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Viewing cable 06BISHKEK457, BISHKEK SCENESETTER FOR SCA ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BISHKEK457 2006-04-05 12:33 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Bishkek
VZCZCXRO2946
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHEK #0457/01 0951233
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051233Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7079
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0527
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1468
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0439
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0172
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0143
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1847
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1230
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000457 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2021 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KCOR KCRM EINV KG
SUBJECT: BISHKEK SCENESETTER FOR SCA ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
RICHARD BOUCHER 
 
REF: BISHKEK 446 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1.  (C) Ambassador Boucher, thank you for your willingness 
to come to Bishkek.  Your visit comes as Kyrgyzstan still 
struggles to make sense of last year's Tulip Revolution. 
Although the government declared March 24 a national holiday 
) "People's Revolution Day" ) and staged a Soviet-style 
military parade to mark the occasion, in truth the overthrow 
of the Akayev regime has left a decidedly mixed legacy. 
Although there is no question that independent media and 
civil society are freer today than under Akayev, there is the 
widespread perception that corruption and crime ) 
particularly organized crime ) have become worse under 
Bakiyev.  Most of the population has yet to see any 
improvement in living standards since the revolution, and the 
government's latest attempt at articulating its economic 
priorities appears to be a disappointing throwback to 
Soviet-era central planning.  The past six weeks has been one 
of relative calm in Bishkek.  Although this is probably only 
a temporary lull between political crises (which have 
repeatedly buffeted the government over the past year), there 
is no escaping the perception that President Bakiyev has 
consolidated his power since the forced resignation of the 
Speaker of Parliament (and long time Bakiyev rival) in 
February.  Your visit, coming just as the government looks 
towards its second year in power, provides an opportunity to 
push President Bakiyev and Prime Minister Kulov in the right 
direction, and to urge them to take concrete steps towards 
real democratic and economic reform, especially on 
corruption. 
 
2.  (S) In your bilateral meetings with the Foreign Minister, 
President and Prime Minister, they will be very interested in 
the outcome of your meetings, particularly in Kazakhstan. 
They will also be interested in hearing more about our 
efforts to establish stronger links between South and Central 
Asia.  MCA and the ongoing negotiations over the Coalition 
Airbase will certainly be important topics during these 
meetings.  You will have the opportunity to urge the Kyrgyz 
to get serious about their bid for MCA funding, including the 
need for concrete steps to combat corruption, and preview for 
them the next round of negotiations regarding the Coalition 
Airbase at Manas. 
 
COALITION MILITARY BASE 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The Kyrgyz are committed to the continued presence of 
the Manas Coalition Airbase.  The first round of talks about 
future U.S. compensation for use of the base was held in 
November of 2005, when the U.S. presented a detailed overview 
of what we are currently paying for the base.  As a sidenote, 
the talks nearly collapsed over the presence of a prominent 
American lawyer hired by the Kyrgyz side to represent them in 
the investigation of past corruption involving the purchase 
of fuel for the base. 
 
4. (C) The recent visit of DASD Jim MacDougall and NSC Deputy 
Director for Central Asia and Caucuses David Merkel went much 
better.  Both sides agreed on a path forward for the next 
round of talks, tentatively scheduled for late April or early 
May.  Both President Bakiyev and Foreign Minister 
Jekshenkulov told us that, at least for the Kyrgyz side, 
financial matters trump all others regarding the base.  Both 
said that once an agreement is reached on financial terms, 
the rest of the negotiations will be relatively easy.  During 
your bilateral meetings, the Kyrgyz will look to you for 
reassurance that we are serious about concluding a mutually 
beneficial agreement.  They will press for specific dates for 
expert talks and the beginning of formal negotiations under 
Ambassador Loftis.  President Bakiyev will likely note that 
the original agreement was delivered - including 
parliamentary ratification - within 48 hours.  It has been 
 
BISHKEK 00000457  002 OF 003 
 
 
almost a year since Secretary Rumsfeld first said that the 
USG is prepared to review financial arrangements, and the 
Kyrgyz are anxious to move forward with negotiations. 
 
Political Situation 
------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Throughout its first year in office, the Bakiyev 
government was unsteady on its feet, lurching from one 
political crisis to another - only in the past two months has 
Bakiyev seemingly found his political footing.  The late 
February forced resignation of Bakiyev's long-time rival, the 
Speaker of Parliament, capped a series of Bakiyev political 
victories.  Bakiyev's newfound success has since led most 
observers to agree that Bakiyev has, at least temporarily, 
consolidated power to a degree that eluded him throughout 
2005.  In a more disturbing sign of this consolidation of 
power, the government has in recent months used law 
enforcement agencies and state-run media to both smear and 
intimidate civil society and the independent media. 
 
