VZCZCXRO4203
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0055/01 1050617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 150617Z APR 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0307
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
INFO RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0325

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BASRAH 000055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/15/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MILITIAS IN BASRAH -- DIRTY POLITICS PERSONIFIED 
 
REF: (A) BAGHDAD 812; (B) BASRAH 49; (C) BASRAH 30; (D) BASRAH 49; (E) BASRAH 26; (F) BASRAH 52; (G) BASRAH 53; (H) 05 BASRAH 140 
 
BASRAH 00000055  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Most of the militias in Basrah are controlled 
by political parties or, in some instances, are now political 
parties in their own right.  The insidious nature of militias 
acting as political parties - or vice versa - makes politics in 
Basrah particularly perverse.  The Fadillah party denies that it 
has a militia, though through its members in the police and the 
Oil Protection Force it has the most powerful armed group in 
Basrah.  The Badr Organization is the best organized and most 
professional of the militias.  Its members are deeply embedded 
in the government, but its leader in Basrah, Hassan al-Rashid, 
strongly avers that Badr has transitioned and now is a political 
party that will not resort to strong-arm or illegal tactics.  A 
smaller militia is Sayid al-Shuhadaa, led by parliamentarian 
Sayid Dagher and loosely linked to Badr/SCIRI.  It has strong 
connections to Iran.  Jaysh-al-Mahdi is wildly unpredictable and 
lacks concrete direction.  Many of its members and units operate 
autonomously from Muqtada al-Sadr and pursue different 
interests.  The members of Thar Allah are small in number, and 
its leader, Sayid Yusif, also professes - though less 
convincingly than al-Rashid - to have traded the role of militia 
commander for political leader.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) The insurgency in Basrah differs from that faced by 
Iraqi government and Coalition Forces in many other areas in 
Iraq.  The insurgency in Basrah is Shia militia based; Sunni 
insurgents and foreign terrorists' presence in southern Iraq is 
minimal.  Militias, however, are just as perilous to the fabric 
of Iraq's society and its future as the operations mounted by Al 
Qaeda and other terrorist groups.  (See Ref A for background on 
militias.)  Shia militias are an integral part of the political 
process in Basrah, and the leaders of particularly virulent 
militias are key political figures.  Hasneen al-Safi, a member 
of the BPC and a focal point for human rights, recently 
complained to Regional Embassy Office (REO) Basrah that militia 
forces control the streets of Basrah - much more so than the 
Iraqi police.  Based on conversations with political and militia 
leaders, this cable describes the predominant militias in Basrah. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
"Fadillah Party Has No Militia" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Governor Muhammad Mossibh al-Wa'eli, who reputedly is 
involved in oil smuggling, assassinations and other political 
skullduggery, repeatedly stated quite clearly to the Basrah 
Regional Coordinator (RC) that Fadillah has no militia.  Perhaps 
he meant that Fadillah does not have one particular entity that 
operates as a militia; Fadillah -- or more precisely the 
governor and Abu Salom, a Basrah Provincial Council member 
representing Fadillah (see Ref B) - controls substantial 
portions of the Oil Protection Force (OPF) and the Serious 
Crimes Unit (SCU) and Tactical Support Unit (TSU) of the Basrah 
police.  These units act as a de facto militia for Fadillah. 
(See Ref C for more on the governor's relationship with Abu 
Salom.)  Sayid Yusif, the head of Thar Allah and a sworn enemy 
of the governor, accuses him of being behind most of the 
violence in Basrah, including recent rocket attacks on the REO 
Basrah compound. 
 
