VZCZCXRO2793
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #1698/01 1031659
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131659Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8329
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0011

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 001698 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: DAMASCUS DECLARATION GROUP DECIDES NOT TO 
CRITICIZE KHADDAM 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 1357 
 
     ¶B. DAMASCUS 1692 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d 
) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Despite intense SARG pressure, members of 
the Damascus Declaration (DD) group who met April 6 decided 
not to publicly attack former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam or his 
recent alignment with Muslim Brother leader Sadreddin 
Bayanouni in the National Salvation Front.  Rejecting the 
arguments of some DD signatories, led by opposition figure 
Hassan Abdulazeem, the group decided merely to reiterate 
publicly that there is no connection between DD efforts and 
those of the NSF.  Following heated debate, members also 
decided to maintain the Muslim Brotherhood's membership in 
the DD group, despite the MB's recent alignment with Khaddam 
in the NSF.  According to one prominent dissident, the group 
opted for pragmatism -- choosing to let Khaddam weaken the 
regime in his own way -- over any ideological concerns or 
fears of SARG retribution.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  A highly-anticipated meeting of the DD group took 
place on April 6.  As noted in ref A, post contacts and the 
local press had previously reported that discussion points 
would include the DD group's position on the National 
Salvation Front (NSF), whether to maintain the membership of 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) following its alignment with the 
NSF, and election of a new leadership committee. 
Approximately twenty key members from throughout Syria 
attended the meeting. 
 
¶3.  (C)  SECURITY SERVICE SCRUTINY HIGH:  According to human 
rights activist XXXXXXXXXXXX, who is well-connected to a 
number of DD group activists, many of the participants were 
called in for interrogation prior to the meeting taking 
place. Even non-members were targeted by the SARG: a State 
Security Service colonel visited human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX at his home on April 5, asking XXXXXXXXXXXX to use his 
influence with Declaration members to encourage them to 
condemn Khaddam and the NSF and to kick the MB out of the 
Declaration group.  XXXXXXXXXXXX laughed off the colonel's 
suggestion, telling him that he is not a member of the group 
and cannot tell them what to do.  On April 6, security 
services succeeded in preventing the meeting from taking 
place, as announced publicly, at the office of Declaration 
spokesman Hassan Abdulazeem.  The meeting was then moved to 
the office of human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX, where 
twenty security agents were stationed outside throughout the 
meeting. 
 
¶4.  (C)  DEBATE FOCUSED ON NSF, MB'S FUTURE IN DD:  According 
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the meeting was focused on determining the 
Declaration group's position regarding the Brussels-based 
National Salvation Front, as well as whether or not to allow 
the Muslim Brotherhood to remain signatories of the Damascus 
Declaration.  Most DD members agreed to "leave the NSF 
alone," agreeing that as long as the NSF is not in opposition 
to the Declaration's positions, there is no reason for coming 
out against it.  Members decided to publicly state that there 
is no connection between the NSF and the Declaration, but not 
to attack the NSF. 
 
¶5.  (C) However, a small group of Declaration figures (most 
prominently Abdulazeem) was intent on kicking Bayanouni out 
of the Declaration group for allying himself with Khaddam. 
Abdulazeem, in the name of his political party, the 
Democratic Arab Socialist Union, went so far as to make 
public statements expressing their desire to remove the MB 
from Declaration membership.  According to contacts, 
Abdulazeem's effort failed and the MB remains, for now, in 
the Declaration group. 
 
¶6.  (C) CHOOSING PRAGMATISM:  According to prominent 
dissident and DD signatory XXXXXXXXXXXX, some DD members 
like Riyad at-Turk resented the MB's failure to consult 
fellow DD signatories before signing on with Khaddam.  Turk 
also resented the fact that Khaddam has not apologized for 
his long service to the Ba'athist regime in Syria.  In 
XXXXXXXXXXXX's view, however, the motivations of Abdulazeem "and the 
Nasserists" were motivated more by fear of SARG retribution 
and pressure than sincerely held ideological convictions. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX and other observers like XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX
(ref B), (and even XXXXXXXXXXXX, despite his reservations) insisted 
that the DD group would be better served by this "vague" 
position towards Khaddam and the NSF.  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, 
"if we were stronger, we could afford to criticize Khaddam 
more openly and express our different views."  In his view, 
 
DAMASCUS 00001698  002 OF 002 
 
 
Khaddam continues to weaken the regime and "he is not our 
enemy."  Discounting arguments that Khaddam is too corrupt to 
be a partner, XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted, "The dirtiest, most corrupt 
thing is the country is the regime." 
 
¶7.  (C)  WAS NEW LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE FORMED?:  There is 
disagreement among contacts about whether a new DD leadership 
committee was also formed during this April 6 meeting.  Human 
rights activist XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff on April 13 that 
Declaration members started the process, with XXXXXXXXXXXX himself 
as one of three members from Damascus; another three members 
from Aleppo have also been named, he said.  The committee 
plans to include a total of 13-15 members from within Syria, 
plus an undetermined number of members from abroad.  Despite 
that level of specificity in XXXXXXXXXXXX's account, other contacts 
disputed whether such a committee was formed, telling Poloff 
they were unaware of such action. 
 
¶8.  (C) DIVISIONS, FRUSTRATIONS CONTINUE TO GROW REGARDING 
NEXT STEPS...:  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the meeting followed 
"the same story" as earlier meetings, in which the same 
people (particularly Abdulazeem) are afraid and are setting 
"roadblocks" for further action.  As long as "these people" 
remain in the committee, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, nothing will 
change.  XXXXXXXXXXXX was very skeptical that the Declaration group 
would take any concrete steps in the near future due to the 
SARG's "nervous state" and its willingness to lash out at the 
opposition at any time.   XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that MB chief Ali 
Sadreddin Bayanouni had told him in a phone conversation that 
one main reason for the MB's joining the NSF was its 
frustration that the internal opposition is "working too 
slowly." 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT:  The Damascus Declaration group's decision 
not to criticize Khaddam, Bayanouni, and the NSF cannot be 
welcome news for the SARG.  It has labored mightily in the 
past three months to dismiss Khaddam as an embittered, 
corrupt traitor to the nation.  While the former VP can 
celebrate his good fortune in steering clear of a hostile 
reaction from the Syrian internal opposition, his true level 
of popular support in Syria remains a matter of conjecture, 
with some arguing that he is gaining traction and others 
continuing to discount his prospects. 
 
 
 
 
SECHE