VZCZCXRO0470
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0167/01 1020913
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120913Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2401
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0332
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0393
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0264
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0320
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0179
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1721

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GUTERRES TO CHALLENGE ALKATIRI FOR FRETILIN PARTY 
LEADERSHIP 
 
REF: 05 DILI 377 
 
DILI 00000167  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Preparations for Fretilin's National Party 
Congress are well underway.  Delegates to the Congress have been 
elected at district meetings that began in February.  Within the 
party it has long been assumed that Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri 
would continue in a second term as Secretary General --- and 
therefore as Prime Minister --- and he currently remains the 
likely front runner.  However, the recent announcement by East 
Timor's Ambassador to the U.S. and U.N., Jose Luis Guterres, may 
significantly alter the competition.  Guterres is widely 
regarded as having the charisma and experience necessary for the 
job and sufficient appeal to unite disparate anti-Alkatiri 
elements.  Many close to the process note that important changes 
to party structure are likely, whether or not that involves a 
leadership change.  However, the strength of the 
anti-Alkatiri/pro-reform camp is hard to determine at this 
point.  Alkatiri and his supporters continue to express public 
confidence that "there is no alternative" to his continued 
leadership and have been generally unwilling to acknowledge 
directly the existence of competition within the party. 
Meanwhile, some observers are pessimistic regarding the 
prospects for a genuinely democratic process at the upcoming 
Congress and fear that an Alkatiri win may be effectively fixed 
in advance, especially if it appears that he lacks the support 
to win legitimately. End summary. 
 
Preparations for Fretilin's National Party Congress 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Preparations are underway for Fretilin's National Party 
Congress, scheduled for May 27-29 in Dili.  Beginning in 
February, meetings were held in all 13 districts to elect 
delegates for the National Congress.  According to sources in 
the party, a total of about 575 delegates and more than 100 
alternates will attend the Congress.  Further preparation for 
the national congress will take place at five regional meetings. 
 The first of these meetings, for the region including Baucau, 
took place last weekend. Included in the current preparatory 
work are draft revisions to the party constitution and 
regulations for the congress itself.  Meanwhile, potential 
candidates to challenge Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri for the 
position of Secretary General of the party are coming forward 
after a period of several months during which rumors abounded 
regarding a range of candidates and ever-shifting alliances. 
Jose Luis Guterres, currently East Timor's Ambassador to the 
United Nations, has confirmed privately to Emboffs that he is a 
candidate and has been widely quoted in the press to the effect 
that he would accept the Secretary General position if the 
Congress happened to select him.  Another possible challenger is 
Abel Ximenes, currently Minister of Development in Alkatiri's 
41-member cabinet. 
 
Many Fretilin members may be ready for change 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶3. (U) According to sources within Fretilin, extensive 
discussions about the future of the party are taking place among 
party members, out of the public eye and without the 
participation of the current party leadership.  The overarching 
questions reportedly being discussed are: a) whether to continue 
with Alkatiri's leadership and b) the party's structure and 
strategy for moving forward.  Reports have been circulating for 
years that many Fretilin members are unhappy with the leadership 
of Alkatiri and his allies and with the direction in which he 
has taken the party.  The primary complaints are that they have 
cultivated a culture of favoritism and a lack of transparency 
and that decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of a 
few.  These party members hope that the upcoming congress will 
result in significant change, although their views range from 
those who declare that they will not continue to support the 
party under the current leadership to those who would support a 
continued mandate for Alkatiri if accompanied by satisfactory 
reform of party structures. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The actual strength of opposition to Alkatiri remains 
hard to measure.  Although it is often alleged that Alkatiri is 
unpopular within Fretilin, the indications of widespread 
opposition within the party remain anecdotal and inconclusive. 
The only well-defined intraparty opposition group seems to be a 
group known as the "group of 20" or "renovators" within the CCF 
who are strongly anti-Alkatiri and some of whose members have 
strong ties with UNDERTIM, a new party registered last year (see 
reftel).  But party members outside this group generally dismiss 
its strength as insignificant. The leaders of other Fretilin 
 
