VZCZCXRO9529
PP RUEHBC RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHDE #1859/01 0911350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 011350Z APR 06
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9528
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 2459
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUBAI 001859 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SOCI
SUBJECT: DRL DAS BARKS-RUGGLES' IRAN MEETINGS IN DUBAI 
 
REF: A. DUBAI 1728, B. DUBAI 1319 
 
DUBAI 00001859  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(C) Summary:  During DRL DAS Erica Barks-Ruggles' March 16-19 
trip to UAE, she met with a diverse strata of the Iranian 
population here, including students, teachers, professionals, 
and Baha'is.  She also discussed Iran issues with two local 
think tanks.  Common themes included a concern that the USG's 
publicized efforts to help political activists in Iran will put 
them in jeopardy, both in Iran -- where the government will use 
this as an excuse to clamp down -- and in the UAE, where the UAE 
government will feel pressure to clamp down on open political 
activity by Iranians.  She also heard praise for many U.S. goals 
regarding Iran, mixed with criticism of the tone of some U.S. 
commentary.  Iranians made various suggestions for VOA 
programming and people-to-people projects.  Many pressed for 
more student visas, scholarships and exchange opportunities as 
the single most beneficial thing the U.S. could do to positively 
influence Iran.  A Baha'i couple talked about repression at the 
hands of the Iranian government.  End summary 
 
UAE Realities 
------------- 
 
2.(C) The majority of interlocutors with whom DRL DAS 
Barks-Ruggles discussed Iran issues in the UAE March 16-19 
indicated that the UAE would not welcome open political activism 
by Iranians here, and that Iranians here are vulnerable to 
pressure from both the GOI and the UAEG. (DAS Barks-Ruggles' 
conversation on Iran with a UAE official is reported septel.) 
Iranians in UAE have greater relative freedom than people living 
in Iran, but there are limits to that freedom -- placed in part 
by the UAE government, in part by the Iranian government, and in 
part by their own society.  Iranians choose to live in the UAE 
for various reasons, including better economic opportunities and 
social freedoms.  Many young people come here to go to 
university due to the scarcity of seats available in Iran. 
Several young men indicated that they would stay after their 
studies to avoid military service.  Because of their desire to 
remain in UAE, Iranians are vulnerable to pressure from the UAE 
authorities not to rock the boat with political activism while 
they are here.  Iranian university students said they had to 
sign a commitment not to conduct political activities before 
being allowed to open a Persian club at their university.  Riad 
Kahwaji, CEO of the Dubai-based think tank Institute for Near 
East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) (who is not Iranian) 
also stressed that the UAE does not want to anger Iran by 
allowing political activities here.  He also noted that to date, 
there has been very little interaction between UAE and Iranian 
academics, such as conferences in Dubai. 
 
3.(C) Iran itself also has the motivation and the means to 
discourage political activism in the Iranian diaspora in the 
UAE, either indirectly by pressuring UAE or directly, via the 
strong intelligence presence that is suspected here.  One of the 
university students with whom Barks-Ruggles met said that in 
many ways he feels like Dubai is just an extension of Iran. 
(Note: The Iranian government promotes this sense by providing 
for Iranians' needs here, including Farsi-language, 
Iran-accredited schools; a hospital; a social club; and a 
newspaper.)  A significant reason why that student wanted to 
live in Dubai was continued contact with Iran.  However, 
Iranians fear repercussions for political activity when they 
travel back to Iran, as most of them do regularly.  Dr. Mustafa 
Alani (who is not Iranian) at the Gulf Research Center cautioned 
that Iranian intelligence in the UAE is more pervasive than one 
might assume.  He was pessimistic that many people would risk 
participating in USG projects here, since their families or 
businesses retain links in one form or another to Iran and/or 
the Iranian government.  In light of this, he was a proponent of 
greater use of more indirect means, like television as a 
communication medium, (though he was very critical of al-Hurra). 
 Kahwaji said he had noted fewer Iranians at a recent Track 2 
event he attended in Greece, adding that he believes the Iranian 
government is clamping down on participation in such activities. 
 
