VZCZCXRO5928
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #0629/01 1080757
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 180757Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4185
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 1137
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 1215
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0067
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0808

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 000629 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE BILL SILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MD RS BO UP KDEM PHUM RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA: DAS KRAMER, AMBASSADOR HODGES - 
CONSULTATIONS IN BUCHAREST 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE MARK TAPLIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: DAS David Kramer and Ambassador to Moldova 
Heather Hodges shared views with leading Romanian 
interlocutors on recent developments involving Ukraine, 
Moldova, Belarus and Russia during a visit to Bucharest on 
April 3-4.  Although Romanian interlocutors described growing 
strains in the relationship with Moscow, they reiterated 
Romania's commitment to encouraging positive developments in 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. Foreign Minister Ungureanu 
said Russia had definitely taken note of Romania's growing 
strategic partnership with the U.S. and was suspicious of 
Romania's motives, including in promoting more Black Sea 
cooperation.  National Security Advisor Medar and others 
sounded generally pessimistic about Ukraine's prospects, but 
emphasized their determination to help Ukraine. Opposition 
Social Democratic Party (PSD) leader Mircea Geoana criticized 
President Triaian Basescu for "frivolously antagonizing" 
Russia, while offering few specifics as to how he would 
pursue regional relations differently.  All interlocutors 
expressed strong appreciation for the visit of DAS Kramer and 
Ambassador Hodges, emphasizing the value and importance of 
regular consultation on countries that are in the top echelon 
of Romania's foreign policy and security concerns.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) EUR DAS David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador to Moldova 
Heather Hodges consulted with key interlocutors in the 
Romanian MFA, presidency, prime minister's office, and civil 
society during an April 3-4 visit to Bucharest.  Throughout 
his meetings, DAS Kramer expressed his appreciation for 
Romania's efforts to promote security and democracy in 
Eastern Europe and beyond.  Recognizing our common interests 
as well as our strong bilateral relations, he emphasized that 
he had come both to provide a perspective from Washington on 
the countries under his purview as well as to hear the views 
of Romanian policymakers and analysts. DAS Kramer said he 
would try to return to Bucharest before he attends the next 5 
plus 2 talks on Transnistria.  Ambassador Hodges emphasized 
the important role Romania can continue to play in supporting 
Moldova diplomatically and in helping strengthen democratic 
institutions in Moldova.  FM Ungureanu and other Romanians 
repeatedly expressed appreciation for the visit, with 
Ungureanu expressing his view that it is "critical" the U.S. 
and Romania "keep in close touch" on key issues and countries 
"we both watch closely." 
 
FM Ungureanu:  "Russia is Tightening the Screws" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶3.  (C) DAS Kramer and Ambassador Hodges met first with 
relevant senior and working level MFA officials, including 
Director General for "Wider Europe" Rasvan Rusu and Special 
Envoy for Moldova Bogdan Aurescu.  FM Ungureunu subsequently 
joined the meeting. Concerning Romania's regional role, 
Ungureanu commented that Moscow was "tightening the screws" 
in its relations with Bucharest.  He expressed the view that 
Romania's strong strategic partnership with the U.S. had not 
gone unnoticed in Moscow. He said Russia views Romania's 
initiatives in the Black Sea along with its interest in 
Moldova and Transnistria as problematic. He opined that 
Russia is "concerned that behind Romania, the U.S. is pulling 
the strings." Nonetheless, he noted that the current Romanian 
government has sought to engage Russia on a number of issues 
and is working to the extent possible to achieve a 
constructive relationship. 
 
¶4. (C) With regard to the domestic situation in Russia, 
Ungureanu assessed that the Kremlin was purposefully pursuing 
a more authoritarian path. He added that many both inside 
Russia and outside are now looking ahead to the post-Putin 
era, although they do not know where to look yet. Russian 
foreign policymaking was split between career diplomats under 
Lavrov and the increasingly powerful intelligence services 
that "hold the reins." Ungureanu commented that Russian 
officials appear to be concentrating their attention 
increasingly on central European countries, after recent 
high-level visits to Prague and Budapest, where the Russians 
believe they can use their leverage on energy supplies as a 
tool to manage relations. He mentioned that he wouldmeet 
Russian FM Lavrov in Sofia on April 27-28 a the NATO 
informal ministerial meeting, since Lavov had asked for a 
"closed talk."  Ungureanu proised to provide a readout of 
his discussion withLavrov to the Secretary, per his March 28 
meetin with the Secretary in Washington. DAS Kramer 
exressed concern over Russia's movements in a negativ 
direction, even in a period in which Russia wasunder 
 
BUCHAREST 00000629  002 OF 004 
 
 
increased scrutiny before the G8 meeting in St. Petersburg in 
July, and suggested that the situation would likely worsen 
afterwards. FM Ungureanu agreed with DAS Kramer's assessment 
that the main problem is the windfall income the Russians are 
enjoying from high oil prices, which has prompted a more 
arrogant foreign policy approach. 
 
