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Viewing cable 06BRUSSELS1166, BURMA'S HUMANITARIAN SITUATION DETERIORATING: EU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BRUSSELS1166 2006-04-05 16:15 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brussels
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 001166 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, PRM AND DRL; PLEASE PASS USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL EAID BM TH EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: BURMA'S HUMANITARIAN SITUATION DETERIORATING: EU 
STRESSES ASSISTANCE, DIALOGUE 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  The 2006 Burma/Myanmar Forum, sponsored by 
the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS), focused on 
the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Burma.  NGOs, 
international organizations, academics and government 
officials outlined the reasons for increased displacement in 
2005, as well as the current obstacles in addressing 
humanitarian needs.  Specific examples of displacement caused 
by military activity, large-scale development projects and 
unsuccessful policy initiatives were described in detail. 
The conference was not meant to explore political responses 
in addressing the root causes of this complex humanitarian 
emergency.  However, given that the event took place in the 
run-up to the European Union,s (EU) review of its "common 
position" towards Burma, several speakers made this critical 
link.  European officials stressed the need for dialogue with 
the regime, in contrast to the USG statement which stressed 
marginalizing it.  Most speakers expressed concern that the 
Burmese government's proposed guidelines for NGOs would 
obstruct access and the delivery of aid and possibly cause 
NGOs to discontinue their work in the country.  Regarding 
Burmese refugees in Thailand, various speakers spoke in 
positive terms about the Thai government's policy shift 
towards accommodating a longer-term refugee community.  The 
EU's common position towards Burma is not expected to alter 
significantly when it is reviewed later this month.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------------ 
EU "common position" on relations with Burma 
------------------------ 
 
2. (U) In his keynote speech at the Burma/Mynmar Forum 2006 
on March 29, the European Commission's Director General for 
External Relations Eneko Landaburu stressed the need for 
balancing criticism of the Burmese regime with limited 
engagement.  He said that the EU sought to be a global player 
and was intent on spreading its values and principles through 
"soft power" and multilateral engagement.  Landaburu outlined 
the EU's common policy -- which has been attacked as both too 
mild and too stringent -- and emphasized the need to: 1) 
maintain a dialogue which included a focus on human rights; 
2) engage the regime to undertake its responsibility in 
developing the country; and, 3) ensure assistance for 
vulnerable populations, including refugees abroad.  He 
stressed that isolating Burma and placing restrictions on the 
regime could not, by themselves, bring about change. 
 
------------------------ 
EC assistance, the "3D Fund", NGO guidelines, and donor 
coordination 
------------------------ 
 
3. (U) Outlining the European Commission's (EC) assistance 
strategy for 2007-2013, Landaburu said the emphasis would be 
on primary education and health programs.  He regretted the 
Global Fund's decision to end its program in Burma and said 
EC funds would help fill the gap in combating malaria, 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.  EC assistance, he said, would 
help prevent a "lost generation" from developing in Burma. 
Landaburu ended with a personal reflection on his youth under 
Franco's dictatorship and said that engagement, including 
visits by tourists, was key in exposing Spaniards to 
democracy and market principles. 
 
4. (U) During the conference, EC officials gave more details 
about humanitarian and longer-term funding.  According to 
Burma-Thailand desk office Javier Menendez Bonilla, the 
Euroepan Commission Humanitarian Aid Officer (ECHO) considers 
Burma a "forgotten crisis."  ECHO will provide 8 million 
euros for humanitarian needs inside Burma this year -- of 
which 2.7 million euros will assist the Rohingyas of Northern 
Arakan -- and these funds will be channeled through UNHCR, 
WFP and ICRC to provide protection, food aid and 
water/sanitation.  ECHO's funding is being straight-lined 
from 2005 to 2006, but the 8 million figure is four times 
higher than the 2003 total. 
 
5. (U) Menendez Bonilla said that the Burmese government's 
proposed guidelines for NGOs are a cause of grave concern in 
that they would obstruct access and the delivery of aid. 
During the conference, NGOs also expressed concern about the 
proposed guidelines and said that they may well cause many 
organizations to discontinue working in Burma. They stressed 
it was important to ensure that not all humanitarian agencies 
cease operations and that a way is found to reestablish and 
maintain a humanitarian space in order for operations to 
continue. 
 
