VZCZCXRO7853
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0632/01 1151546
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251546Z APR 06 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8424
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000632 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y --CLASSIFIED BY LINE ADDED 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/16 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SR
SUBJECT:  TOUGH MESSAGE ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND BELGRADE 
NEGOTIATING ENGAGEMENT 
 
BELGRADE 00000632  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY POLOFF IAN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) (D) 
 
¶1.  (c)  Summary:  In meetings with U.S. Special Envoy Frank 
Wisner in Belgrade on April 17, PM Kostunica, President Tadic, 
and FM Draskovic reiterated strong GoS opposition to an 
independence outcome in Kosovo status talks, but sought to 
reassure that Belgrade was not seeking a "permanent carve-out" 
for Serbs there.  Wisner was unambiguous in his private 
discussions about U.S. certainty that Kosovo would be independent 
as a result of talks and offered to help with necessary 
protections for Serbs and other minorities.  The U.S. could not 
cooperate, however, with a political project that sought to 
undermine Kosovo's stability. 
 
¶2.  (c)  Wisner also met with senior leaders of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church on its ongoing efforts to contribute to the talks 
and with representatives of the Contact Group to brief on his 
meetings (septel).  Press play of the visit focused on timeline 
(outcome of talks by the end of the year) and on GoS intention to 
table the details of its "more than autonomy, less than 
independence" proposal in the near future.  End summary. 
 
¶3.  (c)  During his April 16-18 visit to Belgrade, Special Kosovo 
Envoy Frank Wisner met separately with PM Kostunica, President 
Tadic, and FM Draskovic.  Tadic and Kostunica were both 
accompanied by senior negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan 
Samardzic.  Chief of Staff Nikitovic also attended the Kostunica 
meeting; executive assistant Vuk Jeremic accompanied President 
Tadic.  Wisner had a working lunch with Kojen and Samardzic which 
included Tadic advisor Dusan Batakovic and Kostunica advisor 
Aleksander Simic.  Discussions with Serbian Orthodox Church 
representatives included Metropolitan Amfilohije, Bishops 
Gregorije and Jovan, and SOC International Affairs advisor Father 
Irinej Dobrivojevic.  Wisner met with "Kosovo pool reporters" 
from several leading Belgrade dailies in a short press event. 
Wisner's meeting with local Contact Group representatives on 
April 19 is reported septel.  Ambassador Polt accompanied Wisner 
to all meetings. 
 
¶4.  (c)  Wisner reviewed the details of his latest discussions in 
Europe for GoS principals.  He noted encouraging signs from 
Brussels that the EU was preparing for its role in supporting 
implementation of the final settlement.  The U.S. and EU were 
working closely together.  From talks with Ahtisaari and his 
discussions in Pristina he also saw signs that the new leadership 
in Pristina was moving in the right direction and was prepared to 
engage in a substantive and credible way on protections for 
Kosovo's minority communities.  Wisner noted that while in Kosovo 
he had met with Serbs, Turks, Bosniacs, and other minorities and 
all had been unreserved in their expressed desire to stay and 
prosper in Kosovo and in their frustration that Belgrade 
continued to block progress.  The negotiations, noted Wisner, had 
appeared to hit a roadblock and it was difficult not to conclude 
that Belgrade was responsible.  Recent developments, including 
the "one salary" edict and other unhelpful CCK requirements, as 
well as credible reports of MUP intimidation, were suggesting 
that Belgrade was determined to be unhelpful.  Wisner 
acknowledged the need for strong guaranteed protections for Serbs 
and other minorities, but the U.S. would not cooperate in any 
effort to permanently tie Kosovo Serbs to Belgrade or to prevent 
the development of a stable Kosovo government. 
 