 
4.(C) Finally, the university students also indicated that in 
general - whether in Dubai or Iran - their parents discourage 
them from becoming politically active (since, like most parents, 
they do not want to see harm come to their children).  The 
students said there had been a generational change since their 
parents' era, when people were more politically active. 
Students listed their primary concerns as 1) finding employment, 
2) finding a partner, and 3) being well paid enough to live the 
lifestyle they want -- preferably one that allowed them to shift 
in and out of Iran.  Reza Samadipour, from the Iranian Business 
Council, cautioned that Iran and the UAE both have a vested 
interest in continued business relations, and that the U.S. 
 
DUBAI 00001859  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
would likely get pushback from the local Iranian community -- 
and possibly the UAEG -- if a perception were to develop that it 
was our policy to interrupt this. 
 
People-to-People Exchanges 
-------------------------- 
 
5.(C) Despite these reservations, the Iranian university 
students strongly supported the concept of rebuilding bridges 
between the Iranian and the American peoples.  They suggested 
that perhaps someone could establish an Iranian-American 
Friendship Society.  They liked the idea of conferences or 
speakers at their university in Dubai, but favored multiple 
international sponsors, to minimize the footprint of the U.S. 
In light of the statement they had been compelled to sign (that 
their university Persian club would not get involved in 
political activities), they suggested a greater focus on 
business topics and cultural exchanges.  Kahwaji echoed recent 
comments (reftel A) that there was more space for university-to 
university exchanges, where the USG seemed less visible. 
 
6.(C) The students also advocated approving direct flights from 
Iran to the U.S. as a message of solidarity with the Iranian 
people.  In addition they asked for greater and easier access to 
 more visas for students.  They claimed it cost more to go to 
university in the UAE than in the U.S., while the quality of 
education was lower.  In addition, they advocated for student 
exchanges and access to increased skills training through 
American schools and universities.  They also thought it could 
be useful, either via Internet or on TV, to provide English 
language teaching material for classrooms in Iran. 
 
Media Habits 
------------ 
 
7.(C) The Iranian university students discussed their media 
consumption habits and recommendations for programming into 
Iran.  One student said the three sites he finds credible for 
news on Iran are: Baztab.com (founded by former presidential 
candidate Mohsen Rezai), VOA's website, and London-based 
oppositionist Ali Reza Nourizadeh's website, nourizadeh.com.  He 
said he checks them daily and does not consume any press from 
inside Iran.  Others noted that VOA's Farsi website is very 
credible, but that it is blocked inside of Iran.  Most of our 
Iranian interlocutors, especially the students, agreed they did 
not like the private Farsi-language broadcasting out of "L.A." 
as the stations had lost credibility by exaggerating events and 
constantly predicting the downfall of the Iranian government. 
 
8.(C) The Iranian students said they believe the Iranian 
government's claims to read messages sent by SMS.  They thought 
the government monitored SMS even more than phone calls and 
emails.  They said few Iranians in Iran have i-Pods and that 
most people in rural areas have limited access to the Internet - 
except through work (which is monitored) or Internet cafes. 
 
USG Sponsored Media 
------------------- 
 
9.(C) In the view of the university students, television 
programming is more effective than radio, in part because it is 
harder to jam satellite TV than short-wave radio.  They 
recommended more debates on VOA-TV on issues, including between 
various external political factions.  They liked the al-Jazeera 
show formatted on "Point-Counterpoint" as it is a lively debate 
of issues that are often taboo.  They suggested including more 
content from political activists who have left Iran recently. 
They disagreed amongst themselves over how much access the 
poorer strata of society had to satellite television, with one 
student one saying "a lot," and the other saying "not much," -- 
while adding that passing around videotapes in Iran helped 
amplify the impact of programming.  Both said Radio Farda's 
signal and website are effectively blocked in many places in 
Iran and asked why the U.S. did not set up FM transmitters along 
the border in Iraq and Afghanistan to combat jamming. 
 