6. (U) Andrew Jacobs, a Commission official based at the EC's 
Delegation in Bangkok and Operations Manager of the proposed 
"Three Diseases Fund", gave a detailed overview of this 
EC-driven initiative designed to fill the gap caused by the 
departure of the Global Fund.  Should donors cough up enough 
money, Jacobs suggested the 3D fund budget would be $100 
million over five years.  He said UNOPS had been chosen to 
manage the fund because of its independence (i.e., no need to 
rely on donor funding).  Jacobs highlighted the importance of 
combating malaria, the biggest cause of mortality in Burma. 
However, he also stressed the role of the 3D fund in 
improving dialogue and cooperation with the Burmese 
government since the fund will support the public health 
sector.  Although funds will be used countrywide, Jacobs 
noted that the greatest efforts would be made in areas 
populated by ethnic minorities. 
 
7. (U) For refugees in Thailand, ECHO will contribute a total 
of 8.5 million euros in 2006, of which 5.5 million euros will 
be channeled through the Thailand-Burma Border Consortium 
(TBBC) of NGOs, largely for food aid.  The other 3 million 
euros will be devoted to health needs inside the refugee 
camps. 
8. (U) The Ambassador of the UK to the Union of Myanmar, 
Vicky Bowman, focused her comments on the efforts of the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) to spearhead 
a Strategic Development Assessment. She began by asking, "How 
can humanitarian assistance solve problems instead of being a 
band-aid?" She recalled her initial enthusiasm upon arrival 
for finding a way to use aid to promote national 
reconciliation.  However, a forum sponsored by her embassy 
last year with ethnic group representatives and students 
convinced her there was no point in trying to bring the two 
sides together at this time since the minorities did not 
trust the government.  Bowman stated that perhaps a better 
approach would be to use humanitarian assistance to bring 
local communities together to address problems.  She 
indicated that cross-border assistance may be reinforcing 
Burma,s divisions and cautioned that conflicts can sometimes 
be reinforced by assistance.  She also urged incorporating 
the centrality of religion in the reconciliation process 
(noting that often even Anglican, Baptist and Catholic groups 
would not cooperate with each other). 
 
9. (U) Bowman said donors could set an example of cooperation 
and reported that a group of the major contributors (UK, 
Australia, Germany, Japan and the UN Resident Coordinator) 
were already working on the assessment; she hoped the EC, 
Sweden and Switzerland would join shortly.  The donor group 
visited Shan and other conflict areas in 2005 to review 
assistance programs and determine future priorities.  In the 
nine conflict clusters visited, they determined that there 
was poor local leadership and governance, general economic 
deterioration and a weakened civil society.  The group 
decided to focus their assistance in ten priority areas.  The 
top four included:  building social capital, strengthening 
civil society, promoting local leadership, and improving the 
macro-economic situation. 
 
------------------------ 
Humanitarian Needs inside Burma 
------------------------ 
 
10. (U) Ashley South, an analyst based in London who 
specializes in ethnic politics, displacement and humanitarian 
issues, described three distinct causes of displacement in 
Burma: military activities, infrastructure development, and 
livelihood vulnerability.  According to South, the armed 
conflict in eastern Burma, especially Karen State near the 
Thai border, is causing much displacement, not only because 
of the fighting, but also because of severe human rights 
abuses.  He sited TBBC data which indicated that as many as 
540,000 people were being impacted, some multiple times.  The 
displaced have four options: 1) hide near their villages; 2) 
comply and move to relocation sites where poor living 
conditions normally exist; 3) flee to ceasefire areas, or 4) 
move to government controlled areas.  Frequently, after a 
population is displaced, villages are destroyed so 
inhabitants cannot return.  South emphasized that since 
protection needs vary in each displacement situation, 
assistance must be tailored.  A wide range of conditions can 
be encountered by IDPs in the same region, he noted.  Since 
2003, some areas have stabilized in Karen State while other 
areas have deteriorated. 
 
11. (U) South said that in Kachin and Mon States (ceasefire 
areas) both military and development-induced displacement 
caused by large-scale government controlled projects is 
occurring.  These include expanded mining projects (which 
exploit local natural resources), construction of new 
military installations and the new national capital, and 
large-scale infrastructure projects.  Protection issues 
include housing and property rights.  Although security is 
better in the ceasefire areas and education and economic 
opportunities are improving, South said that support is still 
needed for these IDPs to transition successfully to new 
locations and reestablish their homes and livelihoods. 
 
12. (U) Livelihood vulnerability induced displacement is 
caused primarily by the government's opium eradication 
programs in Shan State and by natural disasters.  South 
indicated that local NGOs are active in dealing with these 
vulnerable groups but that international agencies should 
mainstream protection to allow access to the full range of 
services, not just assistance. 
 
