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Viewing cable 06BISHKEK625, TOUGH TALK AMID HOPES FOR LAST MINUTE COMPROMISE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BISHKEK625 2006-04-28 12:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bishkek
VZCZCXRO8154
OO RUEHDBU RUEHDT RUEHLMC
DE RUEHEK #0625/01 1181222
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281222Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7246
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMCT/MCC THRESHOLD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0549
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1514
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0192
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1898
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1281
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000625 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KCRM KG
SUBJECT: TOUGH TALK AMID HOPES FOR LAST MINUTE COMPROMISE 
ON APRIL 29 DEMONSTRATION 
 
REF: A. BISHKEK 614 
     B. BISHKEK 503 
     C. BISHKEK 605 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Tensions seemed to ease somewhat one day 
before the large opposition demonstration planned for April 
29 in Central Bishkek.  Chief organizer Almaz Atambayev told 
PolOff on April 28 that he hoped for 20,000 people at the 
demonstration, but most Embassy contacts believe 4000-6000 a 
more realistic number.  Unlike his past two meetings with the 
Embassy, Atambayev played down the possibility of violence, 
but said he can't rule it out.  Atambayev told PolOff that he 
and other opposition leaders had met privately with President 
Bakiyev, but he described the meetings as unproductive.  The 
government continues to take the demonstration very 
seriously, with the Interior Ministry planning to deploy 
every available police officer to maintain control in 
Bishkek.  Numerous Embassy contacts reported that the 
National Security Service continues to pressure demonstration 
organizers and others not to attend the rally, although a 
senior government official told the Ambassador on April 27 
that no such pressure was being applied.  END SUMMARY. 
 
RUMORS OF COMPROMISE IN THE AIR 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Former Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism and 
chief demonstration organizer Almaz Atambayev told PolOff 
that he had met one on one with President Bakiyev on the 
evening of April 28.  Atambayev described the meeting as 
friendly, but said he and Bakiyev had not agreed on any kind 
of compromise, and said Bakiyev had agreed only to help "make 
peace" between the Central Election Commission (CEC) and 
organized crime boss Ryspek Akmatbayev.  (NOTE: The CEC and 
Akmatbayev have been locked in a long-running dispute over 
Akmatbayev's candidacy for parliament (reftel b).  END NOTE). 
 Atambayev said other opposition leaders had also met 
separately with Bakiyev, but said their meeting had also 
achieved nothing.  Busurmankul Tabaldiyev, Head of the 
Presidential Administration Department of Defense and 
Security, told the Ambassador on April 27 that President 
Bakiyev was working with civil society members to create a 
dialogue with opposition leaders, but provided no other 
details.  At 1730 on April 28, civil society leader Asiya 
Sasykbayeva told PolOff that opposition parliamentarians 
Temir Sariev and Omurbek Tekebayev had told Sasykbayeva that 
they were ready to meet again with Bakiyev.  But Sasykbayeva 
said other opposition leaders were unwilling to meet with 
Bakiyev,  claiming further meetings with him would be 
pointless. 
 
TONING DOWN THE RHETORIC - SOMEWHAT 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Unlike his previous two meetings with the Embassy, 
Atambayev seemed less resigned to the possibility of violence 
on April 29.  He stressed that the opposition would not 
initiate any violence, and confirmed reports that opposition 
organizers would provide up to 1500 of their own security 
people to help maintain control.  Later on April 28, 
Atambayev held a press conference at which he stressed 
repeatedly that the demonstration would be entirely peaceful, 
and said any acts of violence would be initiated by the 
government or criminal elements and not by the opposition. 
 
BAKIYEV: "I'LL BREAK THEIR ARMS" 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The government, however, continued to talk tough.  At 
a press conference on April 26, President Bakiyev said he 
would "break the arms" of anyone trying to overrun the White 
House on April 29, and said security forces would "use the 
strongest possible measures" to prevent demonstrators from 
storming the White House.  Other government officials have 
 
BISHKEK 00000625  002 OF 003 
 
 
also spoken openly in recent days of their intention to use 
deadly force to prevent any takeover of the White House. 
Political analyst and former Foreign Minister Muratbek 
Imanaliyev told PolOff that such talk was meant less to 
discourage a potential coup attempt than to convince ordinary 
people not attend the rally out of fear of bloodshed.  On 
April 27, several NGOs issued a press release protesting 
Bakiyev's comments, saying they had been horrified by such 
language coming from the President. 
 