10.(C) Another contact, Reza Samadipour with the Iranian 
Business Council said he considers USG broadcasting a credible 
news source and uses its information as a reality check against 
other news about Iran.  He recommended that broadcast management 
take a much more pedagogical approach towards its programming, 
formulating long-term "lesson plans."  For instance, instead of 
random public opinion polls on Radio Farda on news of the day, a 
series of questions over several weeks could be posed to explore 
in depth and shape public attitudes to a specific subject, such 
as human rights.  He also recommended that VOA develop 
children's television programming -- perhaps incorporating civic 
education into English language learning programs. 
 
11.(C) Dr. Alani suggested that given the limits that the 
 
DUBAI 00001859  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Iranian government will try to put on USG outreach to the 
Iranian people, the U.S. should focus primarily on UAE-based 
Iranians, with the expectation that they will operate as a 
bridge to Iranians back in Iran.  He also suggested distributing 
in Dubai a free Farsi-language newspaper -- with some news, some 
advertising and a columnist or two --  which he said could reach 
both a resident population as well as Iranians traveling back 
and forth. 
 
U.S. Rhetoric and Policies 
-------------------------- 
 
12.(C) Even those who seem generally supportive of shared goals 
with the U.S. (i.e. for greater freedom in Iran) were at times 
critical of certain aspects of U.S. policy and rhetoric.  One 
particularly eloquent and westernized Iranian university student 
said that he had been initially opposed to President Ahmadinejad 
but now he supports him out of nationalistic pride over the 
nuclear issue.  He said Iranians get angry when they hear the 
U.S. say Iran does not "need" nuclear energy because of its oil 
and gas reserves because 1) it is not the business of another 
country to make these decisions; and 2) it sounds hypocritical 
in light of the fact that the U.S. helped start those programs 
in the 1970s.  He said he supports Iran's right to nuclear 
technology, despite the fact that he knows perfectly well that 
the regime wants a bomb and he himself is against Iran building 
a bomb. 
 
13.(C) The university students also said that another perceived 
contradiction in U.S. policy was that we say we stand with the 
Iranian people, but at the same time we make the Iranian people 
fly in unsafe planes.  Barks-Ruggles explained that we had 
offered to consider licensing the sale of planes by the EU in 
support of the EU-3 negotiation effort with Iran, but the GOI's 
rejection of the EU-3's efforts had led to a dead end.  She also 
noted that we have, on occasion, licensed export of spare parts 
for safety reasons.   However, the students indicated that in 
the view of the Iranian population, the U.S. does not care about 
their personal safety. 
 
14.(C) Riad Kahwaji cautioned the U.S. not to make empty 
threats, and said that the drawn-out conflict in Iraq had 
reduced Iran's fear of the U.S.  He stressed that Iran's weak 
point was its inability to deliver economically.  He echoed a 
view held by many that the vote for Ahmadinejad was not so much 
for Ahmadinejad but against the corruption that Rafsanjani 
represented.  The U.S. should exploit this weak point by 
focusing more on internal corruption issues in its rhetoric. 
 
A Bleak Future for Iranian Youth 
-------------------------------- 
 
16.(C) DRL DAS Barks-Ruggles met a group of Iranian students 
March 18 who are studying in a Dubai TOEFL program.  Out of the 
roughly 15 students present, only one had been accepted into an 
Iranian university and planned to return to Iran.  The rest 
indicated they planned to study in the UAE or elsewhere.  They 
said the vast majority of students who take the university 
entrance exam fail to secure a place.  However, they disagreed 
amongst themselves how many times a student was allowed to take 
the test (some saying three, others saying it was unlimited). 
Most indicated they would likely try to stay in the UAE to work 
because there simply was not much opportunity in Iran.  Almost 
all wanted to study hard sciences -- medicine, engineering, and 
architecture -- while only one person mentioned business and 
another psychology.  A number of the students -- all males but 
one -- made it clear they were also outside the country in order 
to avoid military service.  They said Iranian males who worked 
for two years after university outside of Iran were allowed to 
buy out their military service, which would allow them to travel 
back and forth.  All the students pressed for more visas to 
study in the U.S. 
 
Baha'i Concerns 
--------------- 
 
17.(C) An Iranian Baha'i couple resident in UAE outlined to 
Barks-Ruggles March 17 the situation for Baha'is in Iran, as 
well as some of the problems they face in the UAE.  The wife 
left Iran five years ago, after being denied a passport for 13 
years.  She continues to travel back and forth and to date has 
had no problems.  Her husband has lived outside Iran for much 
longer. 
 
