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C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM SY IS IZ SU EG KPAL
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER TANTAWI ON IRAN, IRAQ, HAMAS, 
SUDAN AND FMF 
 
Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  NEA Assistant Secretary Welch, accompanied 
by the Ambassador, discussed Iran, Iraq, Hamas, Sudan and the 
International Medical Center with Defense Minister Field 
Marshal Tantawi during an April 4 meeting.  Responding to A/S 
Welch's caution on Iran's growing influence in the region, 
Tantawi asked how Egypt can counter it.  Tantawi reiterated 
the offer to train Iraqi troops in Egypt, and Welch explained 
the difficulties with the GOE proposal.  On Palestine, 
Tantawi urged the USG to continue financial support and give 
Hamas a chance to change.  Welch stressed that Abu Mazen must 
take control of the border crossings and said that if 
Congress approves, USG humanitarian assistance to the 
Palestinian people will increase.  On Sudan, Welch urged the 
GOE to offer to send Egyptian troops to join a UN force in 
Darfur.  Tantawi was open to the idea and promised to raise 
it with the President.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Iran's regional influence:  A/S Welch told Tantawi 
that addressing Iran's nuclear file alone is no longer enough 
because Iran's interference in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Palestine is growing.  Welch said that in addition to 
supporting Hizballah, U.S. (vice Israeli) information shows 
that Iran also supports Hamas. While the amount of money 
Hamas receives is not substantial, the link must be watched, 
Welch said.  He also said that Iranian infiltration in Iraq 
is strongest in the police forces and Interior Ministry, but 
noted that the Army is strong. 
 
¶3.  (C) Tantawi asked how Egypt might counter Iran's regional 
influence.  A/S Welch urged the GOE to (1) strengthen 
political relations with a newly formed Iraqi Government, (2) 
work with neighbors (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE) to 
influence tribes in Iraq, and (3) promote a more proactive 
Arab League involvement in Iraq.  Tantawi promised to convey 
the USG's request.  Tantawi also reiterated Egypt's offer to 
train Iraqi military forces in Egypt, complaining gently that 
significant numbers of Iraqi troops and police train in 
Jordan.  Welch noted that it is not convenient for the troops 
to travel to Egypt for training.  The Ambassador then asked 
Egypt, security permitting, to consider sending small teams 
to Iraq to provide training.  Tantawi declined to commit, 
noting they would be a target and recalling the assassination 
of Egypt's Ambassador to Iraq.  Tantawi promised to raise the 
matter with President Mubarak.  The Ambassador said that any 
sign of support for Iraq, even providing a military liaison, 
would be useful. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Syria:  Tantawi asserted that Bashar al Assad is 
cooperating more on securing the borders.  A/S Welch 
disagreed, noting that the Syrian-Iraqi border is more secure 
because U.S. and Iraqi forces are operating in the Euphrates 
Valley. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Israel/Palestine:  A/S Welch thanked the GOE for 
providing excellent security on the border with Gaza, and 
noted that Israel also acknowledges the improvement.  Tantawi 
said that Israel causes some of the security problems with 
its assassinations.  Welch responded that Abu Mazen's lack of 
control over security at the border crossings remains a big 
problem and asked Egypt to press him to take charge.  Egypt, 
the EU, and Abu Mazen must control border crossing security, 
Welch stressed.  When Tantawi asked if Abu Mazen is strong 
enough to handle this, Welch said yes.  Tantawi then conceded 
that if Israel closes border crossings because of security 
concerns, it would be an Egyptian, and not just a Palestinian 
problem. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Tantawi asked the USG to give Hamas a chance to 
change and asked what Hamas should do to show cooperation. 
Tantawi also asked how Israel would respond to a gesture from 
Hamas.  After urging the GOE to ask Israel this question 
directly, Welch noted that security is a priority and efforts 
to bolster it would be welcome. Welch said that if Hamas 
continues to say one thing on security and do another, Israel 
will respond.  If Hamas fails, it will be because the 
Palestinian people reject them for failing to meet their 
needs.  Tantawi argued that because Hamas succeeded 
democratically, the government must be allowed to work.  An 
electoral victory, Welch said, does not mean the USG must 
agree with Hamas's positions.  When Tantawi pressed for the 
continuation of financial support the Palestinians, Welch 
said that with Congressional approval, the USG would increase 
its humanitarian assistance in the coming weeks. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Sudan:  A/S Welch said Egypt should support a 
successful peace process in Abuja, but should not allow a 
veto on the use of UN forces in Darfur.  Welch urged the GOE 
to offer Egyptian troops for a UN force in Darfur.  Signaling 
receptiveness, Tantawi promised to raise the proposal with 
President Mubarak.  (Note:  During an April 4 visit to Sudan, 
Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit said Egypt would be willing to 
consider increasing the number of observers (in the military 
or civil police) serving with the AU forces. On USG pressure 
to send UN forces to Darfur, Aboul Gheit said this would need 
to be decided in light of developments, including financing 
and the availability of sufficient African and Arab troops. 
End note.) 
 
¶8.  (C)  International Medical Center:  Tantawi asked A/S 
Welch to help Egypt get approval to treat third country 
nationals at IMC.  Welch did not make a commitment, but said 
the State Department would address the matter step-by- step. 
 
¶9.  (U)  A/S Welch cleared this message. 
RICCIARDONE