THE HARD SELL CONTINUES 
----------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Numerous Embassy contacts confirmed that the SNB and 
Presidential Administration are working overtime to 
intimidate demonstration organizers and convince others not 
to attend the protest.  Former Foreign Minister Roza 
Otunbayeva (whose political party is conspicuously NOT 
supporting the demonstration) told the Ambassador that she 
knew of several people who had been threatened by the SNB 
over their participation in the rally.  Both Muratbek 
Imanaliyev and Almaz Atambayev said they too had heard 
numerous reports of the same.  Imanaliyev said he had been 
told by a BBC correspondent that journalists were also being 
told by the Presidential Administration "to keep away" from 
the demonstration's main opposition organizers.  Atambayev 
alleged that members of mob figure Ryspek Akmatbayev's gang 
are intimidating protest organizers, and are going around 
telling bus drivers in towns surrounding Bishkek not to drive 
demonstrators to Bishkek on April 29.  Busurmankul Tabaldiyev 
told the Ambassador that he had been traveling around the 
country, trying to convince people not to take part in the 
demonstration.  He said such efforts had been successful in 
most parts of the country, but admitted that "in Chui Oblast 
(where Bishkek is located) we've still got some work to do." 
However, Tabaldiyev denied that the SNB had pressured anyone 
about attending the demonstration. 
 
6.  (C) The intimidation efforts appear to have been at least 
somewhat successful, particularly among youth-oriented NGOs. 
NGOs Kel-Kel (reftel a) and the National Student Union both 
decided not to back the rally )- Kel-Kel after receiving 
threats from the SNB, and the Student Union out of fears of 
violence on April 29.  Muratbek Imanaliyev told PolOff that 
young NGO leaders were easily frightened off, but said that 
more seasoned activists such as human rights advocate Aziza 
Abdrasulova - who has also received threatening phone calls - 
would demonstrate on April 29 regardless of threats. 
 
FEARS OF VIOLENCE REMAIN 
------------------------ 
 
7.  (C) Roza Otunbayeva told the Ambassador on April 27 that 
she expects some kind of violence to occur on April 29. 
Student Union leader Elnura Osmonalieva (protect) told PolOff 
the Union board had voted not to participate in the rally out 
of fears of violence, particularly that the government or 
Ryspek Akmatbayev would cause some kind of "provocation." 
Muratbek Imanaliyev said his contacts in the SNB said that 
opinion within the SNB was divided over whether Ryspek 
Akmatbayev would attempt to disrupt the rally.  Two contacts 
told the Embassy on April 27 that Akmatbayev's people were 
already in Bishkek in preparation for the demonstration, but 
had no information on what Akmatbayev's plans might be. 
 
POLICE VOW TO MAINTAIN ORDER 
---------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) In separate meetings on April 28, the Minister and 
Deputy Minister of the Interior told the Embassy that police 
would do everything possible to prevent violence on April 29, 
and that troublemakers would be dealt with harshly.  Minister 
Sutalinov told ARSO that police officials were in close 
contact with the opposition, government, NGOs and even 
organized crime groups in an effort to prevent violence. 
Sutalinov told ARSO that his personal view is that there will 
 
BISHKEK 00000625  003 OF 003 
 
 
be no violence.  In a separate meeting, Deputy MVD Minister 
Suvanaliyev told the Ambassador that demonstration organizers 
had followed the law in notifying the city of their intent to 
demonstrate, and agreed with the Ambassador that the 
opposition has a right to peacefully express its views. 
Suvanaliyev said he had heard unconfirmed reports that Ryspek 
Akmatbayev would try to bring his people to Bishkek on April 
29, adding that police would use "strong measures" against 
any pro-Akmatbayev demonstration. 
 
ATTENDANCE FIGURES, DURATION OF PROTEST STILL UP IN THE AIR 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
9.  (C) Atambayev told PolOff that his Social Democratic 
party alone would bring 10,000 demonstrators to Bishkek's 
main square, but said he was unsure of how many people other 
sponsors would bring (although he still hopes for an overall 
turnout of 20,000).  Other Embassy contacts, however, 
estimated that 4000-6000 participants is a more likely 
figure.  Atambayev admitted that getting people from his 
party to Bishkek would be difficult in the event roads 
leading to Bishkek are closed.  Atambayev told PolOff that 
the duration of the demonstration would only be decided by 
opposition leaders on the evening of April 28.  At his press 
conference, he said organizers notified the city of their 
intent to stay on the square for up to five days. 
 
10.  (C) COMMENT: At this point, any last minute compromise 
between Bakiyev and the opposition seems highly unlikely.  By 
all accounts, Bakiyev is unwilling to meet any of the 
opposition demands or even engage opposition leaders in a 
serious dialogue.  Sensing this, most opposition leaders seem 
to have given up hope that any further meetings with the 
President could achieve real results. Nevertheless, there is 
no question that tensions seem to have eased over the past 
two days.  The opposition is no longer hinting that it might 
try to seize the White House, and has bent over backward in 
recent days to stress their peaceful intentions.  The 
government, for its part, although still working hard to 
frighten off demonstrators, has not tried to arrest or detain 
opposition leaders or try to ban the demonstration outright - 
measures that were considered entirely possible only a few 
days ago.  However, the potential for violence remains real, 
and both the opposition and government have stressed 
repeatedly that should it occur they will be ready. 
 
YOVANOVITCH