VZCZCXRO6348
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHKL #0773/01 1170926
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270926Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6510
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000773 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2016 
TAGS: ETTC ETRD PREL CU MY
SUBJECT: CUBA: NSC-DIRECTED COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REVIEW 
REGARDING SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 57782 
 
     ¶B. 2005 KUALA LUMPUR 04256 
     ¶C. 2005 KUALA LUMPUR 02208 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Colin Helmer.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)   Summary:  Based on our understanding of the 
bilateral trade and investment ties, it appears no Malaysian 
entities would be subject to Title III sanctions against 
persons trafficking in confiscated properties in Cuba.  Per 
Ref A request, this message provides post's analysis of 
Malaysian policies and actions with respect to Cuba, for use 
in assessing whether to waive Title III of the LIBERTAD Act. 
There has been no substantive change since Ref B.  Post does 
not believe a decision to waive or not to waive Title III 
will have a significant impact on Malaysian relations with 
Cuba; they will remain cordial.  However, imposing sanctions 
against a Malaysian entity would be perceived as a negative 
political act, and would likely result in more vocal 
opposition to U.S. policy toward Cuba than Malaysia has 
demonstrated in the past.  End Summary. 
 
Investment and Bilateral Trade 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) Malaysia has a very limited economic relationship 
with Cuba.  Total bilateral trade for 2005 was $2.7 million, 
up from $1.8 million in 2004.  Trade reached a peak of $6 
million in 2002, mainly because Malaysia extended a 
$10-million credit for Cuban imports of Malaysian palm oil. 
The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding for 
scientific cooperation in 2002 that is designed to advance 
cooperation on biotechnology, primarily at a university 
level. The same year a Malaysian firm (Bioven) headed by 
Mukhriz Mahathir, son of former Prime Minister Mahathir, 
signed a joint venture with Cuba's Heber Biotec to 
manufacture and distribute Cuban biotechnology products, such 
as vaccines, in Southeast Asia.  We have been able to find 
only a few investments under this arrangement.  The initial 
one was a RM 250,000 ($66,000) project to develop a 
meningococcal vaccine.  The vaccine has not yet come onto the 
market. 
 
¶3.  (U) In November 2005, Bioven announced that it would 
collaborate with Cuba's Center for Molecular Immunology (CIM) 
on clinical trials hoping to lead to production of an 
anti-cancer vaccine.  Bioven will have exclusive marketing 
rights for any products in the Southeast Asian region and to 
member countries of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference.  In conjunction with helping to set up Bioven's 
trials, Cuban doctors and researchers presented a workshop in 
Kuala Lumpur.  Bioven also inked a deal with Heber Biotech to 
produce a shrimp growth stimulator to enhance Malaysia's 
prawn industry.  Malaysian investment in Cuba is 
non-existent, according to Malaysia's Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry.  Malaysia and Cuba signed a 
bilateral trade agreement in 1997. 
 
¶4.  (U) Malaysia's relationship with Cuba in science, 
biotechnology and health is otherwise limited.  In February 
2004, the Universiti Sains Malaysia signed five memoranda of 
agreement with research institutions in Cuba.  There were a 
few media announcements of medical or technical collaboration 
in 2004 and 2005 but there has been no further news (see Ref 
C). 
 
¶5.  (U) Trinidad Holdings Sdn. Bhd., a trading group based in 
Kuala Lumpur, has been the exclusive Malaysian distributor 
for Cuban cigars since 1993, through an agreement with the 
Pacific Cigar Company Ltd Hong Kong.  In the past three 
years, the company added Cuban wine, beer and, most recently, 
ice cream to its list of products.  The products are 
distributed mainly to hotels and restaurants. 
 
Exchange Programs 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Malaysia reportedly agreed to boost ties between 
Malaysian and Cuban universities during recent government 
high-level meetings in Havana, but there has been no mention 
of any agreement in the Malaysian media.  Cuba and Malaysia 
occasionally conduct sports, cultural and medical exchanges 
but they are few in number and scope, and do not seem to be 
organized under a formal structure.  For example, in April, 
Cubano Festival 2006, sponsored by the Cuban Embassy, began 
with a local performance by the Afro Cuban All Stars.  The 
three-month festival includes visits by other musicians and 
displays by Chinese-Cuban artists.  This is the second Cuban 
 
KUALA LUMP 00000773  002 OF 002 
 
 
cultural festival to take place in Malaysia. 
 
Promotion of Democracy 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The Government of Malaysia has undertaken no policies 
or actions of which we are aware to advance democracy, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba.  Malaysia is a vocal 
advocate of non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
states.  Malaysia established diplomatic relations with Cuba 
31 years ago. 
 
High-Level Visits in the Past 6 Months 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) Malaysia has cordial and friendly relations with 
Cuba, and both states currently are members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Troika.  Malaysia is current Chair 
of the NAM, and Cuba is scheduled to be the next NAM chair in 
September 2006.  This results in periodic meetings between 
senior Malaysian and Cuban officials.  The Third Joint 
Commission Meeting (JCM) between Malaysia and Cuba took place 
in Havana on April 3-5, 2006.  The MFA Secretary General 
headed the Malaysian delegation to a senior officials meeting 
April 3-4, while Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar co-chaired 
the ministerial level meeting that followed on April 5. 
During his visit Hamid reportedly discussed bilateral 
relations, and regional issues such as the NAM, with his 
counterpart Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque.  Hamid 
reportedly also met with Fidel and Raul Castro.  During the 
JMC, Malaysia and Cuba reportedly agreed to create a joint 
computer services business, and to boost ties between their 
universities. 
 
¶9.  (C) Malaysia objects in principle to the imposition of 
economic sanctions and consequently supports Cuba's 
opposition to U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba.  We would 
expect Malaysia to protest in principle the imposition of 
Title III sanctions on any country.  The protests would 
become more vehement if a Malaysian entity were singled out 
for sanctions.  Malaysia could be expected to respond to 
sanctions by maintaining or even increasing its support for 
Cuba in the UN and other organizations. 
LAFLEUR