relationship 
between the Libyan Embassy in Maseru and the Government of 
Lesotho (GOL).  Ambassador had a lengthy meeting April 6 with 
Libyan Ambassador Mohamed Algamudi at his residence. 
 
¶2.  (C/NF) The Libyan envoy's wife and daughter prepared an 
elaborate buffet of North African dishes, traditional  coffee 
and juices to welcome the U.S. Ambassador.  During our 
discussion (interrupted by occasional appearances of his family, 
including a one year old grandson), Algamudi stated that he had 
a long standing friendship with the LCD's Minister of 
Communications, Thomas Thabane.  He related that when he arrived 
in Lesotho in 2001, he was faced with the task of locating a 
property and establishing their resident diplomatic mission in 
Maseru.  According to Algamudi, he was warmly received by both 
Prime Minister Mosisili and Minister Thabane, who at the time 
was the GOL's Foreign Minister.  Thabane offered to locate a 
chancery building for the Libyans and had actually turned over 
the current facility to the Libyan People's Bureau.  Since that 
time, Algamudi indicated he and Thabane have been very close and 
he (Algamudi) facilitated the Minister's travel to Tripoli and 
the opening of a Lesotho Mission in Libya.  Algamudi was also 
involved in organizing a visit by Prime Minister Mosisili to 
Tripoli. 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  We asked Ambassador Algamudi about his views on the 
January 29 shooting of Lesotho Foreign Minister, since the 
Foreign Minister had shared with us his opinion that both 
Thabane and the Libyan envoy were involved in this attack. 
Algamudi was firm in his defense of Thabane.  He denied that 
there would be any rationale for the Minister of Communications 
to have orchestrated such an attack.  He based his analysis on 
the fact that Thabane has been present in every government since 
Lesotho's independence nearly 40 years ago and that it would be 
foolish for him to engage in internal political warfare within 
the government.  Algamudi posited that FOMIN Moleleki has known 
Thabane for many years and that although Moleleki represents the 
younger generation, it would be against his own interest to have 
a conflict with Thabane. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) Regarding Libya's potential involvement in this 
attack, Algamudi did not address this issue directly; however, 
he did state that as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, he had taken 
it upon himself to visit Moleleki in the hospital and to offer 
him advice on how to handle statements concerning this assault. 
Of interest, he indicated that he had been the individual who 
told Moleleki to keep silent about the attempted assassination 
and not to engage others in conversations about what had 
occurred.  He said he did this because he felt any comments by 
the FOMIN would only exacerbate rumors and public discussion 
about this unfortunate incident.  Concerning the issue of 
stability following the lack of any public statement until 
recently by Moleleki or the government, Algamudi said he felt 
this was for the best; that any public discussion by GOL 
authorities would only add to a sense of insecurity in the 
country. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) On the question of GOL leaders' actual response to 
the January incident, until April 12 there had only been a 
series of rumors and allegations including a reported dispute 
between Moleleki and the Police Commissioner about lack of 
investigatory action.  There had been only general allusion to 
the incident in Parliament by the Deputy Prime Minister and now 
disputed statement by the LCD Executive Secretary, Minister of 
Trade Malie, who had suggested that the incident was a criminal 
one.  On April 12, the leading English language daily "Public 
Eye" ran a statement by Moleleki saying that following the 
January 29 LCD Party Congress, he had visited a "female 
relative" and had not been at the house of any other woman prior 
to the shooting which occurred around 2:00 a.m.  (Note: A 
widely-circulating rumor had it that the FOMIN had been visiting 
a mistress and was shot by the woman's spouse.  Editorials in 
the same paper questioned why Moleleki was making this statement 
at this time when he reportedly had never given a statement to 
the police.  End Note)  In his statement, Moleleki continued to 
accuse members of the LCD of fomenting over a period of years a 
plan to assassinate him.  There is no hard evidence for or 
against the involvement of political leaders.  However,  Trade 
Minister Malie's position was that there were elements within 
 
MASERU 00000184  002 OF 002 
 
 
the LCD who were very unhappy with Moleleki's leadership on the 
Amendments Committee of the party.  To date, there has been no 
public comment by the Prime Minister.  There have been 
suggestions that Moleleki has thrown in his lot with his boss in 
order to secure his own future position as the Prime Minister's 
successor. 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  Algamudi shared with us a number of frustrations he 
has had with the GOL in trying to provide assistance from Libya. 
 According to Ambassador Algamudi, his government has proposed 
programs ranging from training of helicopter pilots, provision 
of aircraft, supply of tractors and an unusual scheme to import 
camels (to demonstrate Saharan transport methods, especially to 
children of Lesotho, he said).  He had previously shared with us 
that a request to build a large Libyan/Lesotho Muslim Cultural 
Center has remained dormant because there has never been a 
response from the GOL to this offer from Libya.  He also 
reported difficulties in obtaining diplomatic IDs for members of 
his family while he is resident in Lesotho. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)  Comment:  The difficulties the Libyans have faced in 
securing responses from the GOL are not unlike those of many of 
the diplomatic missions in Lesotho; every one of them has 
complained that responses to offers of assistance have taken 
significant amounts of time.  Granted, the services offered by 
the Libyan People's Bureau do not seem always consistent with 
the needs of this developing country.  Algamudi implied that 
Lesotho lags far behind some of its neighbors in the SADC region 
in terms of professionalism and capacity within the government. 
Overall, his relationship with the GOL appears to be mixed.  On 
the one hand, he has received the facilities support, which we 
note also affords Lesotho officials the opportunity to keep an 
eye on Libyan operations in country.  At the same time, Libya 
does appear to have an agenda and Algamudi has been forthcoming 
in telling us that his government is seeking to strengthen the 
African Union and Libya's role as a leader within that 
organization.  Whether or not the Libyan People's Bureau would 
go so far as to have a role in attacking the Foreign Minister as 
Moleleki has alleged, remains open to question.  We will follow 
up with Ambassador Algamudi when he returns from Tripoli where 
he is traveling to visit his older brother who is gravely ill. 
End Comment. 
PERRY