VZCZCXRO7006
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHIHL #0072/01 1171719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271719Z APR 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0594
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0608
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0659

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000072 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/27/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SOUTH CENTRAL SHI'A VIEWS ON SELECTION OF JAWAD AL-MALIKI AS 
PRIME MINISTER 
 
HILLAH 00000072  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO 
Hillah, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  After the April 22 selection of Jawad 
Al-Maliki as the Prime Minister-designate, REO Hillah canvassed 
leaders in the heavily Shi'a South Central region of Iraq for 
their views on this development. Not surprisingly, reaction to 
Maliki's selection broke down mostly along Shi'a 
Islamist/secular lines, with Islamists largely supporting his 
selection, and most secular leaders criticizing him or stating 
they would withhold judgment on him until they see how he 
performs as Prime Minister (PM). Some Islamist leaders described 
Maliki as a better leader than Ibrahim Al-Jafari, who Maliki 
very recently replaced as the Shi'a Islamist United Iraqi 
Alliance (UIA) coalition's PM candidate (NOTE: Maliki is 
Jafari's deputy in the Islamic Da'wa party, which is a 
constituent member of the UIA). Many of those contacted 
indicated they were glad to see the formation of the government 
progress. There have been no protests in the South Central 
region to the replacement of Jafari with Maliki, or to Maliki's 
selection as PM. END SUMMARY. 
 
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SADRIST, ISLAMIC DA'WA LEADERS WELCOME SELECTION OF MALIKI 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) REO Hillah local staff spoke with two Sadrist leaders 
in the South Central region, both of whom described Maliki's 
selection as PM as beneficial and predicted it would advance the 
formation of the government. One from Najaf stated explicitly 
that "Sadrists will respect this decision." They both noted 
Maliki's strong anti-Baathist credentials and highlighted the 
fact that his selection was a UIA decision. 
 
¶3.  (C) One of the Sadrist leaders, Dr. Basim Sharif Al-Hejamy 
(Islamic Fadila party), a Council of Representatives (CoR) 
member from Wasit and a spokesman for the UIA, described Maliki 
as a man of action, asserting that he "wishes to execute more 
than talk." Al-Hejamy also alluded to the UIA's determination to 
have its own coalition, or, more broadly, the Shi'a members of 
the CoR, dominate the new government, in stating that Maliki's 
selection "is also a good step to overcome the Sunni's plan to 
form a national unity government." 
 
¶4.  (C) Sa'ad Zawain, the deputy head of the Islamic Da'wa party 
office in Najaf province, described Maliki as an "excellent 
candidate" for the Prime Ministership. Zawain argued that Maliki 
would show more flexibility than Jafari in resolving political 
problems. In keeping with comments from Sadrist leaders 
themselves, Zawain offered that Sadrists within the UIA 
supported the selection of Maliki.  Zawain predicted that 
choosing the heads of the ministries would take one to one and a 
half months. 
 
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SOUTH CENTRAL SCIRI REPS WELCOME RESOLUTION 
------------------------------------------- 
¶5.  (C) South Central representatives of the Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, which is a constituent 
party of the UIA) welcomed the selection of Maliki as Prime 
Minister. Babil Deputy Governor Hasoon Ali Hasoon was 
particularly pleased that a Babil native had been chosen and 
highlighted his "long history of patriotic struggle against 
Saddam's regime." Similarly, Wasit SCIRI head Ahmed Al-Hakim 
praised the role of the Marja'iya in Najaf in brokering a 
face-saving compromise for all elements of the UIA. In Najaf, 
Provincial Council Deputy Chairman Shaykh Khalid Al-Noumani said 
he would have preferred Ali Al-Adeen as the alternative to 
Jafari, but was pleased that the UIA was able to solve the 
problem independently. 
 
