VZCZCXRO2628
RR RUEHAG
DE RUEHRL #1025/01 1031503
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131503Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2627
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0409
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0279
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1594
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO TREASURY/OFAC 
PLEASE PASS TO TREASURY FOR HAMMERLE AND O'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM CVIS EUN GM BO
SUBJECT: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRAMER'S MEETING IN 
BERLIN ON BELARUSIAN SANCTIONS 
 
 
Classified By: DAS DAVID KRAMER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  (Summary)  During his visit to Berlin on April 11, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer met with Rolf Nikel, 
Deputy Director General for Foreign Affairs, Security Policy, 
and Global Issues at the Chancellery, and Rolf Welberts, 
Office Director for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and other German officials.  DAS Kramer described the 
purpose of his trip was to engage key European capitols on 
coordinating well calibrated sanctions to slowly increase the 
pressure against the Belarusian regime.  Nikel and Welberts 
agreed unity was paramount and while financial sanctions 
might not have a large monetary impact their symbolic value 
was very important.  All parties also agreed that Russia was 
not being very helpful and was unlikely to change its 
behavior.  (End Summary) 
 
Nikel, Chancellery 
 
¶2.  (C)  DAS Kramer; accompanied by EUR/UMB's Alan Purcell 
and OFAC's Jennifer Fowler, applauded German and EU efforts 
on the recently announced visa ban list.  He said the U.S. is 
taking a two pronged approach to Belarus.  The first prong is 
to support civil society, NGO's, the democratic opposition 
and the flow of information inside Belarus; and the second 
prong includes punitive targeted sanctions against members of 
the regime.  Kramer stated that the initial U.S. visa ban 
list would include about 50 names, but the list would remain 
open and further names could be added at any time.  He 
believed the combination of the visa ban and sanctions would 
have a psychological effect of isolating those on the list 
and causing others in the regime to worry if they are next. 
Treasury OFAC official Jennifer Fowler described the 
structure of U.S. targeted sanctions programs, saying a 
program for Belarus could be similar to the sanction regime 
used against Zimbabwe by both the U.S. and EU.  She added 
that while it is difficult to determine the amount of regime 
leaders' assets in the U.S. financial system, imposing 
sanctions would cause disruptions for those on the list and 
would also raise the risk and cost of doing business for the 
targeted individuals. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Nikel agreed that the proposed sanctions may not 
have a large material effect on the Belarusian regime, but 
would have a large symbolic effect.  Nikel thought the 
subject of sanctions would be reviewed at the EU's next 
General Affairs and External Relations meeting on May 15, and 
no action was likely before this meeting.  Nikel said that 
Alexander Milinkevich, main opposition candidate in the 
recent presidential election, stated his opposition to 
blanket economic sanctions on Belarus as these would harm the 
people but he spoke favorably of the proposed targeted 
sanctions.  Nikel also passed along that while Milinkevich 
has been positively received in Berlin, Alexander Kozulin, 
another opposition presidential candidate, did not make a 
very good impression during his visit. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Kramer commented that Russia's strong support for 
Lukashenko and blaming the opposition for the recent violence 
in Minsk were disappointing.   Nikel agreed that Russia has 
not been very helpful on Belarus, but we needed to keep 
working with them since Russia is probably the only country 
that could have a major impact on the Belarusian regime.  In 
the run-up to the G8 summit, Nikel thought the Russians might 
become more accommodating to the West on a number of issues 
but Belarus was unlikely to be included on this list.  Nikel 
speculated that the Belarusian regime's antipathy towards the 
West was a key reason for Russia's continued strong support. 
Both Nikel and Kramer agreed that Ukrainian President 
Yushchenko's planned meeting with Lukashenko for the 
Chernobyl anniversary was not a good idea and both 
governments had demarched the Ukrainians on this issue. 
 
Welberts, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
¶5.  (C)  DAS Kramer opened by saying he wanted to touch base 
with key European capitols on a coordinated approach to 
Belarus and explain Washington's dual track approach of 
engaging the civil society while implementing targeted 
punitive measures against the regime.  Kramer stated that it 
was very important that the U.S. and EU stay united on 
Belarus.  Fowler explained that initially the sanctions could 
be limited to a small number of individuals; however, the 
program could include the authority to designate additional 
 
BERLIN 00001025  002 OF 002 
 
 
individuals or entities at a later date to improve the 
effectiveness of the sanctions against targeted individuals. 
Welberts stated that while he supported sanctions, they would 
largely be symbolic since Belarus had few assets in Germany 
or in the EU.  Welberts relayed that the Belarusian 
Ambassador to Germany seemed far more concerned with the 
possible names on the visa ban list than with the financial 
sanctions. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Michael Kindsgrab, Counselor for EU External 
Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained that 
the EU sanctions process was not as flexible as the U.S. 
procedure.  The EU needed first to create a common position 
among the 25 members and then the Commission needed to create 
a regulation based on this position which must then be 
approved by the Council.  Kindsgrab thought that the 
Commission could have the regulatory framework for sanctions 
ready by May.  The actual names on the list would be a 
political decision by the Council; however, the current 
common position only mentions individuals.  The inclusion of 
entities would require a new position and regulation 
according to Kindsgrab.  Further, humanitarian exceptions 
would also require additional work since they were not 
possible under the current framework. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Welberts thought Russia's recent announcement that 
it would stop subsidizing gas deliveries to Belarus was a 
ploy to help bring about the state union between Russia and 
Belarus.  Welberts said that Milinkevich shared this 
interpretation and appealed to the EU to state its opposition 
to such a union unless the Belarusian people freely voted for 
it.  While Welberts thought Lukashenko remained in control, 
the combined pressure from the West and Russia had clearly 
surprised him.  Regine Hess, Belarus desk officer at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that Lukashenko's control 
is probably not complete because his administration does not 
always strictly follow his orders and occasionally softens 
the implementation of his orders. 
 
¶8.  (U)  DAS Kramer cleared this message. 
CLOUD