VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0988/01 1011551
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111551Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2525
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 7397
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0555
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 8569
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1040

S E C R E T BERLIN 000988 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/AGS, EUR/PGI, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 
TAGS: PTER EFIN KCRM PINR PREL GM
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL GERMAN ACTION AGAINST THE PKK 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 889 
 
     ¶B. STATE 35685 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John A. Cloud, for Reasons 1.4 ( 
b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Recent allegedly PKK-linked violence in Germany and 
one arrest in Berlin formed the backdrop for continued 
engagement with senior German officials pursuant to ref B. 
 
Demonstrations 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (C) According to local press reports, on the evening of 
April 1, alleged PKK supporters damaged several cars and 
broke a Turkish restaurant window in Berlin's Kreuzberg 
district.  The next night, demonstrators damaged a few cars 
and broke the window of a Turkish club in Berlin's Wedding 
district.  Interior Ministry Counterterrorism Director 
General for Counterterrorism Gerhard Schindler told EMIN 
April 7 there were up to 300 demonstrations in dozens of 
cities throughout Germany following recent events in Turkey. 
Schindler said it was unclear whether the demonstrations were 
spontaneous or ordered by PKK leadership, but his sense was 
that they were spontaneous.  In general, the demonstrations 
were not violent; those in Berlin were the exception. 
 
PKK Leader Arrested 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) According to the Federal General Prosecutor's 
announcement, on April 3 German authorities arrested 35 year 
old Turkish female of Kurdish heritage "Gulay A." pursuant to 
a 31 May 1999 outstanding arrest warrant.  The Prosecutor 
accused the suspect, who used the AKA "Beritan," of being a 
PKK leader from July 1995 to June 1996 in Westfalia and 
participating in mid-1996 attacks against Turkish and 
European institutions.  The attacks included seven with 
molotov cocktails at a Dresdner Bank, Deutsche Bank, a German 
savings bank, two travel agencies, a police station, and a 
post office and caused significant damage, although no 
injuries.  The accused traveled to Germany in January 2006 
and applied for asylum. 
 
¶4. (C) MFA Counterterrorism Office Director Matthias Sonn 
(strictly protect) provided Acting Global Affairs Counselor 
with additional information.  German authorities identified 
the accused when her fingerprints from her January 2006 
asylum application -- under a false name -- matched those on 
the arrest warrant.  Authorities also seized two cellphones 
and other material which they are currently reviewing. 
 
Interior Ministry 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (S) At his meeting with EMIN, Schindler elaborated on 
German efforts to target the PKK "middle and upper" 
leadership.  Schindler called the PKK very insular and 
suspicious, which made them a difficult target for German 
under cover agents, but Germany had years of experience and 
had made some good progress, especially regarding funding: 
where and how they collected money and how they transmitted 
it to Turkey.  Schindler said in mid-2005 several German law 
enforcement agencies collaborated to target the PKK, and 
would do so again in 2006.  A key finding in 2005 was the 
role of PKK-linked media in PKK financing, notably the annual 
"autumn fundraising campaign," which prompted the September 
ban of E. Xani (ref A).  He confirmed that the ban will be 
reinstated with a revised law, but that the law will not be 
ready until 2007.  He noted that along with E. Xani, in 
September Germany had banned the much smaller affiliate 
Mesopotamia News Agency, but unlike E. Xani, Mesopotamia had 
not reopened in Germany but instead had reopened in Belgium 
under the name "Firat." 
 
¶6. (S) Regarding cooperation with Turkey, Schindler said the 
two countries' counterterrorism policy makers and law 
enforcement agencies cooperated well; the two law enforcement 
agencies had another meeting scheduled the week of April 10, 
when they would again discuss the PKK.  He denied that Turkey 
needed legal assistance; referring to weak Turkish 
extradition requests, he said that on occasion the papers 
Turkish officials provided were voluminous and compelling: 
"they are smart, they know what they need to do, they have 
done it before."  But often the information that convincingly 
tied a suspect to PKK crimes simply did not exist, Schindler 
said. 
 
¶7. (C) Responding in detail to questions raised in ref B 
concerning the possibility that PKK members might obtain 
asylum in Germany, Schindler admitted such a possibility 
existed until 2002, but now the chances were "as good as 
none, and for Iraqi Kurds, absolutely not."  (NOTE: "Gulay 
A." applied for, but did not receive, asylum.  END NOTE.)  He 
reiterated the role of asylum authorities in the German 
Counterterrorism Center, where a working group focused on 
Afghan returnees, Iraqi returnees, and the PKK to prevent 
abuse of asylum.  He also stressed that German asylum status 
can be revoked.  Concerning ref B's question about PKK 
support elsewhere in Europe, Schindler said the PKK was not a 
major problem in France, but that the PKK had abused the 
"generous asylum and liberal free speech policies" of the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. 
 
Foreign Ministry 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (C) MFA CT Director Sonn told Acting Global Affairs 
Counselor April 10 he had discussed the U.S. concern about 
the PKK with MFA CT Commissioner Witschel after Witschel's 
meeting with EMIN (ref A).  After noting the recent arrest, 
Sonn said the case proves that Germany does not have a lack 
of will to target the PKK, but occasionally Germany had a 
lack of information.  Reiterating comments he said he made 
during his recent visit to Washington, he said evidence was 
crucial because German judges were skeptical of Turkish 
information.  They would give more of the benefit of the 
doubt, he said, to documents from French or Bulgarian 
prosecutors.  The alleged anti-Kurdish bias of the Turkish 
government made the Turkish prosecutors' job more difficult, 
Sonn said. 
 
Turkish Embassy 
--------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Acting Global Affairs Officer alerted Turkish Embassy 
Counselor Tuzun to the MFA and MOI meetings before they took 
place, but has not been able to reach him after the meetings 
(and the arrest) to get his reaction before this cable was 
transmitted.  Post will stay in contact with the Turkish 
Embassy as this effort continues. 
CLOUD