13. (U) Chris Lewa, coordinator of the Northern Arakan 
Project working out of Bangkok, described the chronic 
emergency situation found in the North Arakan region of 
Rakhine State which is caused by acute poverty.  She said 
international aid is essential to avoid a mass migration to 
neighboring Bangladesh.  Three Muslim-majority townships in 
this region have long suffered discrimination.  In 1978, 
250,000 refugees from this region were repatriated from 
Bangladesh to Burma in mass.  However, a Burmese law passed 
in 1982 rendered this population stateless because it 
categorized them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.  They 
are severely restricted in their movements and for a while 
even required official permission to marry.  Frequently 
subject to forced labor and extortion, they have no economic 
opportunities and receive no public services.  Malnutrition 
is a constant state.  Lewa said that eleven international 
organizations and seven NGOs are active in this region. 
 
14. (U) Lewa noted that the EU has been the largest donor 
(combining EC contributions with bilateral contributions from 
EU Member States).  In addition to the ECHO funds noted 
above, the EC contributed 6.9 million euros in food 
assistance from EuropeAid funds during the 2003-2005 period. 
Lewa emphasized that Burma's crisis is political in nature 
and that the presence of international agencies to ensure 
protection is essential.  She called on the EU to exert more 
pressure on the Burmese regime to lift restrictive practices 
and policies. 
 
15. (U) Lewa detailed a list of abuses instigated by the 
regime.  Harassment is a constant.  Food aid deliveries are 
frequently hindered during lean periods.  Muslims are not 
allowed to receive health training and must rely on the 
Buddhist medical staff that frequently hinders assistance and 
treatment.  Travel passes are frequently denied for those 
seeking medical treatment outside of the region for more 
serious conditions.  The education system is also in a 
deteriorated condition due to poorly trained teachers and 
lack of facilities.  Access to higher education outside of 
the region for promising students is usually denied due to 
travel restrictions.  She also said that protection should 
include economic and cultural rights. 
 
16. (U) Saw David Taw of the Karen Internally Displaced 
Committee and Daw Shirley Sen of the Kachin Women's 
Organization, both based in Chiang Mai, stressed other 
difficulties inside Burma, including trafficking in persons, 
sexual violence against women, HIV/AIDS, child labor and 
child soldiers, drug addiction, lack of basic social services 
and economic opportunities in remote regions, negative 
effects of unsustainable drug eradication programs, malaria 
and general isolation from lowland areas.  Sen said that only 
three NGOs are working in the ceasefire areas -- the Metta 
Foundation, YMCA and Kachin Baptist Convention -- and they 
are only able to provide small scale support.  She stressed 
the particular problem of trafficking in persons across the 
China/Burma border for the purpose of forced marriages and 
prostitution.  According to Shirley, the SPDC regime's 
anti-trafficking policies are not working and actually serve 
to restrict the rights of women (such as to free movement). 
 
17. (U) According to UNHCR Senior Desk Officer Marc Rapoport, 
while there had been some sense of possible repatriation of 
refugees to Burma from Thailand in 2004, the difficulties 
encountered in 2005, described above, have curbed the initial 
optimism.  Because progress and presence of humanitarian 
actors in areas of return is still modest, Rapoport concluded 
that "conditions are not conducive for repatriation for the 
time being." 
 
------------------------ 
Humanitarian needs in Thailand 
------------------------ 
 
18. (U) In his overview of the refugee situation, Director of 
the TBBC Jack Dunford said that the militarization of the 
border area over the past decade and subsequent development 
projects had contributed significantly to the outflows. 
Refugees were fleeing from both forced labor situations and 
environmental damage (i.e., inundations for new dams, 
widespread logging, etc.).  Since December 2005, at one 
refugee camp alone, over 1200 have arrived.  Thousands more 
are poised across the border to join them.  Dunford noted 
that the number of new arrivals would be greater, except for 
the landmines and efforts by the Thai army to push them back. 
 