4,  (S) In fact, as noted by Sheik Mansour al-Khanaan, a 
prominent tribal leader in Basrah, the Fadillah militia is the 
strongest and most dangerous since its members run operations 
under the cloak of governmental authority.  Members wear their 
OPF or police uniforms, use their government-issued weapons and 
drive their official vehicles while carrying out illegal 
activities.  Fadillah has an estimated 1,500 active members 
currently working in the OPF, SCU and TSU.  Other Fadillah party 
members besides the governor deny the existence of any sort of 
party-based militia.  The titular head of Fadillah in Basrah, 
Dr. Hayder al-Wa'eli, told the RC that militias "are not present 
in Basrah at all."  Though still disavowing any Fadillah 
militia, the governor does admit that many militias have 
infiltrated the police. 
 
¶5.  (S) According to Majed al-Sari, the intelligence chief and 
representative of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in Basrah, the 
governor's brother, Ismail Mossibh al-Wa'eli, leads a group that 
functions as a death squad or sort of quick reaction force for 
the governor.  (See Ref D.)  Bio Note:  Ismail was an 
unsuccessful independent candidate on List 756 in the December 
15 parliamentary election.  During the election campaign he told 
the RC that the coalition needed to remain in Iraq for a few 
more years to provide security.  He also boasted of his Sadr 
roots:  he said he formerly was the head of the public affairs 
 
BASRAH 00000055  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
office for Sadr, and his name was listed on Sadr.com.  According 
to Ismail, he even was at one time Muqtada al-Sadr's boss.  End 
Bio Note. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
Badr Organization:  Well Organized and Entrenched 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Badr Organization, closely affiliated with SCIRI and the 
second most powerful militia, is the largest in Basrah with 
2,500 - 3,000 members, most of them "underground" in the police 
and other governmental organizations.  Its members are 
professional, with good military expertise; they follow 
instructions and unlike Fadillah's militia, they are not readily 
identified as members of Badr because they work for a particular 
organization or unit.  After the conflict with Saddam was over, 
Badr reorganized itself and inserted its members into government 
positions.  Sheik Mansour estimates that 50 percent of the 
police are members of Badr.  (Comment:  Given the secrecy 
surrounding Badr membership, it is difficult to ascertain the 
exact number of Badr members in the police.  However, the 50 
percent estimate of Sheik Mansour's probably is too high a 
figure.  End Comment.)  Its strength comes from its strong 
organization and the loyalty of its members. 
 
¶7.  (C) The Secretary General of Badr Organization in Basrah is 
Hassan al-Rashid, a former governor of Basrah and current member 
of its Provincial Council.  He is a polished politician, careful 
and measured in his speech, who could be next in line for the 
governorship should Governor Muhammad's many enemies succeed in 
toppling him.  (See Refs F and G.)  He spent six years in Iran 
and travels there frequently, though he says that he does not 
speak Farsi.  When the RC offered to interpret for Hassan during 
his next trip to Iran, Hassan jokingly offered to bring him 
along. 
 
¶8.  (C) Hassan said that Badr maintains a friendly relationship 
with Iran since it provided a safe haven and support for so many 
Iraqis during the Saddam years and asserted that he agrees with 
Iran on some issues.  He denied, however, any direct support 
from Iran at this time and pointed out that any issue related to 
Iran for Badr must go through him.  Hassan reaffirmed that Badr 
is committed to the political process.  In discussing militias - 
and particularly Fadillah's - he recently said, "the most 
powerful militia is not the one with the most weapons but the 
one that has the most people behind it." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------- 
Masters of the Martyrs Really Masters of the Political Process 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Closely related to SCIRI/Badr, Sayid al-Shuhadaa, or 
Masters of the Martyrs, is led by Sayid Dagher al-Musawi. 
Besides being general secretary for Sayid al-Shuhadaa, Sayid 
Dagher represents Muthanna province in the Council of 
Representatives.  During a recent meeting at his headquarters, 
he told the RC that Sayid al-Shuhadaa's goals are one Iraq, 
united under democratic principles, with a strong federalist 
system that provides for equal distribution of revenues and free 
medical insurance.  Speaking in platitudes, Sayid Dagher 
stressed his love of democracy and said that this is the "golden 
time" for political parties in Iraq since they could now operate 
in a truly free political environment.  Sayid Dagher said that 
there were similarities between Sayid al-Shuhadaa and 
SCIRI/Badr, but they also have slight differences of opinions. 
However, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim leads the political process for 
them all. 
 