Romania "Committed to Help" Moldova 
----------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Turning to Moldova and Transnistria, Ambassador Hodges 
noted the "delicate dance" Romania sometimes has to play, 
given continued underlying suspicions in some corners of 
Chisinau about Romanian intentions towards its neighbor.  FM 
Ungureanu and DG Rusu emphasized Romania's commitment to 
helping Moldova in its path toward integration with Western 
institutions.  On Transnistria, DAS Kramer underlined that 
the recent implementation of the Ukrainian-Moldovan customs 
agreement represented a true change in the status quo. He 
said it could potentially spur some movement in 5 2 talks on 
settling Transnistria. Ambassador Hodges recalled 
Transnistrian "foreign minister" Litskai had commented that 
"this is economic war from now on," and that Tiraspol then 
refused to participate in the scheduled 5 2 meeting and 
Moscow subsequently imposed its ban on Moldovan and Georgian 
wine. FM Ungureanu agreed with Ambassador Hodges' positive 
assessment of the EU Border Assistance Mission, which was 
crucial to implementing the bilateral customs agreement. 
Ungureanu said he was pleased that the mission had been 
staffed by many qualified individuals, and led by a long-time 
employee at the SECI Center in Bucharest. With regard to the 
5 plus 2 talks, Ungureanu questioned what the dismissal of 
Ukrainian negotiator Tkach meant for the talks and whether 
Ukraine would continue to stand by its customs agreement with 
Moldova. DAS Kramer noted it would be difficult for Ukraine 
to back out given its desire to further its relationship with 
the European Union, in particular. 
 
¶6. (C) Romania's Special Envoy for Moldova Bogdan Aurescu 
spoke of the "need to solve Transnistria in order to advance 
Moldova on a European path," but cautioned that current 
developments "might lead to a dangerous situation" because 
Russians were blaming the EU for the "blockade" around 
Transnistria. He said that the "parties are heading in 
opposite directions," with an increasingly worse climate in 
the negotiations after four inconclusive rounds of talks. 
While Romania was not at the negotiating table, it would 
continue to express its concerns appropriately and by 
offering its analysis to the U.S. and EU. More broadly on 
Moldova-Romanian relations, Aurescu acknowledged that one 
irritant was what he characterized as a "lack of reaction" 
from Chisinau on the need to upgrade their border regime. 
Romania, he asserted, had been trying to get Chisinau's 
attention in order to update the 1961 Soviet treaty since 
¶2003. Aurescu said Romania would raise the need for a new 
Border Treaty again in negotiations scheduled for April 13-14 
in Chisinau. 
 
¶7. (C)  On Ukraine, Ungureanu asserted that Ukrainian Foreign 
Minister Tarasyuk, did not want the Foreign Minister position 
again under a new government, adding that he had indicated he 
"would be happier in parliament." Below Tarasyuk, Ungureanu 
insisted, other candidates for Foreign Minister were "all old 
ones," making it clear he was not optimistic about finding 
common ground with others in the Ukrainian MFA.  DAS Kramer 
agreed that the Foreign Minister had played a crucial role in 
furthering Ukraine's western orientation. Ungureanu said 
Romania would appreciate hearing from the U.S. "any rumors" 
about Snake Island or other bilateral issues with Romania 
such as Ukrainian plans for the Bystroe Canal. 
 
¶8. (C) On Belarus, DG Rusu emphasized Romania's view that 
Russia was trying to strengthen its grip on Belarus.  Rusu 
and others emphasized that that Romania's approach to Belarus 
was very similar to that of the U.S., and formulated in close 
coordination with the EU. MFA interlocutors reported that 
there was agreement in the EU on extending the visa bans, but 
that it would take longer to develop financial sanctions. 
They argued against placing broad economic sanctions on 
Belarus and said that the West should support civil society 
and the democratic opposition as two distinct elements, 
targeting rural areas as well as Minsk. Romania, they 
stressed, was also "closely monitoring" Belarus as from its 
current position as chair of the Council of Europe. 
 
NSA Medar: "Give Ukraine a MAP" 
------------------------------- 
 
BUCHAREST 00000629  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶9. (C) At a dinner hosted by Ambassador Taubman, DAS Kramer 
and Ambassador Hodges met with a core group of senior 
Romanian foreign policy advisors from multiple agencies, 
including National Security Advisor Sergiu Medar, Deputy NSA 
Constantin Degeratu, Presidential Foreign Policy Counselor 
Anca Ilinoiu, MOD State Secretary Ioan Mircea Planga, Foreign 
Policy Advisor to the prime minister Calin Fabian, and MFA 
Directors General Rasvan Rusu, Stelian Stoian, and Cristian 
Istrate.  NSA Medar reiterated Romania's commitment to its 
strategic partnership with the U.S. and appreciation for the 
"weight" the U.S. brings to issues of mutual concern in the 
region. 
 
