VZCZCXRO5370
PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0057 1071506
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171506Z APR 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0313
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0081
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0331

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000057 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/17/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: HIZB DAWA ISLAMIYA PERSPECTIVES IN BASRAH 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, 
State Department. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Regional Coordinator (RC) and Poloff on April 6 met with 
Amer Al-Khuzaei, field coordinator for the Basrah branch of the 
Hizb Dawa Islamiya party and Deputy Health Minister, to discuss 
the Dawa party's views on various issues.  Poloff on April 14 
conducted a similar conversation with Abu Fatma, member of the 
party's provincial council.  The party members presented the 
history of Dawa to emphasize its stature and stressed the Dawa 
party's key role in making democracy succeed in Iraq.  Closely 
tied to this was their insistence that the election of Ibrahim 
Al Jafari as prime minister would be essential to the democratic 
process. 
 
¶2. (C) Al-Khuzaei described the history of the Dawa movement and 
its commitment to democracy.  The RC asked about the Basrah 
Provincial Council's boycott of the British and Danes and the 
effect it was having on reconstruction democracy-building 
projects.  Al-Kuzaei said that he did not approve of the 
boycott, but he also emphasized that Coalition Forces needed to 
increase the transparency of its actions, particularly relating 
to the detention of Iraqi citizens. 
 
¶3. (C) Both party members asserted that the Dawa party's rich 
political tradition made it a unique partner for the Coalition 
Forces.  Abu Fatma insisted that there was a misperception that 
Dawa supports Iran because of a close connection it forged with 
Dawa party members who spent many years in exile there.  Poloff 
asked Abu Fatma if Dawa attracted support from youth.  Initially 
Abu Fatma insisted that it did, but when pressed admitted that 
Dawa did not fire their imagination. 
 
¶4. (C) The prime message from the two Dawa members was how 
important it was that Ibrahim Al-Jafari remain as prime 
minister.  They argued that it was the Unified Iraqi Coalition 
majority that decided on him as prime minister, and any 
deviation from this election would be inimical to democracy. 
Al-Khuzaei and Abu Fatma equated a failure of the Jafari 
candidacy to an unconstitutional action.  RC responded by 
asserting that a possible failure of Jafari to become prime 
minister would not contravene the Iraqi constitution and 
provided analogies to the U.S. political system.  Al-Khuzaei 
commented that Jafari's personality was not to his liking, but 
Jafari's selection as prime minister would prove democracy in 
Iraq a success. 
 
GROSS