 
19. (U) On developments in Thailand, Dunford said that the 
good news was a shift towards a more realistic approach to 
the refugee situation, with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) 
no longer talking about refugee returns within three years 
and new preparations for longer-term refugee populations in 
Thailand.  He said that the RTG had reacted encouragingly to 
a letter sent by the TBBC on December 8, which outlined a 
comprehensive plan to improve the situation of the refugees. 
The letter stressed that long term confinement in camps would 
not be beneficial to the refugees.  The Thai Ministry of 
Interior approved extension of skills training and income 
generating projects, as well as the teaching of the Thai 
language to Burmese refugees.  Dunford called on donors to 
seize the momentum of this shift in the RTG stance and 
provide the financial support for these new programs which 
may eventually facilitate local intergration.  He also 
mentioned current funding difficulties caused by currency 
fluctuations and the need to possibly cut food rations if 
additional funds did not become available.  Dunford said the 
TBBC was slightly worried that these steps towards improving 
the situation for refugees could encourage more arrivals. 
However, he noted that the push factors are driving them out 
independently of possible camp improvement and without regard 
to other pull factors in Thailand. 
 
20. (U) Rapoport gave a similarly upbeat report on the 
positive shift in the RTG.  He said that while Thailand was 
still not a party to the Geneva Refugee Convention it had 
maintained the spirit of the document through a generous 
asylum policy over the last three decades.  He noted that the 
provincial admission boards, which ceased accepting asylum 
claims in 2001, resumed them in 2005 using a definition of 
refugee very similar to that of the Geneva Convention and 
that 25,000 camp residents have had their status regularized. 
 When asked by a Czech diplomat whether the international 
community should press the RTG to ratify the Geneva 
Convention, both Rapoport and Dunford stressed that the 
current helpful attitude of the RTG is more important than 
formalities; Dunford also noted the deep political division 
in Thailand and said that this uncertainty also meant the 
time for such a sensitive deliberation was not right. 
 
21. (U) Rapoport said that UNHCR intended to refer 13,500 
refugees from nine camps for resettlement in 2005 and a 
similar number in 2006.  According to Dunford, the RTG 
approved the departure of up to 10,000 this year to the ten 
major resettlement countries, but he believe that only about 
half that many would actual leave.  He also stressed that 
asylum rights for those not in camps needed to be maintained 
by the RTG. 
 
22. (U) Several speakers noted the growing number of Burmese 
migrants in Thailand, now estimated at 1.5 million.  UNHCR's 
Rapoport contrasted the situation of the migrants, who have 
been progressively offered more opportunities, with the 
psychological problems developing among refugees.  The most 
memorable line from the conference was delivered by Thaung 
Htun of the National Coalition Government of the Union of 
Burma, who quoted one migrant about his lot, as follows: 
"Thai hell is better than Burmese hell." 
 
--------------------------- 
Comment 
--------------------------- 
 
23. (SBU)  As always, identifying the problems are much 
easier than charting out a course of action to address root 
causes.  EIAS Secretary General Dick Gupwell made it clear in 
his introductory remarks that ASEAN membership had completely 
failed to change the direction of the generals.  A videotaped 
message from former Czech president Vaclav Havel urged 
participants "not to yield to the lobby that would like to go 
on trading normally with the regime."  Yet that lobby tried 
to make that exact case during and in the margins of the 
conference.  Editorials by Dr. Zar Ni of the Free Burma 
Coalition, which said "protracted economic sanctions and 
international isolation of Burma only stymie the emergence of 
a viable civil society" and which noted the failure of the 
U.S. embargo to bring down Fidel Castro, were circulated. 
However, PRMOff's defense of the USG policy on sanctions was 
applauded by some.  One participant noted that the EU Member 
State with the hardest line toward Burma, the UK, also had 
the highest amount of foreign investment in the country. 
 
24. (SBU) Some participants also expressed concern about the 
perceived softening of the EU "common position" -- 
particularly in Germany, France, Italy and Austria -- towards 
Burma.  Landaburu's emollient remarks and emphasis on 
engagement undoubtedly added to their fears.   Ambassador 
Bowman said that the international community had run out of 
ideas for delivering impact.  "What good would come of 
Burma's expulsion from ASEAN?  If Total withdrew, Petro-China 
would take its place," she noted.  Nonetheless, Bowman said 
she believed the EU's "common position" would be maintained, 
not softened.  USEU contacts in the EU Council Secretariat in 
Brussels confirmed Bowman's analysis and indicated that the 
mood in the Council is currently not disposed toward a more 
liberal stance on Burma.  Since much of the conference was 
spent outlining the deterioration of the situation caused by 
new abuses perpetrated by the regime, common sense should 
indicate that easing pressure at this point would not be 
prudent.  Department may wish to demarche EU Member States in 
advance of their review of the "common position" which should 
take place in late April or May. 
 
GRAY 
.