VZCZCXRO6423
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0058 1081255
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 181255Z APR 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0314
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0332

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000058 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/18/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH GOVERNOR ON THE ROPES? 
 
REF: (A) BASRAH 53; (B) BASRAH 49; (C) BASRAH 55 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In an April 17 meeting with the Regional 
Coordinator (RC) for the Regional Embassy Office (REO) in 
Basrah, Ministry of Defense advisor Majed al-Sari confirmed the 
details of a plan (Ref A) to vote Governor Muhammad out of 
office.  Though there is no timetable for the vote, he expects 
it to occur soon.  Al-Sari is sanguine that the Basrah 
Provincial Council (BPC) has the two-thirds majority needed to 
replace the governor with Badr Organization's Hassan al-Rashid 
and that the governor will not respond with widespread violence; 
however, al-Sari believes that individual council members and 
other supporters of the efforts to depose the governor could be 
targeted for assassination.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) The RC for the Basrah REO met on April 17 with Majed 
al-Sari, the Ministry of Defense's Basrah-based advisor to 
discuss the latest permutations in the rumored plan to oust 
Basrah Governor Muhammad (see Ref A).  Al-Sari confirmed the 
plan detailed in Ref B for the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) 
to vote the governor out of office and replace him with Hassan 
al-Rashid.  Majed al-Sari is particularly well positioned to be 
in the know of such efforts since he also has intelligence 
responsibilities, is an adversary of the governor's and is close 
friends with Sayid Yusif, a personal and political enemy of the 
governor. 
 
¶3.  (C) Al-Sari began the conversation by saying that it was a 
very dangerous period for him and Sayid Yusif.  He said that 
both of them are under threat by Governor Muhammad's "death 
squad" commanded by the governor's brother, Ismail (see Refs B 
and C).  However, the plan to get rid of the governor is set.  A 
few mosques have called for a change in government, and 
according to al-Sari, the BPC has the votes necessary to replace 
the governor.  It is now up to the BPC members to initiate the 
vote.  Al Sari confirmed that Sayid Yusif is a BPC member and 
said "he has been drawing a salary since April 14."  Comment: 
The REO has not had confirmation that Sayid Yusif is officially 
a BPC member.  At last week's council meeting, the question was 
discussed and then deferred.  End Comment. 
 
¶4.  (C) The RC asked al-Sari whether the Fadillah militia or JAM 
might instigate a violent reaction in response to a BPC vote 
against the governor.  Al-Sari said that there could be 
assassination attempts directed at BPC members who vote against 
the governor, but did not expect JAM to take to the streets in 
his support.  Based upon conversations with JAM leaders and 
because of public antipathy towards the governor, al-Sari said 
that JAM would remain neutral.  Similarly, al-Sari believes that 
there could be a split in Fadillah, with some members glad if 
the governor and his brother, stains upon the party, were 
removed from power. 
 
¶5.  (C) Al-Sari commented that Hassan al-Rashid, the putative 
replacement for the governor (see Ref A), would be an 
improvement.  Al-Sari said that al-Rashid is smart, politically 
savvy, possesses some morals and is easy to work with.    He 
added that the BPC boycott against the British and the Danes 
would end with a change in government since that "had been a 
condition in the agreements to replace Muhammad with al-Hassan." 
 And in a twist on the connection between al-Rashid, the Badr 
Organization general secretary, and Iran, al-Sari opined that 
Iran hoped that Governor Muhammad remained in office since he 
has permitted Iranians to flow across the border from Iran. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  Majed al-Sari's confirmation of the plan 
described by Sayid Ghali in Ref (A) is no surprise - al-Sari, 
with his enmity towards the governor, would be knee-deep in any 
plan or conspiracy to vote the governor out of office.  He was 
careful to emphasize that no actions would be taken that 
contravene the law.  The vote will take place whenever the 
council members decide, and al-Sari's only concern was that 
individual members' fears of retribution by the governor could 
delay the action.  Nonetheless, he expects the vote to take 
place soon. 
 
GROSS