KOSTUNICA: REGION CONCERNED W/ INDEPENDENCE - PLEASE RECONSIDER 
 
¶5.  (c)  Kostunica acknowledged difficulties in decentralization 
talks but defended the Serb position as constructive, consistent 
with Contact Group giding principles and solel seeking to 
protect the basic vital interests of erbs in Kosovo.  If there 
were difficulties on dcentralization now, this suggested many 
more complications on status and argued for a reconsideration of 
any "predetermined" outcomes.  Kostunica noted his conversations 
with nearby states - Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia - had 
suggested support for Belgrade's position of "substantial 
autonomy along European standards."  Recent conversations with 
French PM Chirac during a recent visit to Paris had identified a 
similar sympathy in the CG for respecting Serbia's territorial 
integrity and general principles of decentralization.  (Note: The 
French Ambassador in Belgrade, who had attended the Kostunica- 
Chirac meeting, told Ambassadors Polt and Wisner that Chirac had 
been very clear in pointing out that Kosovo independence was 
inevitable.)  Kostunica rejected suggestions that Belgrade was 
blocking participation in the PISG, noting that Serbs did 
participate at the municipal level and were committed to 
participating at all levels once they were assured of basic 
guarantees for their safety and rights. 
 
¶6.  (c)  Kostunica said that no Serb would accept an independence 
outcome and he encouraged the U.S. and the Contact Group to 
reconsider its fixation on that goal.  The only objective for 
Belgrade was securing the human rights of Serbs, which had been 
trampled on during the last six years.  Kostunica told Wisner 
that he would be presenting the details of the GoS position on 
autonomy shortly - suggesting it would be an innovative proposal 
somewhere between the strong centralization of France and the 
 
BELGRADE 00000632  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY POLOFF IAN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 
more decentralized structure of Belgium.  He asked Wisner to 
consider it carefully in all its details and allow for a re-think 
of independence.  Kostunica said he was convinced that 
independence would be bad for the region.  If the international 
community insisted, Serbs would not accept it and there would be 
"very negative consequences."  Kojen reviewed some details of the 
Serb negotiating position at Vienna and insisted that Belgrade 
was seeking a "viable outcome, not a permanent carve-out." 
 
TADIC: CONCERNS ABOUT STABILITY 
 
¶7.  (c)     Tadic also expressed his view that independence was 
the wrong outcome, arguing that it would likely destabilize not 
only Kosovo but Serbia as well.  Tadic said he had a deep 
understanding and appreciation for the U.S. position on Kosovo's 
independence, but he said his focus would continue to be on ways 
of minimizing instability in Serbia.  On participation of Serbs 
in Kosovo's institutions, Tadic reviewed in detail his decision 
in 2004 to call for Serb participation in elections.  Little had 
been achieved: Serbs in Kosovo had overwhelmingly rejected the 
idea with less than one percent voting, and his numbers had 
dropped 5 percent in Serbia.  Tadic said that notwithstanding 
anecdotal information suggesting a groundswell for Serbs to 
engage in the PISG, the reality on the ground was much more 
complicated.  Any push on participation would encourage greater 
division among Serbs in Kosovo, encourage new divisions among 
parties in Serbia, and be worse for stability in both places.  It 
was unrealistic, suggested Tadic, to demand that he focus on one 
issue to the exclusion of all others.  Every decision he took on 
Kosovo had to take account of a series of interlocking 
considerations.  It was "dangerous" to focus solely on 
independence for Kosovo without considering larger implications. 
 
¶8.  (c)  Tadic said he was actively considering the elements of a 
workable exit strategy.  He confessed to "not knowing whether 
partition was a good idea," but he viewed it as an intellectual 
argument that ignored the 60 percent of Serbs south of the Ibar 
river.  Ultimately, said Tadic, the solution lay not in a 
"technical talks approach" in Vienna that suggested discrete 
solutions to interconnected problems but rather a more 
comprehensive approach that included Serbia's discussion of the 
details of implementation.  Kojen noted that his comments on a 
"viable outcome not a permanent carve-out" were meant to assure 
that Belgrade had no intention of undermining Kosovo or tying 
Serbs there to its apron strings forever.  But transitional 
arrangements in Belgrade's view were not a question of 2-3 years 
and were more likely to give way to progress for both Kosovo and 
Serbia on EU integration.  Tadic said that he continued to see 
common interests for Serbia and the U.S. in resolving regional 
problems including Kosovo. 
 