¶10. (C) Dinner conversation centered on Ukraine's future, 
with Ambassador Taubman posing the question of whether 
Romania's experience getting into NATO and the EU could be 
instructive for Ukraine if it was still headed westward after 
the parliamentary elections. Medar and others argued that 
whatever challenges lay ahead in reuniting the "Orange team" 
following Ukraine's recent parliamentary elections, it was 
the only plausible way forward. Several guests commented that 
former PM Yanukovych could not be trusted.  Others said the 
vote demonstrated the confusion of the electorate -- the 
tendency for people to vote based on their short-term 
perception of the economic situation.  Romanian interlocutors 
viewed the risk of secession of the eastern half of Ukraine 
as a "red herring."  Degeratu commented that the expectation 
of NATO membership accelerated Romania's democratization and 
believed the same could be applied for Ukraine. He also said 
it was important for Romania to reach out to Ukraine to 
create a better economic partnership. MOD State Secretary 
Planga cautioned that there was a huge difference in popular 
support for NATO between pre-NATO membership Romania and 
present-day Ukraine, with only 18% of Ukrainians currently 
supporting NATO membership. He labeled the parliamentary vote 
as a reaction to the corruption of the Orange leaders and 
added "it would be difficult to help Ukraine from Romania," 
but Romania would be "open to share with Ukraine its 
experience" in joining NATO and the EU. 
 
¶11. (C) NSA Medar mentioned that Ukraine faced a question in 
2004 -- East or West? -- which Romania never needed to 
decide. He supported, however, offering Ukraine a Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) that would make Ukrainians understand that 
"we're serious if they are." Medar commented that the West's 
biggest mistake in Kosovo was that "we didn't educate young 
Kosovars," and argued, "we need to do it in Ukraine." 
Presidential Counselor Ilinoiu surmised that "Ukraine's only 
way to the EU is through NATO," and that "Ukraine is the test 
case for how the West handles Russia." She stated, "it is no 
one's right to deny...Ukraine of the hope of reaching the 
borders of democracy." She said that Russia's bases in Crimea 
"cannot be a disqualifier to NATO membership -- otherwise we 
give Russia a veto." DAS Kramer noted that the West should 
deal with Russia by helping its neighboring countries 
establish themselves as democracies. He pointed out that 
Russia had spent hundreds of millions of dollars in Ukraine 
while the West had focused on getting the democratic process 
right, which in the long term would support our interests in 
Russia as well. One of the Romanian MFA officials reported 
that Russia had encouraged Romania to reach out to the 
Transnistrians to promote a more positive dialogue. 
Ambassador Hodges discouraged the idea, suggested that it 
might be a trap; instead, she offered to work with the 
Romanian Ambassador to Moldova on ways to reach out to 
Transnistrian civil society. 
 
Opposition Leader Geoana: Basescu's Russia Policy "Off Course" 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
¶12. (C) Kramer and Hodges also met with former FM and leader 
of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), Mircea Geoana.  Adding 
a partisan tinge to their visit, Geoana accused President 
Traian Basescu of steering Romania's policy towards Romania 
"off course" and "disrupting diplomatic ties" with the 
Kremlin.  He compared Basescu with a boy shouting at a 
schoolyard antagonist because his older brother -- in this 
case, the U.S. -- was around to protect him. He complained 
that this "frivolous antagonizing" of Russia had caused 
Romania to have the highest gas prices in Europe and an 
Ambassador to Russia who had not been able to received by 
President Putin in six months. Geoana argued that Romania's 
Black Sea strategy should court Russia more, in part on the 
basis of the two countries' common concern with terrorism. He 
concluded that Romanians were "intoxicated by anti-Russian 
themes" and that President Basescu was "speaking for the 
polls" instead of building better regional relations.  Geoana 
 
BUCHAREST 00000629  004 OF 004 
 
 
said he would like to see more coordination with other 
countries in eastern Europe and less emphasis on the Black 
Sea; greater engagement on Moldova but without playing a 
"stupid game...because we are concerned we are left out" of 
the negotiations; and less "strategic overstretch" and more 
consensus building on Romania's national objectives now that 
it had achieved NATO and (almost) EU accession. 
 
¶13. (C) Comment: By all accounts, the Romanian foreign policy 
team, including advisors from the President's and Prime 
Minister's offices as well as the Foreign Ministry, greatly 
appreciated this visit by Ambassador Hodges and DAS Kramer. 
Such broad engagement -- senior interlocutors cleared 
schedules on short notice when they heard of their visit -- 
demonstrates the importance they ascribe to consultations 
with the U.S. on these countries. The Romanians are eager to 
play an active role in their strategically important corner 
of Europe, as a NATO and nearly-finalized EU member. The most 
common Bucharest metaphor for the country's future 
geostrategic role in the region has Romania watchfully gazing 
over the ramparts, guarding Western civilization from 
instability and chaos to the East. Yet Romanian policymakers, 
as well as local NGO representatives like those Kramer and 
Hodges met informally, understand that the type of subtle and 
patient engagement it is going to take to promote democracy 
and stability in this part of the world in the long-term will 
belie that type of watchtower imagery. End Comment. 
 
¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Kramer and 
Ambassador Hodges. 
 
¶15. (U) AmEmbassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are 
available on the Bucharest SIPRNet 
website:www.state.sgov.gov/eur/Bucharest 
TAPLIN