18.(C) The couple believed that in the past few months, the 
nuclear issue has distracted the Iranian government, and 
pressure has eased somewhat on the Baha'i community.  That said, 
the couple believed that should Iran get a nuclear weapon, the 
world could experience terrorism far worse than 9/11.  Because 
the Baha'i religion is non-political, Baha'is do not fight back 
 
DUBAI 00001859  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
in any organized way against the repression they face. 
 
19.(C) Asked about Hojjatiyeh (reftel B), the couple said they 
believe Hojjatiyeh members in various branches of the security 
forces use their position to advance their own agenda and 
persecute Baha'is.  This is likely done without explicit orders 
from the government, but the government takes no steps to rein 
them in.  The couple had no other knowledge of the Hojjatiyeh 
agenda, other than being familiar with its anti-Baha'i stance. 
 
20.(C) The couple said that about six years ago, Iranian 
authorities began recognizing Baha'i marriage attestations, but 
they said only some registries will issue certificates.  Baha'is 
are issued an affidavit saying that they have attested they are 
married; the affidavit makes no mention of religion.  The couple 
thought that a combination of thousands of letters that Baha'is 
sent to complain about their lack of marriage registration, plus 
former President Khatami's influence, led to the policy change. 
In addition, they said that Western condemnation of Iran for 
persecution of Baha'is has had an overall positive effect. 
 
21.(C) Because Baha'is are not allowed to study in Iranian 
universities, they have developed their own underground 
university system. The Iranian government, however, does not 
recognize their degrees.  The couple complained that no U.S. 
universities, other than one school in Indiana, recognize these 
degrees, unlike in Canada, where they are recognized.  They 
thought it would be an interesting idea to try to partner with a 
distance-learning program. 
 
22.(C) The couple described the situation of about 1000 Baha'i 
living in UAE, from Iran and numerous other countries, as 
relatively good, compared to the situation in other Arab 
countries, but said Baha'is do experience some problems with 
civil matters.  For instance, they cannot formally register a 
Baha'i marriage.  There are, however, a few sympathetic 
officials who will register them informally. 
 
WMD-Free Gulf 
------------- 
 
23.(C) The Gulf Research Center briefed on its ongoing sessions 
with representatives from GCC countries, Iran, Iraq and Yemen 
for a declaration of principles supporting a WMD-Free Zone 
(WMDFZ) in the Gulf, with the ultimate goal of a treaty.  Dr. 
Mustafa Alani and Dr. Christian Koch said their next meeting 
will be in South Africa in May, sponsored by the South African 
MFA.  They believe they have a commitment from Qatar, Bahrain, 
UAE, and Oman, but that the Saudis are still trying to gauge 
Iranian behavior.  They also believe that the Iranian 
representatives at the previous meetings are close to the 
government and that Iran is close to a positive decision to 
support a WMD-free Gulf.  They said they would remain skeptical 
of Iranian pledges, but thought it was best to control Iran 
regionally.  In their view, Iran originally thought it could 
bypass the region and negotiate with the European Union, but 
that after the failure of the EU-3 talks, it was now turning to 
the region.  The GRC saw a WMDFZ pledge as a cornerstone for 
ultimately developing a regional security system.  Alani and 
Koch called on the U.S. to affirm its support for Gulf WMDFZ 
activities and praised Secretary Rice's joint statement with the 
GCC along these lines. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
24.(C) The most actionable items that came out of these meetings 
were recommendations to increase VOA programming, up the 
involvement of political activists who have recently left Iran, 
and to develop children's programming.  It was also an 
intriguing idea to put more thought into a long-term syllabus 
for VOA for what the US wants the programming to accomplish, and 
how to do this.  The concerns about UAE-based activities are 
real, but are also a function of all the recent publicity given 
to our decision to expand operations here.  While it is 
important to push the envelope of what we try to do here, it is 
also true that the less said about it, the better. End comment. 
 
25.(U) This message has been cleared by DRL DAS Barks-Ruggles. 
DAVIS