VZCZCXRO2283
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #1692/01 1031144
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131144Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8318
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0006
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0080
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001692 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: TWO IMPORTANT SUNNI LEADERS ASSESS KHADDAM'S IMPACT 
 
REF: DAM 0392 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary:  Two Sunni leaders, XXXXXXXXXXXX, 
assess that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam is a useful tool 
who has already weakened the regime.  They are counseling 
their friends in the opposition not to attack Khaddam 
publicly, regardless of their private reservations.  One of 
these Sunnis XXXXXXXXXXXX, claims that Khaddam has majority 
support among Sunnis in several cities in Syria.  Both 
insisted that the regime has lost support and legitimacy in 
recent months, despite efforts to appeal to nationalism and 
Islam.  They also expressed deep concern about increasing 
Iranian and Shiite influence in Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) ASSESSING KHADDAM'S SUNNI SUPPORT:  According to 
former MP and influential behind-the-scenes Sunni opposition 
figure XXXXXXXXXXXX, Abdul Halim Khaddam has the support of a 
majority of Sunnis in Homs, Latakia, and Tartous, and some 
support in Hama.  In Damascus, it is a "wait and see" 
posture.  However, the support in all these locales is "very 
quiet."  XXXXXXXXXXXX also mentioned that former Minister of 
Industry XXXXXXXXXXXX supports Khaddam and that some 50 
percent of Ba'athists also support him.  (Other contacts, 
like XXXXXXXXXXXX, dispute this 
notion of significant Ba'athist support for Khaddam.)  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
claimed that 90 percent of Ba'athists don't like the 
President and criticize him for allowing his friends to 
monopolize the economy and for bringing problems to the 
country with his mistaken decisions.  (Note:  XXXXXXXXXXXX has made 
clear in the past that Khaddam also has significant support 
among a group of Alawite former regime insiders like XXXXXXXXXXXX
and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Reftel.) 
 
¶3.  (C) ADVISING OPPOSITION NOT TO ATTACK KHADDAM:  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
told Polchief that he had advised his friends in the Damascus 
Declaration group (DD), such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, in 
advance of the April 6 DD meeting, not to attack Khaddam 
publicly (see septel).  Instead they should just say "we are 
the internal opposition" and leave Khaddam to speak for 
himself and weaken regime in his own way.  He had also told 
them that Khaddam is "not our enemy now; it is the regime 
that is imprisoning people, not Khaddam."  XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was 
fearful of possible splits in DD/opposition and of their 
efforts to form a steering committee or organizational 
structure to accompany their statement of principles.  He 
called such a move inevitably divisive.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he 
supports but did not sign the DD, claiming that it did not 
represent well the interests of the "conservatives" in Syria, 
meaning the Muslim population.  In his view, the DD effort to 
reach out to Muslims through the Muslim Brotherhood was not 
completely successful and could not disguise the fact that 
the driving forces behind the DD were secular activists. 
 
¶4.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX FRIEND CONCURS:  Sunni tribal leader and 
former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, who was 
visiting his friend XXXXXXXXXXXX, also called Khaddam a useful 
tool.  When asked what role Khaddam could play in the 
opposition, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he could create strife and discord 
among the regime forces arrayed against the opposition. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX concurred with XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Damascus Declaration 
group should avoid attacking Khaddam. 
 
¶5.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
 
¶6.  (C) STRENGTH OF REGIME ASSESSED:  XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the 
regime is weakening "this time," unlike in the 2000-2001 
period when others had mistakenly predicted that the regime 
was weakening and might fall.  The Brammertz investigation is 
definitely contributing to the uncertainty the regime is 
experiencing, as are economic problems, and falling support 
among officers and advisors inside the regime.  The draining 
away of the regime's legitimacy is also having an impact, 
especially because it is a minority regime.  He assessed that 
the regime has only 15-20 percent support among the people. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is not clear if people "are ready to go into 
 
DAMASCUS 00001692  002 OF 003 
 
 
the streets to protest against the regime."  (Comment:  Most 
contacts tell us they are not ready.)  It they do, he 
asserted, any SARG military and security forces reaction 
could be unpredictable.  Although for example, the Republican 
Guard is 90 percent Alawite, the rest of the military is 70 
percent Sunni and non-Alawite minorities.  Consequently the 
regime might find it difficult to use the armed forces to 
repress any street demonstrations.   Because of the lack of 
internal support, an invasion, as was done in Iraq, is not 
necessary to topple the regime, but "a gesture of support" at 
the right time might be needed, he added, without specifying 
exactly what he had in mind. 
 
