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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000938 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO 
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND PFRENCH, DHENIFIN AND LPETRONI 
SECDEF FOR OSD/WHA PARDO-MAURER 
TREASURY FOR RTOLOUI AND SGOOCH 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR AMB MOORE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SNAR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: A CONCILIATORY MORALES RETRACTS 
ANTI-U.S.TERRORISM CHARGES 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAVID N. GREENLEE FOR REASON 1.5(d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  During a private dinner President Evo Morales and 
Vice President Garcia Linera hosted for the Ambassador, DCM 
and the Embassy's declared intelligence chief late April 1, 
Morales backtracked on accusations of U.S. involvement in 
recent hotel bombings in La Paz, denied targeting the 
judiciary and other democratic institutions, and reiterated 
GOB support on the counter-narcotics (CN) front.  His 
conciliatory repositioning came in response to the 
Ambassador's sharp expressions of concern on those issues and 
on Morales' subordinates' failure to follow through on his 
promise to return counter-terrorism weapons to MILGRP 
custody.  Morales' and Garcia Linera's purpose at the dinner 
seemed to be to close the gap in comity that had been opened 
by Morales' accusations about the hotel attacks and to 
measure our support for a GOB delegation to the U.S. to 
discuss soy and a possible extension of ATPDEA benefits.  On 
leaving, the Ambassador prevailed on Morales to reverse his 
public stance on the bombings in front of a waiting press 
scrum and to thank the Embassy for its help apprehending the 
suspects.  Morales was submissive and quiet most of the 
evening and his olive branch was welcome--but we fully expect 
our relationship to suffer more Morales-inflicted wounds in 
the future.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) VP Garcia Linera called late March 31 to invite the 
Ambassador and emboffs to dinner with the Vice President and 
Morales at the President's residence April 1.  Morales 
arrived about twenty minutes late but established a positive 
mood by excessively apologizing for his delay and sticking to 
light banter, mainly with the Vice President, for about a 
half hour before dinner. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MORALES RETRACTS BOMBING ACCUSATION 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The tone changed at the table, however, when, at 
Morales' query of "what's new," the Ambassador asked sharply 
why he had made four public statements insinuating official 
U.S. involvement in the La Paz hotel bombings.  Morales 
blamed his first accusation on poor information but had no 
explanation for subsequent inflammatory statements.  He also 
claimed ignorance when our intelligence chief explained that 
a police unit we train and support investigated the blast and 
netted the suspects within a few hours.  We added that the 
national police chief and the Minister of the Presidency were 
involved in the investigation from the outset, knew which 
unit had conducted it, and either misinformed or failed to 
inform the President about the facts.  The Ambassador also 
reminded Morales that the American suspect had entered 
Bolivia with a valid visa affixed to a fantasy passport 
(World Service Authority) and had obtained a license to use 
and sell explosives in Potosi despite a well-known, 
multi-national list of prior crimes.  The blame, therefore, 
should not be laid on the U.S., but rather on Bolivian 
incompetence.  The Ambassador suggested that, to put  the 
matter behind us, it would be useful for Morales to correct 
the record publicly.  Morales nodded slightly and said he 
might be willing, at some point, to do so. 
 
---------------------------- 
DELAY IN CT WEAPONS TRANSFER 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador reminded Morales that we had cut all 
ties with an elite counter-terrorism unit and asked why the 
Minister of Defense had failed to follow through on the 
President's promise to return the unit's U.S.-owned weapons 
and equipment to MILGRP custody.  Morales wondered if we had 
provided documentation on the materiel for his staff to 
review and seemed suprised to learn that we had done so two 
weeks previously.  He suggested that his attention had been 
diverted by the Lloyd Bolivian Airlines meltdown and other 
looming problems, but said he would take up the issue early 
in the week with the high command on his return from the IDB 
summit in Brazil.  Vice President Garcia Linera asked whether 
he could see the MILGRP warehouse in El Alto where the 
weapons and equipment would be placed.  The Ambassador said 
we would be pleased to arrange such a visit at his 
convenience -- and he could also see the other equipment 
stored there for possible future use by the Bolivian armed 
forces. 
 
------------------ 
MILITARY FRICTIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador went on to advise that the delay in 
the transfer had hurt other areas of cooperation, including 
abandoning planned construction of a civil defense emergency 
operations center, and seemed to fit a pattern of creeping 
estrangement between our militaries, such as new access 
restrictions for our attaches.  He said it would be 
unfortunate for our relationship if we were forced down the 
road of tit-for-tat reciprocity on access or other issues. 
 
