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RR RUEHAG RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0612/01 1091013
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191013Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8398
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: Radicals Test the Waters of Popular 
Discontent 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary: The underwhelming public 
responses to recent Serbian Radical Party (SRS) 
demonstrations in Belgrade protesting the 
government's policies on Kosovo and The Hague has 
led some observers to suggest a growing weariness 
with nationalist hyperbole among a frustrated 
Serbian electorate.  They also exposed some 
divisions within the party and with its 
nationalist allies.  Despite increasingly 
assertive rhetoric from the Radicals to put 
pressure on the government to lessen its 
cooperation with the international community, the 
SRS is not in a position, nor does it desire, to 
push for elections at least until it can try to 
win nationalist points out of the end-game of 
Kosovo status talks.  Nevertheless, the SRS is 
still easily the strongest party in Serbia, and 
recent polls continue to indicate a mathematical 
possibility of an SRS-SPS coalition in new 
elections. End Summary. 
 
Yelling at the Wind: Weak Showings in Belgrade 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (U) On February 24, the SRS organized a rally 
in the center of Belgrade against the government's 
Kosovo policies, efforts to arrest Mladic, and 
failure to improve low living standards.  It 
invested significant resources and heavily 
publicized the event.  Nonetheless, the 
demonstration failed to attract a large crowd, 
leaving Republic Square, the site of several 
200,000 plus demonstrations over the past ten 
years, largely empty.  Our sources confirm our own 
in-house estimates of 2,500 - 3,000 people at 
peak, with dropping temperatures making for an 
even smaller showing in the follow-on march 
through the city. 
 
¶3.  (U) In March, the Radicals made a play to 
steal the Socialist Party's thunder over the 
burial of SPS leader Milosevic.  This 
grandstanding culminated in a prominent role at 
the March 19 funeral/commemoration, which some 
analysts believe it funded and organized, that 
harangued the US, key European countries, and The 
Hague. The event was also underwhelming, drawing 
only some 50,000 people (or less than two-thirds 
of one percent of the population), most of them 
pensioners, at peak - far less than the half- 
million the organizers proclaimed.  The event also 
had little impact on life in Belgrade, despite 
extensive coverage on CNN and BBC, with the most 
common remark being a grumbling over the impact on 
traffic patterns. 
 
SRS Strategy: Build Support Now; Elections Later 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) SRS General Secretary Aleksander Vucic 
told a key Embassy contact that the SRS plans to 
raise the tenor and ferocity of their attacks on 
the government this year, but will not attempt to 
bring down the government until fall.  The SRS 
strategy is to act after the Montenegrin 
referendum, after Mladic is turned over to The 
Hague, and after Kosovo final status talks are 
largely resolved.  In the meantime, SRS hopes that 
stronger rhetoric will slowly draw in more voters 
over the next six months.  The Radicals hope that 
this plan would result in an SRS parliamentary 
majority, as Vucic remains concerned about the 
party's ability to enlist a coalition partner. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The SRS stratagem also is partly 
designed to draw nationalist voters away from the 
SRS' competitors, namely the Socialists, erstwhile 
supporters of Karic's PSS, and the ruling 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS).  UN Political 
Officer Alex Mackenzie-Smith said that SRS acting- 
President Tomislav Nikolic recently told UN 
officers that the party is seeking to push 
Kostunica into a corner on Kosovo.  In other 
words, the SRS would move beyond its current (and 
widely criticized) call for Kosovo to be declared 
an "occupied territory" if it becomes independent 
(reftel) and adopt a more "politically correct" 
position unacceptable to PM Kostunica, but that 
would still appeal broadly to DSS members. 
 
The Radical House: Divided, but Stable (for now) 
 
BELGRADE 00000612  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (U) Complicating these efforts are internal 
divisions within the Radical Party itself.  The 
fight for control of the party between Nikolic and 
Vucic, e.g., is longstanding.  Mackenzie-Smith 
noted that SRS President and Hague indictee 
Vojislav Seselj has begun to favor Stevo 
Todorovic, the SRS caucus head in the State Union 
parliament, which represents another leadership 
challenge to Vucic and Nikolic.  Nonetheless, 
party discipline remains solid so far, and SRS 
leaders have managed to effectively cooperate at 
least enough to present a coherent public front to 
their support base. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In addition, local analysts tell us Novi 
Sad mayor Maja Gojkovic, the seemingly least 
objectionable of SRS's senior officials, has 
distanced herself from the party.  She was notably 
absent from the February rally and March 
demonstration.  She has reportedly told the party 
that she will continue to distance herself from 
the party as long as Seselj remains president and 
that she is reluctant to play along with the 
party's nationalist rhetoric.  One respected 
analyst said Seselj ordered Nikolic to expel her 
from the party for disloyalty, but the SRS 
leadership has resisted because such a move would 
cause a serious public relations scandal and would 
undermine SRS support in Serbia's third largest 
city.  Gojkovic's public position has been to deny 
any gulf between her and the SRS leadership. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Finally, questions are starting to arise 
in Belgrade over Seselj's future in the party. 
Although he remains president and influential, 
Vucic has said that SRS leaders are often 
frustrated by his interference and resent the 
overbearing role Seselj's wife plays in delivering 
orders to the party.  Despite these rumors, 
though, it is unlikely SRS's leadership is willing 
to jettison their figurehead at this point. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Radicals are unlikely to push for 
early elections before the announcement of 
Kosovo's final status.  The February rally and 
March 11 demonstration were designed to warn the 
government that it would pay a price "on the 
streets" for cooperation with the international 
community.  Instead, they highlighted the 
limitations of SRS's ability to mobilize 
discontent or politically outmaneuver Kostunica, 
proving that it will take more than xenophobic 
slogans to win over a frustrated and increasingly 
apathetic electorate.  Until Kosovo reaches its 
end-game and the SRS can roll out a strident "they 
lost Kosovo" campaign against the government, the 
party will try to increase its appeal to 
nationalist-leaning voters from PSS, SPS, and DSS 
- but not enough to endanger the current 
government unless it can successfully convince 
voters that Mladic, Montenegro, and Kosovo results 
are all damaging to Serbia and its future. 
 
POLT