¶10.  (C) Sayid Dagher totally rejected any Iranian influence in 
Basrah, saying that though both peoples are Shia, "they're 
Iranians and we're Iraqis."  Many Iraqis are called "Iranian" 
because of time spent in Iran during Saddam's era, but Sayid 
Dagher said Iranians and Iraqis have divergent interests.  He 
denied any evidence existed of Iranian influence or pressure. 
Majed al-Sari, the MOD's intelligence representative, tells a 
different story.  According to him, Sayid al-Shuhadaa members 
are specially chosen by Iran, and the organization functions as 
an "advance intelligence unit" in Basrah.  He asserted that it 
cooperates with SCIRI, but is not closely linked at the lower 
levels.  The number of armed members of Sayid al-Shuhadaa is 
uncertain, but best estimates put it at a few hundred.  More so 
than the other militias, its activities are shrouded in secrecy. 
 When the RC asked Sayid Dagher about the oft-repeated 
description of Sayid al-Shuhadaa as the "Iranian Embassy in 
Basrah," he quickly changed the subject and launched into an 
esoteric and convoluted discussion of democracy. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Jaysh al-Mahdi - Lots of Action, Less Direction 
 
BASRAH 00000055  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM, is the best known of the 
militias in Basrah and receives the most press coverage. 
Created as the military wing of the Office of the Martyr Sadr, 
it maintains ties but rejects the prospect of bring part of the 
political process.  JAM has an estimated 1,500-1,700 hard-core 
members in Basrah, though it can rally substantial numbers of 
sympathizers for demonstrations.as evidenced after the bombing 
of the Golden Mosque in Samarra on February 22 (Ref E).  JAM 
members are suspected of being behind many of the rocket and IED 
attacks against Coalition Forces.. 
 
¶12.  (C) JAM lacks strong leadership in Basrah, and its units 
are very diffuse.  Muqtada al-Sadr is only a figurehead for JAM, 
exerting only partial control on the more important issues. 
Local operations, however, are out of the scope of Muqtada's 
control, and the crazy quilt of actions by various local JAM 
units shows no coherency.  JAM units in Basrah frequently follow 
their own individual agendas, sometimes in tandem with Fadillah 
and other times according to the direction of the individual 
unit's leader.  The current leader - if there is one - of JAM in 
Basrah is unknown. 
 
¶13.  (C) Sheikh Mansour equates this lack of strong leadership 
in JAM with institutional weakness.  Though JAM members are easy 
to rally and exhibit much enthusiasm, without a strong religious 
figure to follow they are subject to many other influences. 
Most JAM members follow their own interests or those of their 
unit leader or their mosque.  Sheik Mansour asserts that 
providing decent employment opportunities for young men would 
reduce JAM membership considerably. 
 
¶14.  (C) Sayid Yusif, the head of Thar Allah, corroborated 
Muqtada al-Sadr's lack of operational control over JAM in 
Basrah.  His example was an alleged order by Sadr that JAM 
should retain its separate identity and not cooperate with 
Fadillah; Sayid Yusif said that individual JAM units work with 
Fadillah whenever they have a confluence of interests despite 
Sadr's strictures.  Sheikh Mansour complained about cooperation 
between Fadillah and JAM after an IPS office two months ago 
arrested a member of a Fadillah hit squad who had killed a 
member of Sheikh Mansour's tribe.  Both Fadillah and JAM 
elements attacked tribal members protecting the police station 
where the Fadillah member was jailed.  This commonality of 
interests among some of the militias, according to Sheikh 
Mansour, has "reduced the trust of the people in the law to 
below zero." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Thar Allah - Punching Above its Weight 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶15.  (C) Thar Allah, or "Revenge of God," dates back to the 
Saddam regime when, according to its leader, Sayid Yusif, it 
conducted military operations against government forces.  It 
formerly was known as the "Followers' Committee."  Sayid Yusif 
told the RC that Thar Allah now is strictly an Islamic political 
party that adheres to the political path.  Hassan al-Rashid of 
Badr recently told the RC that Seyid Yusif had decided to turn 
to politics rather than stay outside of the political process. 
Differentiating it from other militias, Sayid Yusif said that 
Thar Allah is not like Badr Organization - "that's still a 
military organization."  Sayid Yusif is next in line to sit on 
the Basrah Provincial Council and seeks to burnish his political 
credentials.  (See Ref D.) 
 
