VZCZCXRO5191
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #1909/01 1161221
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261221Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8573
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0024
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0092
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 001909 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KMCR SY IZ LE
SUBJECT: ASAD MEETS BRAMMERTZ IN DAMASCUS 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
 ¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Syrian President Bashar al-Asad met with 
UNIIIC chief Serge Brammertz in Damascus April 25.  The 
official Syria News Agency SANA issued a terse statement 
confirming the visit after Brammertz departed Damascus with 
his team.  Media contacts acknowledged that very few details 
about the visit were known.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) President Bashar al-Asad met yesterday morning 
(April 25) with the head of UNIIIC, Serge Brammertz, and his 
accompanying team of investigators.  Brammertz met separately 
with FM Farouk al-Shara'a, according to the brief statement 
released by the official Syrian Press Association, SANA. 
Present at the meetings on the Syrian side were the Foreign 
Ministry's legal advisor and point man for the UNIIIC 
investigation Riad Daoudi, and Assistant Foreign Minister 
Ahmad Arnous, according to SANA.  Reuters quoted Syrian law 
professor Ibrahim al-Daraji, a spokesman for the Syrian team 
investigating the Hariri assassination, saying "the fact that 
Brammertz is here shows that Syria has no problem in seeking 
the truth about the Hariri killing and cooperating with the 
inquiry."  Human rights contact Anwar al-Bunni expressed 
satisfaction with the visit, telling Poloff that it was an 
accomplishment just to force Asad and Shara'a to accept being 
questioned. 
 
¶3.  (C) According to foreign  affairs expert Dr. Imad 
Shueibi, who confers regularly with senior regime officials, 
Brammertz met with Asad at the President's office and not, as 
some press accounts reported, at the Monterosa Hotel complex 
on the outskirts of Damascus.  The Syrian government 
announced that the interviews had taken place only after 
Brammertz returned to his base in Beirut in a convoy of 
armored vehicles, according to AP.  Shueibi reported that in 
fact Shara'a had not met with Brammertz himself but with 
members of Brammertz's team, although press accounts and the 
SANA statement contradicted this assertion. 
 
¶4.  (C) Shueibi told Polchief that Brammertz's interview with 
Asad on April 25 was not the first such meeting, but followed 
a secret meeting in Damascus held April 24.  The second 
meeting was designed to allow the two sides to read and sign 
the transcripts of the questioning that had occurred. 
(Comment:  We have not been able to confirm from other 
sources if Shueibi's information about two meetings is 
accurate.)  There will be no further meetings with Asad or 
Shara'a, he noted, but added that Brammertz and his team are 
likely to return to Syria for meetings with others. 
 
¶5.  (C) Shueibi insisted that Asad "was happy" with the way 
the interview went.  Asad had "answered all Brammertz's 
questions" and had repeated his previous denials that he had 
threatened Lebanese PM Hariri, in the period before the PM's 
assassination.  Shueibi predicted that there would be no 
evidence found that would implicate Asad or the most senior 
regime officials beneath him in the assassination of Hariri, 
although some Syrians below that level would likely be 
accused and tried (but not convicted) at the international 
tribunal that will hear the case.  In his overall assessment, 
"the sword of the UNIIIC investigation" will continue to hang 
over Syria, but "nothing will be done," he maintained, that 
will shake the foundations of the regime. 
 
¶6.  (C) Assessing Syria's situation in the wake of the 
Brammertz visit, Shueibi insisted that Syria is stronger now 
-- despite its acknowledged military weakness -- than at any 
time since the release of the first Mehlis report last 
October, with valuable regional cards to play in Iraq, 
Lebanon, and Palestine.  Shueibi said he was puzzled about 
why the U.S. had not reached out to Syria for help, 
especially to address the situation in Iraq, where in his 
view a civil war was breaking out.  He noted that Syria is 
the only regional party whose intervention Iraq's Sunnis 
would accept.  He expressed hope that in the wake of the 
Brammertz visit, the U.S. would re-evaluate its hard-line 
stance towards Syria. 
 
¶7.  (C) COMMENT:  Apparently very nervous about the optics of 
this visit, the regime succeeded in keeping the precise date 
for the Asad-Brammertz meeting a secret until it was 
completed, and released no details beyond acknowledging that 
the meeting had taken place.  The positive spin that Shueibi 
puts on the meeting is already evident in the regional press 
coverage of the visit and will likely continue in the coming 
 
DAMASCUS 00001909  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
days. 
 
 
 
 
SECHE