VZCZCXRO3398
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0835/01 0951716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051716Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4766
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0170
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE PRIORITY 0866
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0719
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA PRIORITY 0373
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 0406
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 000835 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/RSA, PRM/AFR, DRL/PHD AND AF/W 
ACCRA ALSO FOR WARP 
LISBON ALSO FOR DAO 
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016 
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PREF SNAR PU SG
SUBJECT: IT MAY BE TIME FOR DIPLOMACY TO END THE FIGHTING 
IN NORTHERN GUINEA-BISSAU 
 
REF: A. USDAO DAKAR SG IIR 8 886 0086 06 DTG 030812Z APR 
 
        06 
     ¶B. USDAO DAKAR SG IIR 8 886 0084 06 DTG 291649 MAR 06 
 
Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The fighting in northern Guinea-Bissau was a 
major theme of Charge and PolOff,s March 29-31 meetings with 
Bissau-Guinean leaders.  Charge told Major General Tagme that 
parliamentarians and the media have a right to raise 
questions about the ongoing operations, which have displaced 
more than 8,000 people to date.  Tagme did not respond 
directly but clearly believes that members of the African 
Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde 
(PAIGC) have supported Salif Sadio,s MFDC faction, which has 
purchased landmines and weapons from the sale of narcotics. 
Landmines are slowing the "guerilla army,s8 advance against 
the MFDC guerillas.  UNOGBIS, ECOWAS, the CPLP and the ICRC 
are all examining ways to implement President Vieira,s 
request to help find a diplomatic solution.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Charge and PolOff traveled to Guinea-Bissau, March 
29-31.  The conflict between Movement of Democratic Forces of 
the Casamance (MFDC) factions and the Bissau-Guinean Army 
dominated some of our meetings.  Chief of Staff of the Armed 
Forces (CHOD) Major General Baptista Tagme Na Waie and four 
of his senior officers ) all International Military Training 
and Education (IMET) program graduates -- spent 30 minutes 
with Charge and PolOff on March 30.  Tagme said that the 
Bissau-Guinean armed forces have captured four of MFDC Atika 
leader Salif Sadio,s eight bases ) all of which are near 
Sao Domingos.  Sadio and his men are putting up stiff 
resistance, however, using four 81-millimeter Soviet-made 
bazookas and one heavy machine gun, as well as  both tank and 
anti-personnel mines to protect themselves.  Although the 
MFDC may be running low on ammunition, the mines are impeding 
progress.  Tagme noted that the MFDC has mined the road from 
Sao Domingos to Varela but that the road from Ziguinchor to 
Bissau remains open. Tagme described MFDC human rights 
abuses, including beheading one village leader, and its 
operations as an independent power.  Tagme felt sure that the 
MFDC acquires supplies from narcotics sales.  However, he was 
uncertain whether the MFDC confined itself to selling 
marijuana or had branched out into the cocaine trade. 
 
¶3.  (C) Charge told Tagme that if he had evidence that 
politicians had helped the MFDC (Ref A), he should share that 
evidence with police and prosecutors.  Charge insisted that 
members of the National Popular Assembly (ANP) and the media 
had the right ) even the duty ) to raise legitimate 
questions about the military campaign.  Characteristically, 
Tagme did not reply directly, saying only that although the 
MFDC has representatives in every major town in 
Guinea-Bissau, the rebel group has no right to operate from 
Bissau-Guinean territory.  In meetings with President Joao 
Bernardo &Nino8 Vieira, Prime Minister Aristides Gomes, 
Foreign Minister Isaac Monteiro, Special Advisor to the Prime 
Minister Afonso Te, UNOGIS Representative Joao Honwana, and 
International Monetary Fund ResRep Ousmane Dore, Charge also 
stressed concern about Tagme,s comments.  Te said that 
Vieira had told Tagme to cease and desist.  For his part, 
Vieira said Tagme was very frustrated with the length of the 
campaign and the loss of life.  Other interlocutors 
emphasized that most Bissau-Guineans had expected that Salif 
Sadio and his men would be driven into Senegal, killed or 
captured within three days.  No one had anticipated that the 
operation would go beyond three weeks.  Vieira indicated that 
contrary to other reports, the armed forces had only suffered 
six ) not 60 ) combat deaths through March 30.  Vieira told 
us he would ask the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to attempt to contact Sadio and mediate with him. 
UNOGBIS, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries 
(CPLP), and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) are also seeking a ceasefire as a prelude to a 
diplomatic initiative and/or solution. 
 
¶4.  (C) COMMENT:  The Prime Minister was in Dakar for 
consultations through March 30.  The Defense Minister and 
Chief of the Naval Staff had been in Dakar the previous week, 
and President Vieira came to Dakar for April 3-5, where he 
 
DAKAR 00000835  002 OF 002 
 
 
met with Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, Cape Verdean 
President Pedro Pires, Congolese President and OAU Chairman 
Denis Sassou Nguessou, Gabonese President Omar Bongo and 
Libyan leader Mouammar Qadhafi.  He did reportedly ask for 
assistance in seeking Sadio's exit through negotiations. 
Meanwhile, Embassy believes credible reports that the 
Government of Senegal is providing food, fuel, ammunition and 
intelligence for the Bissau-Guinean military operation. 
Senegal may also eventually be asked to provide combat pay to 
prevent a repetition of the October 2004 mutiny.  Meanwhile, 
Senegal continues its efforts to seal the border and to give 
the appearance of scrupulously respecting its December 2004 
ceasefire with the MFDC.  At this point, a diplomatic 
solution may be attractive to both the GOGB and Sadio, and it 
might allow the 8,500 or so displaced people to return to 
their homes.  END COMMENT. 
JACKSON