6.  (C) The current lull between political storms is probably 
only temporary, and a number of potential crises  lurk ahead. 
 President Bakiyev and Prime Minister Kulov remain bitter 
rivals.  Rumors of an impending parliamentary effort to sack 
the current government - including the Prime Minster - 
through a no-confidence vote also signal the potential for 
serious trouble ahead.  The impending election to Parliament 
of organized crime figure Ryspek Akmatbayev (reftel) could 
touch off another serious political crisis, similar to the 
one he sparked in October of 2005. 
 
7.  (C) The U.S. has been vocal both publicly and privately 
that criminals have no place in Parliament.  In your 
conversation with the President, you should note U.S. 
disappointment that a criminal was able to intimidate the 
system and win a seat in parliament - subverting the 
democratic process.  Stability is important, but not taking 
action against organized crime only undermines long-term 
stability and damages investor confidence and donor interest. 
 
 
8.  (C) Kulov's ambition and Bakiyev's insecurity are making 
for an increasingly fragile "tandem."  While the Southerner 
Bakiyev appears to hold all the cards, it is not clear what 
kind of support the Northerner Kulov could muster if the 
efforts to push him out take a serious turn.  Both Bakiyev 
and Kulov will take note, when you stress the importance of 
keeping the tandem to the stability and security of 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
9.  (C) Finally, the ongoing debate over constitutional 
reform could also lead to political conflict.  In your 
meetings you will likely hear conflicting visions from the 
President, Prime Minister and civil society regarding what 
they expect from a new constitution.  It is important that 
Bakiyev, especially, hear from you that any future 
constitution, regardless of content, should be formed in a 
transparent manner with meaningful input from the government, 
parliament and the full range of civil society (a 
Constitutional Working Group, which has been tasked by 
Bakiyev to draft a new constitution, has only one, blatantly 
pro-Bakiyev, civil society representative).  A repeat of the 
seriously flawed 2003 constitutional reform process would 
undermine the legitimacy of the Bakiyev government. 
 
THE ECONOMY, CORRUPTION AND MCA 
------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) President Bakiyev, from his earliest days in office, 
has made priorities of fighting corruption and jump-starting 
the Kyrgyz economy, particularly the manufacturing sector. 
Unfortunately, the government's various economic plans since 
then have either tried to inject greater central planning 
into the economy or amounted to little more than blatant 
 
BISHKEK 00000457  003 OF 003 
 
 
attempts to squeeze more money out of donors and foreign 
governments (including Manas Airbase).  Meanwhile, the 
government has done very little of substance to combat 
corruption.  Instead, the widespread perception among 
businesspeople is that corruption has only become worse over 
the past year.  Nominally, Prime Minister Kulov is in charge 
of economic policy, but it has been clear for some time that 
all-important decisions are made by the President. 
 
11.  (C) Making the fight against corruption the center of 
any economic plan is our key message.  Corruption remains 
endemic in every sector of society, and there are numerous 
indications that it has actually become worse under Bakiyev. 
Corruption in the State Passport Agency, which has been well 
documented by Post, has become a major political issue, with 
some in Parliament threatening to use it as an excuse to vote 
the government and Prime Minister out of office.  A proposal 
now being floated by the Presidential Administration to 
create a new State Agency to attract foreign investment 
appears to be little more than a 
one-stop-bribe-collecting-shop. 
 
12.  (C) Qualifying for MCA funding has also been a stated 
priority of President Bakiyev since his earliest days in 
office.  Since being named a Threshold Country earlier this 
year, however, the Kyrgyz government has made halting 
progress at best in preparing its Threshold Country Plan and 
in drafting new legislation to meet MCA requirements, both of 
which are due on May 15.  At this point, it will take an 
all-out effort on the part of the Kyrgyz government in order 
to make the May 15 deadline and have any hope of receiving 
funds under MCA.  An important message to the Kyrgyz, 
particularly President Bakiyev, is that minus drastic action 
on the part of the government by May 15, Kyrgyzstan's chances 
of getting funding for an MCA Threshold Plan are in serious 
jeopardy. 
 
13.  (C) It is in our long-term interest that the Kyrgyz 
experiment work -- that they succeed in building a free 
market-oriented economy based on a democratic society.  The 
combination of high-level attention and continued assistance 
in the right areas can be the push the Kyrgyz need in the 
right direction.  The Kyrgyz decision to release the vast 
majority of the Uzbek refugees to UNHCR, as well as our 
success in blunting efforts to gut the OSCE Center's mandate, 
show that our opinion and that of the international community 
matters ) particularly when our message is clear and direct. 
 I look forward to meeting you upon arrival and updating you 
on the constantly changing situation in Kyrgyzstan. 
YOVANOVITCH