¶6.  (C) Garcia Linera retorted that unfriendly signals were 
coming from our side as well, citing as proof our refusal to 
support with NAS helicopters a recent planned presidential 
visit to a flood-ravaged Santa Cruz town.  The Ambassador 
responded that an earlier flight, at our considerable 
expense, produced only thanks to Cuban doctors and silence 
for us.  We viewed that as an intentional slap, the 
Ambassador said, and noted that we had not even received a 
letter of thanks.  Garcia Linera smiled darkly.  Morales 
looked at his plate. 
 
----------------- 
ERODING DEMOCRACY 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador said that there was an issue of 
broader concern relating to the evolution of Bolivia's 
democracy.  While we respected the legitimacy of Morales' 
overwhelming election triumph -- and wanted him to succeed as 
a democratic president -- we had noted moves to dismember the 
opposition and amass power in the executive.  These included 
direct attacks on the judiciary and other independent 
institutions, and the subsequent resignation of top officials 
on the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal, the 
Judicial Council and the National Electoral Court. 
Additionally, four ex-Presidents were facing politically 
inspired criminal charges (three for authorizing gas 
contracts and one for the Chinese missile transfer), while 
other former senior officials or alleged "enemies of the 
state" were either in jail or possibly on their way there. 
 
¶8.  (C) Again assuming his counterpoint role, Garcia Linera 
rebutted that the new administration respected democratic 
institutions and neither pressured nor advocated resignations 
from the judiciary, but said it also was committed to rooting 
out corruption wherever it prospered, even to the 
hypothetical point of condemning their own families to jail. 
He added that the governing MAS party was itself a study in 
pluralism and did not seek a controlling majority in the 
upcoming constituent assembly.  The Ambassador said all this 
bore further discussion, but we would remain sharply 
attentive to the integrity of Bolivian democracy. 
 
----- 
CN/CT 
----- 
 
¶9.  (C) On the counternarcotics front, the Ambassador agreed 
that the GOB had been effective in interdiction, but said 
eradication had fallen off significantly.  While Garcia 
Linera tried to split hairs about historically acceptable 
rates for pulling coca plants, Morales acknowledged problems 
in the Chapare but said he could manage them; the Yungas, he 
mused, was a different and more frightening proposition for 
which he had no ready answers.  The Ambassador suggested that 
improved eradication might set the stage for a successful 
visit by INL Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson, whom Morales 
said he was looking forward to meeting.  After characterizing 
the FARC as a narcotics trafficking organization, the intel 
chief noted the presence in the Morales government of a 
prominent FARC contact, leftist Bolivian journalist Hugo 
Moldiz, as another mixed signal from an administration 
ostensibly fighting the narco trade.  Garcia Linera 
acknowledged Moldiz might have had contacts with the FARC, 
while commenting, as one who himself had been "connected with 
the subversive world," that Moldiz was really a man of the 
right rather than the left. 
 
----------------------------------- 
BOLIVIAN-COLOMBIAN DELEGATION VISIT 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) What may have been the real aim of the 
evening--getting planning back on track for a high-level 
visit to Washington to discuss Bolivian soy within the 
Colombia FTA and to pursue extension of ATPDEA 
benefits--emerged only at the end of the dinner.  To Morales' 
round-about query about the thinking in Washington, the 
Ambassador responded that we were prepared to discuss a visit 
by a joint Bolivian-Colombian delegation anytime, but the 
visit itself should be well prepared and might not be useful 
before May or June.  Morales and Garcia Linera seemed 
comfortable with that timeframe. 
 
----------------- 
PUBLIC RETRACTION 
----------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) As we broke from the table, Garcia Linera said the 
media had gathered and wanted brief statements, presumably 
relating to the improved mood and our continued bilateral 
cooperation.  The Ambassador insisted that we take the 
opportunity to clear the record on Morales' damaging remarks 
on the bombing incident.  Morales reluctantly agreed, and his 
subsequent public retraction was carried in all print and 
television media the following two days. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) If past experience is indicative, Morales will 
restrain his anti-U.S. impulse for a while, but could well 
deliver another anti-U.S. outburst in the near term. 
Meantime, our public restraint and willingness to stay 
engaged are keeping us on  the moral high ground with the 
media and the chattering class.  Morales, however, continues 
to sail in polls that rate his popularity at 80 percent, 
despite widely reported missteps with us and others.  End 
comment. 
GREENLEE