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PP RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHCHI #0065/01 1071026
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171026Z APR 06
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0175
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0457
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0011
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 0205
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU PRIORITY 0025
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL PGOV TH BM
SUBJECT: TEN YEARS AFTER MOVING TO THAILAND, KNU RESISTANCE 
CONTINUES 
 
REF: A. A) BANGKOK 01625 
     ¶B. B) CHIANG MAI 00049 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000065  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. Summary:  The Thai-Burma border around Mae Sat in Tak 
province hosts up to a million ethnic Karen and a large number 
of Karen exile organizations.  The most prominent of these 
organizations is the Karen National Union (KNU), headquartered 
in Mae Sot since 1995.  No longer as effective or powerful as in 
the past, the KNU nevertheless remains a force to be reckoned 
with.  A pending USG determination that the KNU is a terrorist 
entity would play into the Burmese regime's hand and lead to 
more human rights abuses.  End summary 
 
¶2. The KNU, which has resisted the central government in Burma 
since 1949, defines itself as a political organization whose 
goal is to protect the Karen people. Even after losing much of 
its fixed territory inside Burma in 1995, the KNU and its 
military arm, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), 
retained a major role in opposition to the ruling State Peace 
and Development Council (SPDC) in Rangoon. The Karen is the only 
major ethnic insurgency in Burma not to sign a cease-fire 
agreement with the Burmese regime.  According to Chiang 
Mai-based journalist Bertil Lintner, the majority of Karen on 
both sides of the border view the KNU as their only hope for 
resisting the Burmese regime. 
 
¶3. At one time the KNU functioned as a de-facto government, 
funding basic services in Karen territory through tax collection 
and trade.  The Karen Education Department, which administered a 
network of schools throughout Karen State up to 1995, is now 
limited to cooperating with NGOs providing education in the 
Thailand-based refugee camps.  The Karen Department of Health 
and Welfare trained civilian medics and a Mae Sot-based supreme 
justice presided over local courts in the Karen State. 
 
Thai Government Policy Mixed 
 
¶4. The Thai government attitude toward its large and diverse 
Karen population - which includes long-time residents of 
Thailand, migrant workers, exiles opposed to the Burmese 
military regime, and over 100,000 refugees in camps - is mixed. 
According to KNU Foreign Secretary David Taw, there is no single 
Thai "policy" toward the KNU.  "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
doesn't know much about the KNU," he said, showing interest only 
"when the SPDC complains."  Although a coordinated policy by 
Burma and Thailand likely could eliminate the KNU, elements of 
the Thai military maintain that it is not in their interest to 
push the KNU into a corner. Sources within the Thai Special 
Forces confirm their cooperation with the KNLA, noting that 
policies formulated in Bangkok are often in contradiction with 
the reality faced by soldiers on the frontline. 
 
¶5. This tacit support for the KNU is a legacy of the historical 
Thai view of the Karen as long-standing allies who provided a 
buffer against both the Burmese army and communist insurgents. 
Prime Minister Thaksin's policy of engagement with the SPDC does 
not appear to have significantly changed the government's 
handling of the KNU and related organizations.  In fact, the 
Karen retain standing in the business community as important 
players in border commerce.  A Thai proposal to develop an 
industrial zone in Karen territory stalled for want of KNU 
agreement, according to David Taw. 
 
Background of the Conflict 
 
¶6. The roots of the Karen resistance predate an independent 
Burma, with years of grievances on both sides.  The Karen's 
predominantly Christian leadership and World War II allegiance 
to the British against the Japanese and their Burman allies 
exacerbated ethnic differences.  The Karen were the only major 
ethnic group to opt out of an agreement that led to Burma's 
independence in 1948.  Less than a year after independence, the 
Karen's uneasy alliance with the first Burmese government fell 
apart as communal violence spread. 
 
