VZCZCXRO2714
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHIHL #0054/01 0951005
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051005Z APR 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0585
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0569
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0634

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000054 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/5/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER NAJAF GOVERNOR ON AL-SADR, IRANIAN INFLUENCE 
 
REF: A) HILLAH 0046 B) HILLAH 0010 
 
HILLAH 00000054  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department 
of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Former Najaf Governor and head of the Loyalty to 
An Najaf party Adnan Al Zurfi believes Muqtada Al-Sadr wishes to 
avoid armed confrontation with coalition forces, but is finding 
it difficult to keep Madhi Army militia under his direct 
control. Sadr, Zurfi commented, is listening to Sistani and 
working to purge radical, unpredictable lieutenants from the 
Najaf Mahdi militia. By doing so, he hopes to minimize chances 
of an out-of-control incident that could give the Americans an 
excuse to attack the Jaysh al-Mahdi.  Zurfi warned that JAM 
militia in Najaf are stockpiling mortars and may have recently 
received anti-tank missiles from Iran (NFI).  He described 
Iranian influence in Najaf as deep, but limited.  While Iranian 
intelligence is embedded in many layers of Najaf government, 
there has been little Iranian commercial investment. 
Consequently, many Najaf citizens remain skeptical of Iranian 
intentions and would strongly prefer a continued U.S. presence. 
Zurfi described a massive Iranian public relations campaign in 
which up to three hundred Najaf business owners, bureaucrats, 
teachers, and intellectuals, men and women, are sent on an 
all-expenses paid trip to Tehran.  Despite the inducements, 
Zurfi said, many Najaf citizens return unconvinced.  Zurfi also 
updated REO Hillah staff on his brother's kidnapping case, and 
again called for financial support of his party and related 
organizations (reftel B). END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (S) Adnan Al Zurfi came to REO Al Hillah to pass along 
documents related to his brother's kidnapping, and the arrest of 
one of his aides.  He said he intended to go to Baghdad in the 
near future to meet with the FBI and pass along a dossier on his 
brother's case to PM Ibrahim Jafari. 
 
¶3. (S) Zurfi portrayed himself as a hunted man, continually 
under attack by Najaf Governor Assad Al Taee and Deputy Governor 
Hassan.  He stated that he believed Hassan is holding his 
brother, Hussein, based on calls made from Hussein's cell phone 
that appeared to originate from government buildings, prisons, 
and houses known to belong to Hassan.  Zurfi described Governor 
Al Taee as more aggressive than DG Hassan.  He downplayed 
reports of enmity between the two, noting they were moving in 
the same direction.  Al Taee, he said, had warned Zurfi's 
long-standing provincial government and Iraqi police contacts 
that they would be fired if they were seen with Zurfi. 
"Trumped-up" charges of corruption during Zurfi's tenure as 
governor, brought by the Governor, had been dismissed in 
Baghdad, Zurfi added. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Iran: Often thanks, but no thanks 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S)  "Najaf belongs to the Iranians," Zurfi said.  He stated 
that the Governor had told him it was nothing personal, but as 
long as Zurfi, a U.S. national, was seen by the Iranians as 
someone who could rally anti-Iranian sentiment, the prosecution 
would continue.  Zurfi urged the United States to pay more 
attention to Zurfi's political allies, the sheikhs of major 
tribes, such as the Al-Ghazali in Najaf province. Those sheiks, 
Zurfi said, saw no commercial advantage in dealing with Iranians 
and preferred the status quo, preferably with plenty of U.S. 
largesse. Comment: However, tribal-based politicians have 
performed poorly in local elections, with SCIRI and Dawa 
capturing most votes. End Comment 
 
¶5. (S) Zurfi claimed that the governor swings all municipal 
contracts to Iranian-connected business owners.  However, his 
power is checked somewhat by Ayatollah Sistani's disinclination 
to interact either with the governor or the Iranians.  Sistani, 
Zurfi noted, meets infrequently at best with Governor Al Taee. 
 
