VZCZCXRO6296
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #1005/01 1161726
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261726Z APR 06 ZDK CTG RUEHGV SVC
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4956
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0177
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0729
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0713

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 001005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/PHD AND INR/AA 
ACCRA ALSO FOR WARP 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
LISBON ALSO FOR DAO 
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PINS PGOV PREL PU SG
SUBJECT: CASAMANCE: CHIEF REBEL STRONGER THAN ANTICIPATED 
 
REF: DAKAR 1004 
 
DAKAR 00001005  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (SBU) Beginning in mid-March the Bissau-Guinean 
military lent a helping hand to Senegal, putting into 
execution its threat to cleanse the border area of 
Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) 
recalcitrant Salif Sadio and his supporters.  Bissau- 
Guinean troops have succeeded in purging villages that 
harbored Sadio's men, his supporters and their families 
both east and west areas of Sao Domingos, Guinea-Bissau. 
It is not clear, however, how much Sadio has been weakened 
by this operation.  He has redeployed to regain positions 
he was forced to abandon in the Sindian area of the 
northern Casamance near The Gambia.  Casamancais are 
frustrated by the situation of "no war, no peace" but the 
move to attack Sadio, with extensive media coverage, has 
not provided the boost to the peace process that the GOS 
and GOGB had anticipated.  END SUMMARY. 
 
IMPACT OF BISSAU-GUINEAN INTERVENTION LIMITED 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) General Baptista Tagme na Waie, the Chief of 
Staff of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces, announced two 
months ago to Senegalese negotiators in the Casamance 
peace process that removing Sadio as an element of the 
Casamance puzzle is the only way to find a solution. 
Guinea-Bissau deployed hundreds of soldiers and shelled 
Sadio's main positions located in the forests near the 
border, east and west of Sao Domingos at Baraca Mandioca, 
Bazere, Koumere, Kassou and four other locations.  An 
Embassy contact indicated that Sadio's counter-attack 
against Sao Domingos was launched by his elite troops in 
Bazere (north-east of Sao Domingos), and it is those 
troops who mined the road from Sao Domingos to Varela, 
where a Bissau-Guinean passenger vehicle was destroyed by 
a land mine with 11 deaths.  It seems that the Bissau- 
Guinean attacks have deprived Sadio of his safe havens in 
Guinea-Bissau.  However, the intervention seems to have 
realigned forces. 
 
RADICAL TROOPS RECONQUER OLD POSITIONS 
-------------------------------------- 
¶3.  (SBU) To avoid a concentration of troops under Bissau- 
Guinean attack, Sadio's men fled to the Sindian area, 
north of Ziguinchor.  During the weekend of April 23, they 
attacked a Senegalese army position in Nyassia, to make 
sure that these soldiers would not move while their men 
were crossing towards the north to escape the Bissau- 
Guinean forces.  A few months ago, Sadio's commanders had 
been driven from the same area by younger leaders who were 
more open to the peace process, but it seems the Bissau- 
Guinean attack may have enhanced MFDC solidarity around 
Sadio, whose men have recaptured the MFDC bases of 
Kadialouck, Tambaf and Petit Banlandine in the Sindian 
area.  On April 25, an Embassy source indicated there were 
exchanges of fire in the area and it is probable that 
Sadio's men have captured the fourth MFDC base at 
Keurounor. 
 
CIVILIANS ARE CONCERNED 
----------------------- 
¶4.  (SBU) So far there is no movement of refugees or IDPS 
except those noted previously in Guinea-Bissau and 
Ziguinchor.  As long as the fighting is limited to 
factions within the rebellion, most Casamancais villagers 
appear to have confidence that traditional mechanisms will 
work to regulate the conflict.  Their main fear is a 
return of the Senegalese army, which would entail villages 
being caught between two sides and conflict of allegiances 
between the nation and the ethnic group. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶5.  (SBU) The intervention of Bissau-Guinean troops with 
the blessing of Senegalese authorities has not resulted in 
the surgical operation to extirpate Sadio that was 
anticipated.  It has, however, driven enemy rebel forces 
back to the Sindian area.  There is a potential danger 
that if they fail to lay aside their arms, the Senegalese 
military may be forced to return to the area to restore 
law and order.  To avoid such escalation, there is a move 
 
DAKAR 00001005  002 OF 002 
 
 
among Casamance leaders close to Sadio to push for a 
return to the step-by-step approach to peace that allowed 
the area to remain stable for the last three years. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Embassy notes that the GOS's continuing failure 
to provide regular, reliable air service from Dakar to 
Ziguinchor or Cap Skirring has also fanned Casamance anger 
and renewed allegations that President Wade and his 
government do not care about the Casamance.  Recent 
violence in the area may yet bring Senegalese authorities 
to focus more on the Casamance, despite their preparation 
for 2007 elections.  END COMMENT. 
 
JACOBS