¶7. During the early years following independence, the Karen 
engaged in open conflict with the Burmese central government. 
Prolonged warfare took place throughout Karen State as well as 
in ethnic Karen areas throughout southern Burma and in the 
vicinity of Rangoon.  In the decades after the military seized 
power in Rangoon in 1962, however, the Rangoon generals 
consolidated their power throughout the country.  The Burmese 
army attacked the Karen and other ethnic groups using a strategy 
known as "Four Cuts:" cutting supply lines, cutting 
communication between the population and the military, cutting 
income-producing activities, and cutting off access to new 
recruits. 
 
Human Rights Issues 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000065  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶8. This policy caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands 
of Karen villagers over the years, creating a large population 
of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are vulnerable to 
rape, disease, and starvation.  NGOs such as Karen Human Rights 
Group and Human Rights Watch have documented systematic abuse 
against Karen villagers and IDPs, including extra-judicial 
killing, torture, forced labor, forced relocation, extortion, 
rape, destruction of property, and land confiscation. 
 
¶9. The Karen have faced charges of human rights violations as 
well; Amnesty International documented the use of child 
soldiers, landmines, extra-judicial killings, and torture by the 
KNLA.  KNU contacts admit that these abuses occur, but say that 
the KNU is actively working to improve their human rights record 
by educating civilian and military leaders about human rights 
issues. 
 
Cease Fire Talks 
 
¶10. Cease fire talks between the KNU and Rangoon, abandoned 
after 1995, resumed in December 2003 when a team led by 
long-time KNU leader General Bo Mya went to Rangoon to 
negotiate.  The resulting "Gentleman's Agreement" - a handshake 
to stop fighting - has been repeatedly violated by both sides. 
Although a KNU delegation went to Rangoon in October 2004 to 
continue the talks, negotiations ended abruptly with the sudden 
downfall of Burmese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and subsequent 
purge of his military intelligence apparatus.  A later offer by 
Rangoon in May 2005 to resume talks was deemed unacceptable by 
the KNU. 
 
 
¶11. KNU Foreign Secretary David Taw confirmed that the 
organization remains interested in a cease fire agreement with 
Rangoon, "but after Khin Nyunt's departure we don't know who to 
deal with."  In the meantime, the KNU considers that the 
"Gentlemen's Agreement" achieved with the SPDC in 2004 remains 
in force, despite numerous skirmishes in the ensuing years. 
 
The Christian Connection 
 
¶12. A large number of Karen converted to Christianity in the 
19th century due to American missionary efforts, educational 
opportunities and a traditional Karen legend that corresponded 
to Christian teachings.  Among Karen leaders today, many are 
Christians, including most of the KNU executive committee and 
the Karen Refugee Committee. 
 
¶13. Christian missionaries and aid workers in northern Thailand 
provide various kinds of support to the Karen on both sides of 
the border; the Chiang Mai-based Free Burma Rangers (FBR) 
assists IDPs in Burma and publicizes their plight through widely 
circulated email reports of Burmese atrocities.  FBR staff 
confirm that these eyewitness accounts go to Congressional 
offices and British parliamentarians as well as to journalists, 
NGOs, and UN organizations.  FBR photos and video footage have 
been used in reporting on Burma by international media 
organizations such as BBC, VOA, AP, and Swiss, German, and 
French TV. 
 
¶14. Comment:  Within Thailand's multi-ethnic border dissident 
community, the Karen play an active and highly visible role.  By 
virtue of their numbers and long resistance to the Burmese 
central government, the Karen are central to refugee and exile 
issues in Thailand.  The KNU in turn is central to most of the 
Karen.  As with other exile groups, the KNU is struggling with 
problems of operating out of Thailand, which makes communication 
with villagers and colleagues inside Burma more difficult. 
Recent advances by the Burmese army on the small remaining 
territory controlled by the KNU in Karen State near the Thai 
border, as well as on other areas populated by ethnic Karen, has 
led to a surge in Karen IDPs and refugees and put further 
pressure on the KNU.  A USG determination that the KNU is a 
terrorist organization would be used by the Burmese regime to 
justify continued and even more severe abuses against the Karen 
people. 
 
¶15. This cable was coordinated with Embassy Rangoon. 
CAMP