¶16.  (C) Seyid Yusif reportedly has approximately 100-150 armed 
militia members available to do his bidding.  In an "odd couple" 
like pairing, Majed al-Sari, the MOD representative in Basrah, 
is a close friend of Seyid Yusif.  (Comment:  Repeated attempts 
by the RC to meet with Seyid Yusif were unsuccessful until the 
RC asked Majed al-Sari to assist.  Without bothering to check 
with Seyid Yusif, Majed al-Sari immediately arranged for a 
meeting three days later.  End Comment.)  Majed al-Sari told the 
RC that he was investigating Seyid Yusif before launching an 
arrest operation, but once he had an opportunity to speak to him 
Majed al-Sari realized "he is not a fanatic."  Majed al-Sari 
admitted that Seyid Yusif had killed some people, but not all of 
those he is reported to have murdered.  Seyid Yusif makes his 
money from working with people in commerce and in government and 
sometimes extorting money from those who smuggle goods.  Majed 
al-Sari added, "Seyid Yusif believes that it is good when bad 
activities are attributed to him since it makes more people 
afraid of him." 
 
¶17.  (C) The close friendship between Majed al-Sari and Seyid 
Yusif may have been cemented because of a mutual hatred of 
Basrah Governor Muhammad.  Both ardently desire his removal, 
with Seyid Yusif perhaps interested in a more violent 
termination of services.  During a meeting with the RC, Seyid 
 
BASRAH 00000055  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Yusif repeatedly asked when Coalition Forces would arrest the 
governor, and as he was leaving Seyid Yusif requested that "if 
some sort of independent action is taken against the governor, 
please do not intervene."  The RC told Seyid Yusif that 
Coalition Forces would enforce the law against any group taking 
illegal actions and strongly recommended that Seyid Yusif abjure 
any extra-legal means to oust the governor.  The governor 
wholeheartedly reciprocates Seyid Yusif's enmity, accusing him 
of being responsible for conducting assassinations for Iran and 
vowing to arrest him soon. 
 
¶18.  (C) Comment:  The influence of militias is pervasive in all 
elements of Basrah society.  Militias conduct political 
vendettas, extortion, murders and kidnappings, and some enforce 
a strict fundamentalist version of Islam on local residents. 
(See Ref H for background on the Islamification of Basrah.) 
Businesses operate in this militia-influenced atmosphere by 
either acquiescing to militia pressure or trying to maintain 
some separation.  Jabbar A.H. al-Ueibi, the general manager of 
South Oil Company, said he does not interfere with the Oil 
Protection Force and only "coordinates" with it.  He remains 
apolitical, though even with his non-partisan stance his 
headquarters building was set on fire last year and a small bomb 
exploded outside of his office six weeks ago. 
 
¶19.  (C) Comment continued:  There is no simple solution to rid 
Basrah of militias.  The best way forward is to encourage what 
already is occurring to a very limited degree with Badr 
Organization - the transformation of a militia into a political 
party committed to a democratic system of government.  We need 
to work closely with Badr and all militia/political parties to 
persuade them that full participation in the political process 
is more rewarding for its members.  For some Basrah militias, 
this will not be feasible, but they still need to be encouraged 
to rely solely on political activities.  This will be a long 
process, but one that offers the best chance for success. 
GROSS