VZCZCXRO6450
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #1754/01 1081301
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181301Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8386
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0014
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0083
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 001754 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PINR PREL PHUM SY
SUBJECT: C-NE6-00262: KHADDAM'S AND BAYANOUNI'S FAUSTIAN 
PACT 
 
REF: A. STATE 51913 
 
     ¶B. DAMASCUS 1698 
     ¶C. DAMASCUS 1692 
     ¶D. DAMASCUS 1357 
     ¶E. DAMASCUS 0392 
     ¶F. DAMASCUS 0311 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:   Former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam's public 
criticism of the regime and his move to ally himself -- via 
the National Salvation Front -- with Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood leader Sadreddin al-Bayanouni continue to provoke 
the regime and stir tremendous speculation among the public 
and the opposition about potential impact in Syria.  For now, 
given the NSF's uncertain potential, most people are adopting 
a "wait-and-see" attitude, a posture not likely to shift in 
any fundamental way before the June release of the Brammertz 
report.  The answers provided below respond to the questions 
posed in Ref A.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) QUESTION 3 (A): WHAT IS THE REACTION AMONG THE 
OPPOSITION, THE PUBLIC AND THE SARG TO KHADDAM-BAYANOUNI 
(SMB) COMMON VISION?  As detailed in refs B, C, and D, the 
reaction of the opposition to the Khaddam-Bayanouni formation 
of the National Salvation Front in Brussels has been nuanced 
and relatively pragmatic, with one significant disagreement. 
The dominant opposition view on Khaddam's decision to join 
forces with the MB is that this will increase his 
effectiveness and strengthen his efforts to weaken the 
regime, although there is uncertainty about how much Khaddam 
has been strengthened.  Many still feel that his potential as 
an opposition figure is greatly weakened by his well-earned 
reputation for corruption and his decades-long loyal service 
to the Asad regimes.  Others like XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX point out that Khaddam has said nothing critical 
about Hafez al-Asad and his brutal reign, limiting himself to 
criticizing Bashar al-Asad, and that Khaddam has not 
apologized for his long service to the regime.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also 
believes that the NSF's program is too pro-Kurd and risks 
creating an anti-Kurd backlash among Arabs in Syria. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Despite these reservations, the dominant 
opposition view, certainly within the Damascus Declaration 
(DD) group, is that Khaddam is a useful tool for weakening 
the regime, all the more so after his joining forces with 
Bayanouni.  There is also a sense among the opposition that 
the initial "shock" at having to consider Khaddam as an 
opposition figure has worn off and people are more willing to 
see what he can accomplish. The opposition group that has 
coalesced around the DD met on April 6 and decided not to 
publicly criticize Khaddam, despite intense SARG pressure to 
do so (Ref B).  Instead, the group decided to maintain a 
relatively vague position that could not be used by the 
regime to try to weaken Khaddam, issuing a statement merely 
pointing out that the opposition inside Syria was not 
connected to Khaddam.  Some, like XXXXXXXXXXXX, blamed Khaddam's NSF 
initiative on the failure of the internal opposition and DD 
signatories to organize and follow up more rapidly after the 
issuance of the original Damascus Declaration in October. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) A minority view within the opposition, led by 
XXXXXXXXXXXX, pressed for a more publicly critical opposition 
attitude towards Khaddam in the run-up to the April 6 
meeting.  Some activists, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, have told 
us the primary motivation of XXXXXXXXXXXX and his group was 
fear of regime retaliation, rather than real opposition to 
Khaddam on ideological grounds.  Nonetheless, it is true that 
opposition figures (and DD activists) such as XXXXXXXXXXXX
held very strong views, prior to the April 6 meeting, about 
Khaddam's blemishes (ref D).  These people were willing to 
grant Khaddam and the NSF a limited role in the opposition 
but were strongly opposed to granting Khaddam the leadership 
of the opposition.  XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief that Khaddam is unfit 
for such a role and "we have ways to make him fail" if he 
tries to usurp such a role.  (XXXXXXXXXXXX also speculated that Khaddam may want to try to preserve much of the Ba'athist 
regime, aiming to topple merely the Asad family and the 
inner-most circle of the regime, but leaving the armed 
forces, security services and Ba'ath party intact.)  Others, 
such as XXXXXXXXXXXX and former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, thought that fears 
 
