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DE RUEHEG #2162/01 0991427
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O 091427Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7281
INFO RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0135
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0235
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0639

S E C R E T CAIRO 002162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS UNSC EG IR KNNP
SUBJECT: CAIRO:  SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH 

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes your visit and the 
opportunity to continue our dialogue with the GOE on 
counterproliferation, Iran, and security assistance.  Egypt 
values its role as a regional leader on nonproliferation and 
its influence in multilateral fora.  Your visit will reassure 
Egypt that the U.S. values its regional influence and may 
also highlight areas for greater cooperation.  The Foreign 
and Defense Ministers will likely tell you that the GOE: 
shares U.S. concerns on Iran's nuclear intentions; wants to 
keep Israel's nuclear program on the agenda to address at the 
earliest appropriate opportunity; is not ready to endorse 
PSI; and fears Congress may reduce or redirect U.S. security 
assistance to Egypt. 
 
------------------ 
Your interlocutors 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  You will meet both the Ministers of Defense and 
Foreign Affairs.  Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit previously 
served as Egypt's representative to the UN (1999-2004) and is 
proud and protective of Egypt's role in multilateral fora. 
He has become increasingly involved in nonproliferation as a 
result of the developments in Iran, and remains keenly 
focused on the creation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone (MENWFZ).  Defense Minister Field Marshal Tantawi is 
reluctant to engage on sensitive issues such as 
counterproliferation, but will do so when pressed. 
Preserving the USD 1.3 billion in annual U.S. military 
assistance is Tantawi's number one priority, and you should 
expect him to stress this during your meeting. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶3.  (S)  USG officials have briefed the GOE on three separate 
occasions on our assessment of Iran's nuclear aims and 
weaponization capabilities.  Following each briefing, GOE 
officials, including Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit, have said 
they are convinced of the USG's assessment, but seek more 
clarity on when Iran will develop nuclear weapons.  Because 
of our consultations, Egypt supported the IAEA decision to 
report Iran to the UNSC.  Egypt's antipathy towards Iran in 
general is intense, and Egyptians are increasingly concerned 
about Iran's regional influence, particularly in Iraq, and 
its support for Hamas.  A senior GOE official recently warned 
a visiting USG official against any U.S. engagement with 
Iran.  That said, any discussion of Iran's nuclear file 
inevitably leads to Egyptian charges of the U.S.' "Double 
Standard" on Israeli nukes. 
 
------ 
MENWFZ 
------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  Aboul Gheit wants to advance the discussion on the 
MENWFZ, but understands the impediments to progress. 
Nonetheless, he will remind you that this issue is still on 
his agenda and on the minds of the Egyptian people, and he 
will press for more U.S. support for President Mubarak's 
initiative. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Proliferation Security Initiative 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) As previously reported, Egypt is not yet ready to 
endorse PSI's statement of the Principles of Interdiction. 
During a recent meeting with the Ambassador, the DefMin 
explained that raising the profile of U.S-Egyptian 
counterproliferation support through a public endorsement of 
PSI could harm our governments' currently excellent 
cooperation.  Tantawi also reminded the Ambassador of the 
cases in which Egypt interdicted ships at USG request.  After 
reassuring the Ambassador that Egypt would continue to 
support (quietly) the U.S. on counterproliferation, Tantawi 
asked that the USG not press Egypt on PSI.  Separately, an 
MFA Disarmament official recently asked if a government can 
join PSI in "observer status" and said that the Ministry is 
coordinating a National Committee meeting to discuss the 
initiative.  But we expect MoD representatives at that 
meeting to oppose endorsement of PSI. 
 
------------------- 
Military Assistance 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  President Mubarak regards the USD 1.3 billion in 
military assistance to Egypt as the keystone of the 
U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship.  Because of Egypt's 
support for U.S. regional objectives, such as on Iran, the 
Peace Process, Hamas, counterproliferation, and Sudan, the 
GOE believes that Congressional discussions about reducing or 
redirecting any portion of this assistance are inappropriate. 
 GOE officials have said that any change would signal a 
downgrade in the relationship and may impact cooperation in 
key areas.  These officials have also said that, on a 
practical level, reducing military assistance would force 
them to look elsewhere (i.e, Russia and China) for less 
expensive military equipment.  We have advised the GOE that 
they bear responsibility for convincing Congress of Egypt's 
value to the U.S, but the GOE believes the U.S. should press 
Congress harder to ensure continued FMF support for Egypt. 
NEA A/S Welch recently suggested to Tantawi that Egypt send 
troops to support a UN mission in Darfur, and Tantawi 
promised to raise the matter with Mubarak.  (Note:  The issue 
of sending Egyptian troops to Darfur has been historically 
sensitive.  Thus far, Egypt has sent only a small number of 
observers and a field hospital to Darfur.  End note.)  You 
may want to follow up on this suggestion during your meeting 
with Tantawi. 
 
----------------- 
Domestic Politics 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  President Mubarak recently told Egyptian newspaper 
editors that his January meeting with Vice President Cheney 
and his February meeting with Secretary Rice indicated that 
the USG was satisfied with Egypt's reform process. This is 
not the case.  The GOE is proceeding with its economic reform 
agenda, centered on an ambitious plan to create 4.5 million 
jobs over the next six years, but few concrete results on 
political reform have been observed thus far.  The 
parliamentary elections in 2005 went badly, and postponement 
of local council elections until 2008 suggests that the GOE 
leadership is moving cautiously. The February 3 Red Sea ferry 
accident and the avian influenza crisis (11 human cases thus 
far) have also pushed the GOE into a defensive crouch. The 
opposition bloc in the new Parliament, which includes 88 
independent deputies affiliated with the banned but tolerated 
Muslim Brotherhood, has kept up a steady stream of criticism 
of the GOE. Secular opposition activist Ayman Nour, who 
placed a distant second to Mubarak in the September 2005 
presidential elections, remains in prison after his December 
24, 2005 conviction on politically-motivated forgery charges. 
Nour's appeal before Egypt's highest court will be heard on 
May 18.  Both Aboul Gheit and Tantawi will tell you that 
internal reform is underway and will continue to proceed at a 
pace appropriate for Egypt. 
 
RICCIARDONE