¶7.  (C) REGIME USE OF ISLAM DISMISSED:  XXXXXXXXXXXX rejected the 
notion that Syrians had been persuaded by President Asad's 
recent appeals to nationalism and to Islam, calling such 
appeals "hand-me-down clothes" that had fooled no one.  Like 
XXXXXXXXXXXX, he said the regime had lost its legitimacy and noted 
that as a minority regime it would have increasing difficulty 
ruling the country under those circumstances.  He requested 
that the U.S. keep up the verbal pressure on the regime, 
criticizing it for corruption, lack of democracy, and absence 
of any reforms.  On that same note, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed 
appreciation for the recent USG message on human rights, 
which he said was good, but that a more specific statement on 
Kamal Labwani was needed.   (Comment:  Some human rights 
activists take issue with this view and believe that the USG 
should not name individuals but keep its statements of 
support for human rights general.  More on this issue and 
Labwani's condition will be reported septel.) 
 
¶8.  (C) COUNSELING ISLAMIC LEADERS:  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he had 
begun counseling certain Islamic leaders to be careful about 
their support for the regime, telling them it could be 
problematic for their future credibility.  He had also 
conveyed the importance of teaching a message of tolerance, 
justice, and respect for non-Muslims ("the other") in an 
initial effort to stop an intolerant strain of mosque 
preaching that was spreading.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he maintained 
good relations with all the major religious leaders in 
Damascus and in other major cities. 
 
¶9.  (C) CONCERN OVER SHIITE, IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ: Both 
men expressed concern about the signs of rising Iranian 
influence in Iraq.  XXXXXXXXXXXX called the influence dangerous and 
said it is everywhere in Iraq.  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the 
Iranians are spending hundreds of millions of dollars in Iraq 
to spread their influence, and that the Saudis and the 
Kuwaitis are now pouring in money to the Sunnis to try to 
balance that influence.  He called the rising Shiite 
influence in the country frightening for the region.  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
reported that the Iranian cultural attache from Damascus had 
visited him recently XXXXXXXXXXXX and invited him to Tehran 
for a visit, hinting it was an invitation he did not plan to 
accept.  XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted that he is not sectarian but noted 
that the situation in Iraq and the region lends itself to 
calls for "sectarian balancing."  He claimed the SARG is 
giving signals to the imams XXXXXXXXXXXX 
to criticize the U.S. for its responsibility for the 
situation in Iraq. 
 
¶10.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief that he met recently with Iraqi 
tribal leader XXXXXXXXXXXX underlining to him 
that the American forces occupying Iraq were there 
temporarily but that Iranian influence would be permanent. 
He told XXXXXXXXXXXX, as he tells other Iraqi Sunni leaders that 
he meets with, that the Sunnis in Iraq are making a 
fundamental miscalculation in supporting the insurgency 
against U.S. forces.  XXXXXXXXXXXX.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also 
told XXXXXXXXXXXX he had the sense that the Syrians were exerting 
great efforts to keep Iraq unstable. 
 
¶11.  (C) COMMENT:  It should be noted that views about 
Khaddam's level of support among Sunnis, or Syrians in 
general, vary widely.  The majority view among most of our 
contacts is that his impact, thus far, has been limited, 
although some of these contacts seem to be passing along a 
SARG-manufactured talking point to downplay his significance. 
 XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX are extremely plugged in to the Sunni 
communities in Syria and are offering a minority view but one 
that we do not dismiss.  Their view that the regime is 
weakening is also hotly disputed.  Most contacts agree that 
 
DAMASCUS 00001692  003 OF 003 
 
 
the regime has seen some of its legitimacy drain away and 
that it is moving somewhat unpredictably in different 
directions to shore up that legitimacy.  Most contacts assert 
that in the short and intermediate term, the regime is and 
will remain strong, but over the longer term, especially if 
Brammertz weighs in with damning accusations, the regime 
could face problems. 
SECHE