LUNCH WITH NEGOTIATING TEAM 
 
¶9. (c)  Chief negotiators Kojen and Samardzic took strong 
exception to suggestions that Belgrade was obstructing the 
decentralization talks, and they strongly denied that Belgrade 
sought a permanent carve-out or a fully autonomous entity in 
Kosovo.  Instead, their goal was simply to ensure "essential 
living conditions and fundamental freedoms" for the K-Serbs, 
regardless of the status outcome, they claimed.  Both negotiators 
emphasized that the law of Kosovo, not Serbia, would obviously 
prevail throughout Kosovo.  Regarding the details of the 
decentralization negotiations, Samardzic divided the Serb 
position into two baskets -- "identity" issues and security 
issues.  He said that the Serbs sought a substantial measure of 
autonomy (including vertical links) for Serb-majority 
municipalities in six "identity" areas (education, health, 
culture, religion, etc.) and merely "enhanced competencies" in 
two security areas (police and judiciary).   They stressed that 
Belgrade was prepared to offer provide full transparency, but not 
a veto, to Pristina regarding any vertical interactions with K- 
Serb municipalities.  (Kojen averred that Pristina insisted on 
controlling inflows of money in order to prevent K-Serb 
municipalities from enjoying better-funded health and educational 
facilities.)  In the security area, they underscored that police 
and judicial organs in K-Serb municipalities would be part of 
Kosovo-wide institutions, although they argued for a strong 
municipal role in selecting judges and police chiefs.  Referring 
to a "troubling dinner" with Ahtissaari and some cynical comments 
by Rohan, Kojen closed by noting that the Belgrade team suspected 
that UNOSEK was not committed to the negotiations and was merely 
going through the motions. 
 
 
DRASKOVIC 
 
¶10.  (c)  There was nothing new in the Draskovic meeting.  The 
FonMin simply reiterated his standard plea for a "European 
solution" to Kosovo status that would leave the Albanian majority 
in control in Kosovo, but the international borders of Serbia, 
including Kosovo, unchanged.  Draskovic also pushed hard against 
a Kosovo UN seat, arguing that giving Kosovo such membership was 
 
BELGRADE 00000632  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY POLOFF IAN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 
 
like awarding a student a university degree and then asking him 
to begin to study for that degree.  Ambassador Wisner challenged 
the logic of withholding the UN seat for Kosovo, asking Draskovic 
whether doing so would lead to Belgrade's acquiescence to 
independence.  Predictably, Draskovic was not prepared to strike 
such a deal. 
 
SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 
 
¶11.  (c)  Both sides reviewed the Church?s concerns and its role 
in the ongoing status talks.  Amfilohije raised concerns about 
destruction and vandalism at one of the SOC cemeteries and showed 
a photograph of trash dumped at the site.  Wisner promised to 
check to see what could be done (material faxed to USOP).  Father 
Irinej asked for support for a project to return 1,000 Serbs to 
Prizren in connection with the reconstruction of Church buildings 
there.  He also asked that Wisner raise with Ahtisaari the 
possibility of SOC representatives being allowed to attend Vienna 
talks dealing with Church interests, but not attached to the 
Belgrade negotiating team.  Wisner promised to follow-up on both 
issues. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶12.  (c)  Ambassador Wisner's visit was both timely and 
effective.  His clear private reaffirmation of U.S. support for 
Kosovo independence finally laid to rest any lingering doubts or 
hopes among Belgrade's leadership.  Wisner's tough "no permanent 
carve-outs" message and sharp rebuke of recent CCK actions also 
put down a clear marker that the U.S. would not tolerate 
obstruction or delay of the negotiations process. 
 
¶13. (c)  The Serbian reaction was predictable, both in asserting 
their genuine desire for negotiations progress, as well as in 
their complete rejection of an independence outcome.  Our 
reaction and that of the Ahtisaari team should be to simply push 
forward with the negotiations, not based on Belgrade or Pristina 
bluster, but on what we consider to be a reasonable deal 
protecting Serbians' future in an independent Kosovo. 
 
¶14. (c)  In the end, independence -- as well as some of the 
envisioned minority rights -- will likely have to be imposed. 
Give that Belgrade is hoping on some Contact Group disunity on 
this imposition, the manner of taking this action matters.  Some 
of our contact group partners have called for "soft imposition," 
meaning a face saving way of delivering Belgrade the bitter pill. 
If that is the price for getting the Russians and maybe some 
others in the CG on board, it is worth paying.  In addition to 
offering Belgrade a small fig leaf, it could help accelerate 
Belgrade's tolerance of an independent Kosovo and a lessen 
domestic political consequences.  Despite Draskovic's response to 
Wisner, a delayed UN seat may be possibly be a useful device in 
that regard and we should consider it. 
 
POLT