¶6.  (C) None of the SCIRI officials contacted by REO staff 
expected significant changes on substantive issues as a result 
of Maliki's selection. Deputy Governor Hasoon, who described 
Jafari and Maliki as "two sides of the same coin," placed the 
unity of the UIA and its governing program ahead of specific 
personalities. Wasit's Al-Hakim particularly welcomed Maliki's 
reputation as a forceful negotiator and administrator, and in a 
pointed jab at Jafari, described Maliki "as a man who liked to 
do more than talk." 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INDEPENDENT ISLAMISTS VIEW MALIKI FAVORABLY 
------------------------------------------- 
¶7.  (C) Independent Islamists in the region, all of whom spoke 
very favorably of Maliki. Dr. Abdul Hussein Al-Mousawi, the 
Najaf Provincial Council Chairman, offered that Maliki will have 
"a much stronger and more stable basis of support in the CoR 
than Jafari would have had" (although he did not offer an 
 
HILLAH 00000072  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
explanation as to why this would be the case). 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Abdul Ali Yaseen Mohammed Al-Yasseri, the Deputy 
Chairman of the Karbala Provincial Council, said "this 
nomination might not please everyone but the new government will 
get quick approval from the CoR." Al-Yasseri also described 
Maliki as a "patriot" who had fought against Saddam Hussein. 
Adnan Abid Al-Turki, a journalist for Al-Fayhaa newspaper, 
stated that the UIA has succeeded because changing the 
characters has nothing to do with their program -- the UIA 
program will still be accomplished, whether it is Jafari or 
Maliki in the Prime Minister's position. 
 
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SOME ALLAWI LIST MEMBERS SEE BLOW TO NATIONAL UNITY GOVT. 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶9.  (C) Two CoR members from the National Iraqi List (NIL, a 
largely secular list led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi) 
and the Iraqi National Accord party (Allawi's party, which is 
part of the NIL) from South Central Iraq greeted the end of the 
political stalemate with resignation. Shaykh Jamal Al-Batik, a 
CoR member from Wasit, said he would have preferred Jafari or 
Adil Abd Al-Mehdi (of SCIRI) instead of Maliki, primarily 
because of Maliki's reputation as a tough and inflexible leader. 
Shaykh Sa'ad Safouk, a CoR member from Karbala, interpreted 
Maliki's selection as a further blow to the Allawi alliance's 
wish for a national unity government, and criticized Maliki as 
"another face of Jafari, but more extreme." 
 
¶10.  (SBU) An Iraqi National Accord (INA) member from Babil, 
Sabah Allawi, was more neutral on the selection of Maliki, 
stating, "our opinion in the INA is not against or with 
Al-Maliki. We will support the PM as long as he applies the 
constitution." He added that he and his colleagues would not 
pass judgment on Maliki until the government is formed and it is 
tested. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
BEYOND THE PARTIES: OTHER SECULARISTS WITH MIXED VIEWS OF MALIKI 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
¶11.  (SBU) The REO contacted five secular leaders who are not 
currently members of political parties or office holders. Some 
see Maliki as an unknown quantity. Two of the secular leaders 
said that there is not much difference between Maliki and 
Jafari, with one of these two offering, grudgingly, that Maliki 
is something of an improvement over Jafari. Two of the five said 
they, or local residents in general, were glad that there had 
been major progress in forming a government, after the long 
delay. 
 
¶12.  (C) Eltefat Al-Kabiee, a woman who works as a lawyer with 
the Najaf Human Rights Center, reasoned that Iraqis should 
withhold judgment on Maliki's abilities as Prime Minister until 
they have the opportunity to see him perform. A journalist from 
Karbala said people there wanted Jafari to remain the nominee 
given that he is from Karbala, but that residents do not have 
any "objection" to Maliki. 
 
¶13.  (C) Taking a less charitable view of the new Prime 
Minister-designate, a secular journalist from Wasit declared, 
"this nomination accomplished nothing. Al-Maliki is only another 
face of Al-Jafari because he is the number two in the Da'wa 
party." Amal Al-Rubaiee, the head of the Karbala Family Center 
(a women's rights organization), stated that there is not much 
difference between Jafari and Maliki, "but with Al-Jafari people 
had zero hope and now about thirty percent [have] hope in 
solving their daily difficulties." 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
¶14.  (C) There have been no protests or violence in the heavily 
Shi'a South Central region in response to the selection of 
Maliki, and none of the REO's contacts predicted any. This is 
largely due to fact that all parts of the UIA, including the 
Sadrists, can live with Maliki as part of the broader bargain 
over senior CoR leadership, and eventually, cabinet positions. 
Regardless of their opinion of Maliki, most of those contacted 
seemed glad to see the fight over the selection of the Prime 
Minister come to an end, so that the political parties in the 
CoR can move towards the completion of the formation of the 
government. END COMMENT. 
FONTENEAU