DAMASCUS 00001754  002 OF 004 
 
 
about Khaddam's ambitions were exaggerated, insisting that Khaddam understood the limits of his role. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) THE PUBLIC'S VIEW:  The Syrian public's view of 
Khaddam and his NSF union with the SMB is harder to ascertain 
, with his level of support remaining a matter of conjecture. 
 The majority view seems to be that his impact to date has 
been limited, primarily because of the regime's success at painting him as a corrupt, embittered traitor with foolish, 
impractical ambitions of overthrowing the Asad regime.  Some 
contacts insist, nonetheless, that Khaddam, with his 
sustained criticism of the regime carried over various 
satellite TV channels (and to a lesser degree via print 
media) has made inroads, especially among the majority Sunni 
population.  XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained recently (ref C) that Khaddam 
is attaining quiet "majority support" among Sunnis in cities 
other than Damascus, where the Sunni population is 
maintaining a wait-and-see attitude towards the former VP. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that Khaddam has substantial (also quiet) 
support among Ba'athists and among a key group of Alawites, 
including former (Hafez al-Asad) regime figures such as 
XXXXXXXXXXXX and senior army officer XXXXXXXXXXXX
(ref E).  Our best sense is that Khaddam's support so far is 
relatively limited among the Syrian public. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) THE SARG'S VIEW:  The SARG's reaction to Khaddam 
and the NSF has combined hostility and fear.  The regime has 
apparently complained to the Saudis about their initial 
decision to allow Khaddam access to al-Arabiya to air his 
regime criticism.  Since late December, Khaddam has not had 
access to any Saudi-owned media, either satellite or print. 
The SARG, as noted, unsuccessfully put pressure on the DD 
group to publicly attack Khaddam and the NSF.  Despite the 
SARG's repeated attempts to dismiss Khaddam as unimportant, 
it is clear that his initial efforts, and his success in 
joining forces with Bayanouni, rattled the regime and have 
kept it on the defensive about his next moves and how much 
support he is quietly building.  Besides trying to portray 
Khaddam as a traitor, the regime has initiated two sets of 
legal proceedings against him, one relating to corruption 
charges involving transactions and business deals done by 
Khaddam or his family, and another charging him with inciting 
a foreign attack against Syria and plotting to overthrow the 
government.  Both moves appear aimed at preventing any 
increase in internal support for Khaddam.  The government has 
also apparently moved to prevent the travel -- and to freeze 
the assets -- of at least one former senior official (XXXXXXXXXXXX) reportedly sympathetic to Khaddam.  There were 
unconfirmed reports of a SARG-compiled list of such officials 
banned from foreign travel on suspicion they might constitute 
"future Khaddams" or might try to coordinate with Khaddam 
(Ref F). 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) QUESTION 3(B):  ARE KHADDAM AND THE SMB DEDICATED 
TO WORKING TOGETHER? IS IT A PARTNERSHIP OR IS THERE A 
SINGLE LEADER?:  Embassy Damascus's insight into the 
relationship between Khaddam and Bayanouni's SMB is 
relatively limited, but our best assessment is that it is a 
partnership, with both sides contributing.  Khaddam, despite 
his reputation as an Asad regime henchman, also has a long 
history of outreach to Sunni groups in Syria, including 
Islamist groups sympathetic to the banned MB.  He represented 
the wing of the Ba'ath Party that was ideologically committed 
to such outreach, believing it essential for secular 
Ba'athists and nationalists to increase their "echo" and 
grassroots support by attempting to appeal where possible to 
the Syrian (Sunni) Islamic masses.  Consequently, it is not 
totally out of character for him to reach out to Bayanouni 
and the SMB.  If press reports are to be believed, Bayanouni 
has remained steadfast in supporting Khaddam and the NSF 
joint venture, despite the wave of criticism he and his group 
were subjected to, which charged them with gross opportunism 
and being blind to Khaddam's former service to an oppressive 
regime. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) QUESTION 3(C):  DID EITHER SIDE MAKE A CONCESSION 
BEFORE THE PRESS STATEMENT ON A COMMON VISION?: We have no 
information on this issue but presume Khaddam and Bayanouni 
shared some common objectives, primarily a desire to topple 
the Asad regime, and were willing to compromise on their 
visions for a future Syria.  Both sides' adherence to the 
principles of democratic change from within likely 
facilitated the blurring and compromise needed to agree on a 
 
