VZCZCXRO9136
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHHK #1512/01 1010957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110957Z APR 06
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6060
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 001512 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP AND EAP/CM 
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2031 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL HK CH
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S ELECTION STRATEGY 
 
Classified By: E/P Chief Simon Schuchat. Reasons: 1.4(b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On April 7, Consul General Cunningham met 
with Lee Wing-tat, Democratic Party (DP) Chairman to review 
the party's election strategy.  Lee said he welcomed the 
creation of the Civic Party and seemed pretty confident that 
the pan-democrats could get the hundred plus Chief Executive 
Election Committee members needed to nominate an opposition 
candidate, although Beijing will work hard to prevent it. 
The pan-democrats had no illusion that a democratic CE 
candidate could win, but Lee contended that the DP could turn 
the CE election into a "virtual election" and take advantage 
of the opportunity to influence public opinion.  (Separately, 
the "Ming Pao" reported that the democrats could potentially 
win 120 Election Committee seats.)  The DP Chief also 
confirmed that mainland representatives had offered bribes to 
two DP members; the party will make this information public 
later this month.  End Summary. 
 
Election Strategy 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On April 7, Consul General Cunningham met with Lee 
Wing-tat, Democratic Party (DP) Chairman to review the 
party's election strategy.  Lee said he welcomed the creation 
of the Civic Party and said that the two parties would work 
well together.  He and Civic Party lawmaker Ronny Tong were 
working together to develop strategy and to prepare for the 
next major political event -- the 2007 Chief Executive (CE) 
election.  Lee emphasized that the party's CE Election 
Committee strategy was not yet public knowledge and 
emphasized the sensitive nature of this information. 
According to Lee, the DP and Civic Party needed to register 
voters in the various constituencies now and lay the 
groundwork for a campaign in the fall.  Lee seemed pretty 
confident they could get the hundred plus members needed to 
nominate an opposition candidate but acknowledged that 
Beijing will work hard to prevent that from happening. 
 
¶3. (C) It was clear that the democratic CE candidate would 
not be able to win the election, said Lee, but having a 
candidate would force Tsang to debate a range of issues, 
including democracy, political reform, a timetable for 
universal suffrage, as well as social and economic issues. 
The Chief Executive is expected to produce a new report on 
political reform (presumably from the Commission on Strategic 
Development) by the end of this year and will have to defend 
it during the CE election campaign.  The democrats will use 
that debate to establish the DP as a party with an agenda and 
platform that goes beyond democracy, but will also energize 
the public again.  With a good, articulate candidate (Lee 
mentioned former Chief Secretary Anson Chan as an example but 
just as quickly said he had no idea who might run), the DP 
could turn the CE election into a "virtual election" because 
the democratic candidate will have the chance to influence 
public opinion.  Tsang will not only have to respond to the 
800 Election Committee members, but to public opinion as 
well.  Tsang will not want to combine selection by the 
Election Committee with a poor performance in opinion polls 
of the general public. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On April 11, "Ming Pao" published a special 
investigative report on the pan-democrats' strategy for the 
September CE Election Committee elections.  The newspaper 
reported that the pan-democrats intended to stage a 
large-scale campaign to encourage eligible voters to register 
by the May 16 deadline.  If the democrats fared well in the 
social welfare, legal, medical, health services, higher 
education, education and accountancy sub-sector elections and 
if one included the 25 pro-democracy Legco members who are 
automatically members of the Election Committee, the 
pan-democrats could potentially have as many as 120 seats. 
The "Ming Pao" noted that the pro-Beijing forces had been 
instructed to counter the democrats' push by fielding their 
own candidates and keeping the number of pro-democratic 
Election Committee members below 100.  (Note: The efforts of 
the democrats to aggressively campaign for Election Committee 
seats is in sharp contrast to their previous boycott of the 
July 2000 Election Committee elections.  At the time, they 
argued that they did not want to participate in "small circle 
elections."  End Note.) 
 
Some Coordination with the Civic Party 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Regarding other elections, Lee told the CG that he did 
not expect DP and Civic Party candidates to compete for the 
same pro-democracy votes in the District Council elections -- 
they would coordinate on where to run candidates in order to 
 
HONG KONG 00001512  002 OF 002 
 
 
maximize their chances and strengths.  The DP has an 
established organization, which the Civic Party won't have, 
added Lee.  They would, however, be competing with each other 
in the 2008 Legislative Council elections, since there were a 
limited number of geographic constituency seats. 
 
Relations with the Government and Factional Issues 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6. (C) Lee said that he had no regrets at how things turned 
out last fall, with the defeat of the Government's reform 
package.  He was now concentrating on deflecting attempts by 
the press and pro-Beijing forces (and at times the Government 
and especially Tsang) to paint the DP as an opposition party 
only intent on obstruction.  Lee pointed out that the DP had 
had a good dialogue with Secretary for Finance Henry Tang on 
the budget and ultimately supported the Government's budget. 
The DP also worked well with York Chow, Secretary for Health, 
Welfare, and Food, and other ministers.  The relationship 
with the CE was a bit different now, although they did talk. 
Still, Lee thought that the Government would try to maximize 
its support per issue, rather than relying on a fixed support 
base from pro-Government parties such as the Democratic 
Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) 
and the Liberal Party.  Lee explained that the DP had 
supported the HKG on the budget after some concessions by 
Tang, and would support the Government on the construction of 
Government headquarters at Tamar, albeit, with some 
modifications.  He noted that Tsang had mentioned three major 
projects in his policy address last October: constitutional 
reform, the West Kowloon Cultural District, and Tamar.  Lee 
said that since the first two projects were considered either 
failed or stalled, getting support for the Tamar project was 
very important to Tsang.  He was sure that Beijing had told 
the DAB to drop its opposition. 
 
¶7. (C) The Consul General asked Lee if the negative attacks 
in the media regarding contact between the USG and the DP or 
the Civic Party were causing the parties any problems.  He 
replied no, that this type of speculation had been going on 
for some time.  Separately, Lee confirmed that mainland 
representatives had offered bribes to two DP members.  In mid 
March (around the time of the Civic Party's official launch) 
Lee revealed during a press conference that there had been a 
mysterious increase in membership applications to the party 
and possible bribe attempts.  Lee assigned a taskforce to 
investigate these allegations.   It seemed likely, added Lee, 
that others had been offered bribes and not reported it.  The 
party will be making this information public, with the 
individuals involved, later this month.  (Comment:  There is 
speculation that the internal probe is actually a battle 
between Lee and another DP faction unhappy with Lee's 
leadership of the party.  End Comment) 
Cunningham