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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #1090/01 0971141
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071141Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2950
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016 
TAGS: IR IS KISL LE PGOV PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  AMAL-HIZBALLAH MARRIAGE WEAKENING AMAL 
BUT MAY OPEN A WAY FOR OTHER SHIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  Econoff met separately with independent Shia leaders 
Mohammad Obeid and Mohammad Baydun on April 5.  Both Obeid 
and Baydun reported that Amal's support is crumbling away at 
the rank-and-file level.  The main reason was Amal movement 
leader and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri's perceived 
subservience to Hizballah as well as his rampant corruption. 
Berri is even losing supporters in his power base in Tyre and 
among government employees.  Obeid saw an opportunity in the 
erosion of Amal support.  His embryonic third way movement is 
quietly recruiting disgruntled Amal supporters by promising 
to return to the Imam Musa Sadr's vision.  Baydun, however, 
doubted that the political climate is right for a Shia third 
way movement.  Obeid said that the political climate is 
gradually changing because the aura around Hizballah 
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Hizballah is fading as 
 
SIPDIS 
he engages more and more in ordinary politics.  Both Obeid 
and Baydun saw the prospects for Hizballah disarmament as 
dim.  End summary. 
 
THE AMAL GIANT HAS FEET OF CLAY 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  On April 5, econoff met separately with two 
prominent independent Shia leaders: intellectual and 
political analyst Mohammad Obeid and former MP and cabinet 
minister Mohammad Baydun.  Both Obeid and Baydun, from 
Nabatiyeh and Tyre respectively, reported that support for 
Amal in southern Lebanon is crumbling away.  According to 
Obeid, the main reason is the loss of credibility by Amal 
movement leader Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri.  There is 
the perception that Berri is a junior partner to Hizballah 
and does whatever Hizballah Secretary General Hassan 
Nasrallah asks of him.  Second, Berri's reputation for 
rampant corruption is catching up to him.  Obeid said that 
Amal supporters in the thousands are leaving Amal to support 
Hizballah.  He noted the large number of Amal supporters at 
Hizballah's February 23 rally to protest the bombing of the 
Golden Mosque in Samarra, Iraq.  Obeid said that such a large 
Amal turnout for a Hizballah rally would have been unheard of 
a few years ago. 
 
¶3.  (C)  There are additional signs that Berri is losing 
ground in his power base.  Even some of the 5,000 government 
workers who owe they jobs to Berri's patronage are leaving 
his fold.  Obeid added that if privatization proceeds, Berri 
will be in big trouble once his cronies lose their patronage 
jobs.  On February 23, Berri also held a rally in Tyre 
against the Golden Mosque bombing but only 35 people showed 
up to hear him speak.  Tyre is supposed to be Berri's 
stronghold, emphasized Obeid.  He estimated that with a new 
electoral law, and if Hizballah does not save Berri with a 
joint list, Berri's parliamentary bloc would shrink from 15 
MPs to five or six in the next elections.  Obeid does not 
expect Hizballah or Syria to rescue Berri in the next 
elections.  The Syrian regime is angry at Berri, according to 
Obeid.  Damascus blames Berri, as leader of the Ayn el-Tinneh 
coalition, for failing to defeat the "Cedar Revolution." 
There also is talk that Berri allowed pro-Syrians in 
parliament and government to lose their jobs. 
 
¶4.  (C)  In a separate meeting on April 5, Baydun had similar 
views.  Berri is seen as being with Hizballah.  Some two to 
three thousand young people have left Amal for Hizballah, 
according to Baydun.  Amal is increasingly viewed in the Shia 
community as a Berri family enterprise.  Berri has placed his 
brothers and relatives in high positions in government, thus 
allowing them to skim off public funds, according to Baydun. 
Baydun does not think Berri can win another term as Speaker. 
 
THIRD WAY TAPS INTO 
AMAL RANK AND FILE 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Obeid had recently returned from meetings in 
Nabatiyeh and was buoyed by the prospects of forming a third 
way Shia political movement.  Shia intellectuals have never 
been with Hizballah and are the biggest supporters of a third 
way.  However, Obeid said he and his allies were beginning to 
recruit Amal supporters.  His group, still in the formative 
stages, will structure its platform around the Imam Musa 
Sadr, just like Amal.  However, the message will be that 
Obeid's group is staying true to Musa Sadr's vision by 
 