DILI 00000167  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
factions may or may not like Alkatiri personally, but he appears 
to have learned how to keep them satisfied.  (One indication of 
this is the extremely large size of East Timor's Cabinet.) 
Nevertheless, there are indications that Alkatiri's reelection 
is not a sure thing.  Of the 500-plus delegates to the national 
party congress, 88 are members of the Fretilin Central Committee 
(CCF) and therefore automatic delegates, but the rest were 
elected during the district congresses.  Several sources within 
Fretilin have noted that, of the newly-elected delegates, at 
least one-third are newcomers who are eager to "discuss the 
issues".  Moreover, these sources report that a number of 
candidates close to the Alkatiri camp, including Vice Minister 
of the Interior Alcino Barris, were unsuccessful in their bids 
to be delegates from their respective districts.  (Note: The 
list of delegates is not publicly available, so the Embassy is 
unable to make its own assessment of these assertions, which 
could be wishful thinking on the part of anti-Alkatiri 
enthusiasts. End note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Another unknown variable is how Alkatiri and his 
supporters will respond if they perceive widespread opposition 
and the possibility of defeat.  Several Embassy contacts have 
expressed concern that the current party leadership might choose 
to undermine democratic processes at the Congress.  They point 
to the last Fretilin Congress in 2001, at which these Alkatiri 
critics say he unilaterally assumed the chairmanship of the 
meeting and was "accepted" by the delegates rather than actually 
being elected as the new Secretary General.  Some of these 
observers add that now-Ambassador Guterres, who had been the 
elected leader of Fretilin's overseas wing during the last few 
years of the Indonesian occupation, had been expected to assume 
the newly created Secretary General position in 2001 but that 
Alkatiri and his faction arranged for the Congress to be held 
before Guterres could return to Timor. 
 
Ambassador Guterres may mount a serious challenge to Alkatiri 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The most significant development for members of the party 
looking for an alternative to Alkatiri is the candidacy of 
Ambassador Guterres.  Although Guterres's name had been 
mentioned frequently as a potential candidate in recent months, 
and although he has often been cited as the only candidate who 
could credibly challenge Alkatiri, most political observers did 
not expect him to throw his hat in the ring.  His public 
acknowledgement that he is ready to run for Secretary General 
came as a welcome development to those in the party who see 
grassroots readiness for change but until now did not see a 
realistic alternative for party leadership. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In conversations with Emboffs last week Guterres left 
no doubt that he intends to run an aggressive campaign to unseat 
Alkatiri as the party's Secretary General.  He reported that he 
has been in regular email contact with various members of the 
party over the last months, discussing issues of mutual concern 
and preparing for his candidacy.  He stated that it was not his 
idea to run for the position but that many people within the 
party have been pressuring him to do so.  When asked about his 
differences with the Alkatiri camp, he strongly stressed what he 
sees as a lack of democracy within the party and in the way the 
Government operates.  He particularly emphasized his unhappiness 
with the Government's relationship with the Catholic Church and 
civil society, noting that greater dialogue and openness to 
opposing views is needed in the nation's governance.  Regarding 
party structure, he said the CCF should be given greater 
decision-making powers, in contrast to the current situation in 
which all major decisions are taken by Alkatiri and his small 
circle of close supporters.  Guterres has also been quoted as 
saying that he would take a conciliatory and co-operative 
attitude toward opposition parties, in contrast to Alkatiri's 
dismissive and often sarcastic approach. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Ambassador Guterres, who along with East Timor's other 
Ambassadors is in Dili for a two-week Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs conference, told Emboffs he will return to New York for 
the last two weeks of April but will then return to Timor in 
early May to focus on being a "full-time politician" during the 
weeks leading up to the Party Congress.  He indicated to Emboffs 
that he expects to take leave during May rather than resigning 
from his Ambassadorship, pointing out that Alkatiri and other 
cabinet members will retain their positions while spending much 
of their time in May campaigning. 
 
 
DILI 00000167  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In an interesting follow-up discussion, Jorge Teme, a 
former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to 
Australia who had joined Ambassador Guterres in a meeting with 
Emboff, stated that he will leave Fretilin for the Democratic 
Party (PD) if Ambassador Guterres does not become Fretilin's 
Secretary General.  Furthermore, Teme said that Ambassador 
 
SIPDIS 
Guterres has also indicated in private that he may also move to 
PD if his bid is unsuccessful.  The Embassy has not been able to 
confirm this intent directly with Ambassador Guterres.  PD is 
the largest of the opposition parties and is regarded as the 
only one that might be able to launch a serious challenge 
against Fretilin in the 2007 elections.  A defection to PD by 
such a high profile Fretilin member could significantly alter 
election dynamics. 
 