¶6. (S) Zurfi characterized Iranian influence as deep, but 
limited.  The Iranians work through "their man", Deputy Governor 
Hassan, but also control most intelligence functions in the 
province.  Zurfi noted that this is a important reason why 
Iranian public relations often fails to capture hearts and 
minds; the blatant exercise of power by local intelligence 
personnel cuts too close to the excesses of the Saddam era for 
most local residents.  Teachers, former Baathists, clerks 
believe they could be dismissed at any time for no reason.  As 
an aside, Zurfi commented, many intelligence operatives from the 
Saddam days are back in action and manipulating Sadr militia 
units, or alternatively influencing Sadrists through relatives 
embedded in the militias.  They have just swapped green shirts 
for black, Zurfi concluded. Zurfi also claimed that in the past 
two months, the price of weapons has surged in the Najaf area as 
 
HILLAH 00000054  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
JAM members stock up.  They are particularly interested in 
mortars and have received anti-tank missiles from Iran, Zurfi 
asserted. 
 
¶7. (S) Zurfi contrasted Iranian pull in the Najaf provincial 
bureaucracy with their limited commercial clout.  Many Najaf 
businessmen would prefer dealing with the Americans who at least 
bring aid dollars to the table, Zurfi said.  To counter this, 
Zurfi claimed that the Iranians are giving out all-expenses-paid 
tours to Teheran on a grand scale.  Up to three hundred local 
residents a month from all works of life are bused or flown to 
Iran.  The particularly influential are sometimes taken to meet 
Ayatollah Khata or Rafsanjani 
 
¶8. (S) Zurfi asserted that the Governor of Qom Province had 
recently secretly traveled to Najaf during Arba'een, staying in 
a small house adjacent to the main shrine for Hussein.  He 
related how an acquaintance had had business dealings with a 
relatively high-profile Iranian intelligence agent "Hammad" who 
made it a point to seek out Iraqi businessmen and offer them 
Iranian imports at close to or below cost ("Hammad" had 
allegedly worked in the Sudan during the Eighties). The 
Iranians, Zurfi claimed, were also assisting SCIRI in gradually 
removing police chiefs one by one around the region, replacing 
them with SCIRI members.  In these small ways, Zurfi stressed, 
the Iranians steadily accumulated influence. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Muqtada Al-Sadr: A Fearful Moderate? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (S) Zurfi claimed that Al-Sadr had met with Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani one-on-one just days before, in a two hour meeting. Sadr 
"knows what is going on," Zurfi says, and does not hesitate to 
demonstrate his willingness to cooperate with Sistani.  Zurfi 
characterized Al-Sadr as wanting to stay engaged in the 
political process.  Accordingly, Zurfi commented, Al-Sadr is 
fearful that uncontrollable elements of the JAM will jeopardize 
his political gains by provoking the Americans into attacking 
and crushing the militia.  Therefore, in Najaf, Al-Sadr is 
sending away more radical members of his entourage and turning 
over militia groups to more reliable or at least predictable 
lieutenants.  He noted that after a recent Badr-instigated 
attack on his compound, Al-Sadr's first reaction was to restrain 
militia members who had rushed to the scene, encouraging them to 
stay calm.  Zurfi commented that Sadr's support is not as 
monolithic as commonly portrayed in the media.  The Americans, 
Zurfi commented, should attempt to reach out to older, "simple" 
Sadr members who have automatically, but at best only 
half-heartedly, transferred their allegiance to the son. 
Comment: Reftel A reports on a meeting between Al-Sadr and 
Sistani. Zurfi may or may not be referring to the same meeting. 
His account of the meeting differs substantially from reftel. 
End Comment 
 
---------------------- 
Zurfi's perilous place 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) As per reftel B, Zurfi continues to emphasize that his 
party and other secular parties in Najaf (including the 
Communist Party) are losing ground as supporters abandon hope 
that they can influence events.  He stated that he himself is 
only staying in Najaf because of the disappearance of his 
brother.  He also asked for U.S. intervention in the trial of a 
former assistant who has been transferred to Babil Province to 
face multiple charges of murder and extortion.  Zurfi claims 
that the charges are based on a confession extracted by torture. 
 Comment: Regardless of the validity of Zurfi's accusation, 
there have been repeated accounts of human rights abuses by the 
defendant End Comment 
 
¶11. (S) Zurfi said his finances are dwindling and he has yet to 
receive the salary he is entitled to as an ex-governor. Still, 
he commented, he remains politically active, most recently 
organizing a teen sports and culture association as an 
alternative to joining the militias.  He optimistically 
commented that while many of his supporters may have gone 
underground, they yearn for leaders who can deliver normalcy, 
and not rely on partisan religion for their base of support. 
FONTENEAU