DAMASCUS 00001754  003 OF 004 
 
 
common vision. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) QUESTION 3(D):  DID EITHER SMB OR KHADDAM LOSE 
CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY WORK TOGETHER?  REACTIONS 
OF THE "DAMASCUS DECLARATION" GROUPS?:  The SMB has more 
support in Syria than Khaddam, so it had more to lose from 
risking an alliance with him.  Many accused Bayanouni and the 
MB of unprincipled opportunism for their willingness to ally 
themselves with a pillar of the Hafez al-Asad regime that was 
responsible for the violent suppression of their movement in 
the early 1980's.  MB sympathizer XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized 
Bayanouni's Khaddam alliance as "a mistake" which is 
receiving criticism from SMB members inside and outside 
Syria.  Others question the SMB's political calculations in 
betting on Khaddam and his limited assets, but are waiting to 
see if the former VP is able to deliver. Some contacts 
believe that the MB did take a hit, at least initially in 
their support base in Syria.  XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that if one 
assumed the SMB  had "20 percent street support" in Syria, 
then the movement had lost half of it for allying with 
Khaddam.  Our sense is that as the NSF alliance has endured, 
the force of the charge of opportunism has diminished. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX's read on Sunni support for Khaddam throughout Syria 
seems to indicate that any drop in MB support because of 
Bayanouni's move has been temporary.  (For Damascus 
Declaration group views on the NSF, see paras 2-4.) 
 
¶10.  (S/NF) QUESTION 3(E):  HOW DO KHADDAM AND THE SMB PLAN 
TO CHANGE THE SYRIAN REGIME?  VIOLENT RESISTANCE?  INCREASING 
PRESSURE UNTIL THE REGIME IMPLODES?  SOMETHING ELSE?:  So 
far, Khaddam and the SMB have not given any indication that 
they plan to use violent resistance to topple the Asad 
regime, a not surprising view given how heavily armed and 
well-protected the regime is.  Our contacts here remain 
puzzled about precisely how Khaddam and Bayanouni can topple 
the regime in the absence of some type of outside 
intervention. Most believe they want to gradually increase 
pressure on the regime, using  Khaddam's public criticism and 
revelations (or threats of revelations) about embarrassing 
regime secrets.  Nonetheless, given the weakness of the 
internal opposition, in tandem with the fear that the regime 
has instilled in any would-be Khaddam/Bayanouni supporters, 
and the apparent resilience of the regime's ties to critical 
ally Saudi Arabia, which is keeping Khaddam out of its media, 
it is unclear how these efforts, by themselves, could unseat 
the Asad regime.  Apparently, Khaddam/Bayanouni are hoping 
Brammertz in June will issue a follow-up UNIIIC report that 
will implicate senior regime officials in the killing of 
former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri, shaking the foundations of 
the regime.  Beyond that, they seem to be playing the best 
cards that they have and hoping for developments going their 
way in the next year or so.  The sense that the regime's 
legitimacy is slowly draining away is playing in their favor, 
while the violence and political instability in Iraq, as well 
as resurgent SARG influence in Lebanon, seem to be 
undercutting their efforts and reminding many Syrians that 
the regime is still a formidable and necessary bulwark 
against the threat of instability and sectarian violence. 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) QUESTION 3(F): BY SAYING THEY HAVE A COMMON 
VISION, DO KHADDAM-SMB HAVE MORE LEGITIMACY INSIDE SYRIA? 
SINCE KHADDAM AND SMB CANNOT ENTER SYRIA HOW DO THEY CONTACT 
GROUPS IN SYRIA?  WHICH GROUPS?:  Overall, Khaddam has 
certainly increased his legitimacy by allying himself with 
Bayanouni.  SMB took an initial hit in its support base, we 
surmise, given Sunni/Islamist reservations about a 
"principled ideological" movement like the SMB joining a 
former Ba'athist henchman such as Khaddam.  The extent of 
that drop in support is unclear, with some contacts pointing 
to now-rising Sunni support for Khaddam.  The manner in which 
Khaddam or Bayanouni maintains contact with government or 
opposition insiders is unclear. There are unconfirmed
reports that insiders not restricted by SARG-imposed 
restrictions travel abroad under various pretexts and make
contact with one or both of the two external opposition 
leaders.  Sometimes trusted travelers in Syria carry messages 
to Khaddam and Bayanouni (and report back), according to 
other contacts.  These two leaders also seem to rely on the 
steadfast but quiet support of insiders that is not dependent 
on regular contact to shore it up.  Khaddam seems to have 
arranged some support before he left, although it has not 
been visible at all, and is suspected only because a few 
contacts refer to it (refs C and E). 
 
DAMASCUS 00001754  004 OF 004 
 
 
SECHE