¶10. (SBU) In addition to Guterres, there are a number of other 
candidates still being discussed within Fretilin circles. 
Discussions by Fretilin insiders about an Alkatiri-Guterres race 
frequently assume that there will be a third candidate, Minister 
of Development Ximenes.  Although he does not generate the kind 
of excitement expressed in response to Guterres's candidacy, he 
is seen as a potentially shrewd campaigner who has been quietly 
establishing a base of support.  However, his support is 
reportedly thin on the ground in some key districts, so most 
observers do not regard him as having a real shot at the 
Secretary General seat.  Others who have been mentioned as 
 
SIPDIS 
potential candidates at various times in recent weeks, but have 
not publicly declared, include: Aniceto Guterres, former head of 
the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) 
and current member of the bilateral Truth and Friendship 
Commission (TFC); Rogerio Lobato, Minister of the Interior; and 
Victor da Costa, who would be a candidate from the "renovator" 
group mentioned in paragraph 5.   (Comment:  Aniceto Guterres 
would draw support from many of the same circles as Ambassador 
Guterres and is more likely to support the Ambassador than to 
run himself.  Lobato is an ambitious but widely disliked figure 
who appears to understand that his best strategy for continued 
political survival is to make himself useful to Prime Minister 
Alkatiri.  He reportedly negotiated a deal a few months ago to 
support Abel Ximenes, but then reported the negotiations to 
Alkatiri. End Comment.) 
 
Alkatiri and supporters revealing little but showing signs of 
concern 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Meanwhile, Alkatiri and his supporters have been 
expressing confidence that he, along with Fretilin President 
Francisco "Lu'olo" Guterres (who is also the President of the 
National Parliament), will continue to lead the party.  In a 
recent conversation with Emboff, Jose Reis, the Secretary of 
State for Region I (Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem) who is close to 
Alkatiri, stated, "There is no alternative to Mari and Lu'olo 
and this is agreed within Fretilin."  This sentiment has also 
been expressed publicly by other prominent members of the 
current leadership.  (Note: The support of Party President 
Lu'olo is regarded as a key element in Alkatiri's continued 
legitimacy, since he remained in Timor as a member of the 
resistance to Indonesian occupation while Alkatiri and most 
other leaders of the ruling circle were in exile in Mozambique. 
Although there have been occasional rumors in the past that 
Lu'olo was considering a split from Alkatiri, the pairing has 
been recently reaffirmed and a split is now regarded as unlikely 
in the extreme. End note.) 
 
¶12.  (SBU) However, Alkatiri's recent public comments indicate 
that he may well be nervous that his position in the party is 
not assured.  Although his public statements were initially 
dismissive regarding Ambassador Guterres' candidacy, he has 
since demonstrated his discomfort with the new situation.  At 
the regional party meeting in Baucau last Saturday, Alkatiri 
reportedly called on members to conduct open dialogue regarding 
the future of the party, but warned that some party members were 
conducting "secret night meetings", implying that such meetings 
were designed to destroy rather than construct the party.  This 
statement appears to have been directed at Ambassador Guterres, 
who has been spending much of his time meeting with Fretilin 
members and asking for their support. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment: Given Fretilin's dominance and the general 
view that its organizational and financial advantages will 
enable it to win the next election despite the personal 
unpopularity of Alkatiri and some other Fretilin leaders, the 
 
DILI 00000167  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
outcome of its National Congress will be extremely important. 
However, gauging this outcome remains difficult.  Three main 
questions are outstanding.  First, what is the real strength and 
breadth of opposition to Alkatiri within the party?  Although 
Emboffs have heard from a number of party sources confident that 
"there will be changes," it has not been possible to get a sense 
of solid numbers of delegates behind one or another position. 
It is quite possible, as one journalist put it, that the 
majority of the delegates elected at the district conventions 
"know their job already" and have no intention of opposing 
Alkatiri.  Second, what will be the effect of Ambassador 
Guterres' candidacy?  It is possible that his entry into the 
race will solidify it into a two-person competition, but it is 
not yet clear whether the various elements within Fretilin who 
profess dissatisfaction with Alkatiri will consolidate around 
Guterres.  Third, how will Alkatiri and his supporters approach 
the Congress and will they allow it to be truly democratic?  The 
election of delegates is generally reported to have been a far 
more democratic process than some had feared, but at least one 
independent-minded Fretilin member of Parliament has reportedly 
been disqualified on a technicality after being elected as a 
delegate, and there is still time for strong-arm tactics if the 
leadership were inclined to use them.  One possible obstacle to 
any such efforts is that the Congress will reportedly elect the 
Secretary General and President by secret ballot.  End Comment. 
 
SIPDIS 
REES