BEIRUT 00001090  002 OF 003 
 
 
refusing to engage in corruption. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Obeid was optimistic that he could recruit large 
numbers of Amal supporters by focusing on Berri's well-known 
corruption.  Obeid asserted that the Berri family is worth 
around USD 2 billion.  "Imagine," he exclaimed, "I knew Berri 
in 1990 and he was living in a rented apartment!"  In 
addition, the Berri family are most likely the largest land 
owners in southern Lebanon.  Obeid added that Berri receives 
USD 400,000 a month from Iran.  He uses a fourth of the money 
to shore up his support and pockets the rest, according to 
Obeid.  (The political problem is not that he receives money 
from Iran, but that he keeps most of it.)  Obeid plans to 
appeal to the secular, nationalist nature of traditional Amal 
supporters.  Econoff asked whether Obeid's plan would 
basically gut Amal for his third way movement.   Obeid 
acknowledged that Hizballah supporters would not necessarily 
flock to him. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Baydun also reported that many Amal supporters are 
unhappy with Berri and are looking for another movement. 
However, Baydun, who contemplated running against 
Amal-Hizballah in last year's parliamentary elections, said 
that those who would be open to a third way, namely Shia 
elites, intellectuals, and disgruntled Amal supporters, lack 
a credible face to rally behind.  They need prominent Shia on 
their side.  Also, the political climate right now is not 
right.  It would be difficult for a third way movement to 
campaign without being seen as anti-Hizballah and 
anti-resistance. 
 
BREAKING HIZBALLAH TABOOS 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Econoff asked Obeid if he wouldn't just face the 
same vicious Hizballah political attacks that previous third 
way movement proponents have faced.  Obeid admitted that this 
was an obstacle, but clarified that his movement is looking 
at the long term.  He can sense the political climate 
changing as taboos about discussing Hizballah and its 
resistance activities are beginning to fade away.  First, any 
Shia seen shaking the hand of Lebanese Forces leader Samir 
Ja'ja' three months ago would have been declared a traitor. 
Now, Nasrallah is sitting at the same table with Ja'ja' in 
the national dialogue.  By participating in the national 
dialogue and sitting down with the likes of Walid Jumblatt, 
Amin Gemayel, and Berri, Nasrallah has lowered himself to the 
level of Lebanon's ordinary politicians.  Obeid can see the 
aura around Nasrallah fading as he participates more in basic 
politics.  Second, Hizballah has opened itself to 
negotiations on its arms and activities.  Before it was taboo 
to question the legitimacy of the resistance, and now 
Hizballah has submitted to at least talks on its arms even if 
it gives unrealistic conditions for disarmament.  Third, the 
prospect of U.S.-Iranian diplomatic talks would show that 
even Iran will talk to the USG.  Hizballah cannot afford to 
be more extreme than Iran. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Obeid admitted that he has a long way to go.  The 
current climate of confessional tensions is unfavorable to a 
third way.  Hizballah has been telling the Shia that only 
Hizballah can protect them from the Sunni, Christians, and 
Druze.  The Shia community is fearful of being left out of 
governing the country if it does not coalesce around a strong 
party.  The Shia are afraid of losing the political and 
economic ground they have gained since the 1970s.  According 
to Obeid, Shia resentment of other confessions is strong 
because the others accuse Shia of being Syria supporters. 
 
NOT SO OPTIMISTIC ON DISARMAMENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Obeid was not as optimistic on the prospects for 
Hizballah disarmament as he was on political change in the 
Shia community.  Obeid did not think Hizballah would ever 
deliver its arms to the Lebanese army or join it.  Hizballah 
does not trust the military and security services now that 
Syrian intelligence is at least overtly gone.  The most the 
national dialogue may accomplish, according to Obeid, would 
be an agreement that Hizballah could not use its arms 
whenever it wanted to.  Hizballah would have to consult with 
the GOL before carrying out any military operations. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Baydun was equally pessimistic about the chances 
that Hizballah would disarm.  He thinks the process would 
take years.  Hizballah will argue that the Lebanese army is 
not ready to take over Hizballah positions on the border that 
 
BEIRUT 00001090  003 OF 003 
 
 
many southern Shia see as a cordon sanitaire protecting them 
from future Israeli aggression.  Hizballah enjoys the credit 
for nearly six years of stability in southern Lebanon, 
according to Baydun.  Baydun doubts Shia could support 
disarmament because they distrust the Maronites and Saad 
Hariri.  Shia fear that the Maronites and Hariri will try to 
dismantle the state into a confederation.  (Comment:  This 
Shia fear is ironic given that Hizballah operates as a 
virtual state-within-a-state in south Beirut, southern 
Lebanon, and parts of the Biqa' Valley.  End comment.) 
Baydun dismissed the Aoun-Hizballah agreement as a tactical 
move by Hizballah.  Hizballah feels no obligation to honor it 
in the long term. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Obeid was characteristically overly optimistic. 
His movement, if it gets off the ground, will face the same 
blistering political counter-attack from Hizballah that other 
third way attempts faced last year.  Even the Mufti of Sidon 
had to retreat under the Hizballah storm.  Nonetheless, 
Obeid's reports, if true, are encouraging for the prospects 
of choice among Shia.  It should be noted that for the near 
to medium term, a successful third way movement is more 
likely to strip away Amal than cause any significant damage 
to Hizballah's support.  End comment. 
FELTMAN