VZCZCXRO4368
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0048/01 0961228
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061228Z APR 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0294
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0312

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/6/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER KISL IZ
SUBJECT: COUNCIL DITHERS AS BASRAH SECURITY WORSENS 
 
REF: A) BASRAH 19, B) BASRAH 17 
 
BASRAH 00000048  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On April 3, the Basrah Regional Coordinator 
(RC) met with Hakim Abdul Sahib Kadum (Independent- Basrah 
Islamic Coalition), Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) member and 
Head of the Supervisory Security Committee of the council.   He 
insisted that the U.S. REO take an "active role" in convincing 
the British to give in to BPC demands for ending the ongoing 
boycott.  The RC delivered the message that the REO would assist 
in mediation but would not deliver ultimatums to the British on 
behalf of the BPC.  The boycott on the Danish Mission in Basrah 
continues, and the BPC has to weigh the value of the Danish 
programs before ending it.  Tactical Support Unit (TSU) 
demonstrations were held on April 2 in Basrah to protest the 
decision to place the unit under the control of the local Iraqi 
police.  Hakim blamed the worsening security situation in Basrah 
on the British, but admitted that there were many other factors 
influencing security.  At least 100- possibly 230- families have 
arrived in Basrah province fleeing sectarian violence in the 
north.  End Summary. 
 
Boycotts Must Be Resolved through Negotiations, Not Ultimatums 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On April 3, the Basrah RC met with Hakim Abdul Sahib 
Kadum, BPC member and Head of the Supervisory Security Committee 
of the council.  Hakim has been in contact with the REO over the 
course of the BPC's boycott of the British and Danish 
established on February 13 (see Reftel A).  His message to the 
REO on this occasion was a request for the United States to take 
what he termed a "more active role" in breaking the impasse on 
the boycott.  When pressed to specify what sort of role he 
envisioned for the United States, he clarified that he wanted 
the REO to pressure the British to give in to the demands of the 
BPC (see Reftel B).  The RC stressed that the U.S. REO 
considered it important to end the boycott and would be happy to 
serve as a mediator in direct negotiations between the British 
forces and the BPC.  However, the RC emphasized that both sides 
must meet and discuss their differences with each other. 
Expecting the United States to deliver the council's ultimatums 
to the British would do nothing to end the impasse and was no 
substitution for direct negotiations. 
 
¶3.  (C) As for the boycott on cooperation with the Danish 
Mission in Basrah, Hakim shrugged and said that Denmark 
transgressed against the Prophet Mohammed, and as such, the 
boycott could not be resolved at the provincial level, only at 
the national level.  The RC relayed the information that the 
Danish Mission would most likely close its office in Basrah 
within the next month if work with its Iraqi counterparts on the 
council could not continue.  Hakim did not appear overly 
concerned about the possible pullout of the Danish, saying that 
the BPC would have to consider the impact that the Danish 
Mission's pullout would have on project work and vote on whether 
or not to abandon the boycott on the Danish.  He added that the 
agenda for the council's meeting the next day was already full, 
so the council would not be able to discuss the Danish until the 
next meeting. 
 
TSU Demonstrations Over Status 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4.  (C) Hakim explained that the Tactical Support Unit (TSU) 
forces demonstrated in Basrah on April 2 because they opposed 
the Ministry of Interior's decision to absorb the TSU into an 
Emergency Battalion with the Disturbance Battalion under the 
Iraqi Police (IP) in Basrah.  Accustomed to operating 
semi-independently and benefiting from receiving better 
equipment than most of the rest of the IP, the TSU saw the 
decision as a demotion in prestige.  Hakim said that the 
Supervisory Security Committee was working on resolving the 
issue by mediating between the IP and the TSU, and that the TSU 
had been advised to work through the BPC to air their grievances 
and not demonstrate in the streets. 
 
Basrah Security Situation Worse for Many Reasons 
--------------------------------------------- -------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Hakim attributed the worsening security situation in 
Basrah to several factors:  the power vacuum in the national 
government, the current Chief of Police Hassan Sewadi's 
incompetence, Iranian interference, British meddling, militias 
and tribal warfare.  He said that until a new government is 
formed, long-term solutions to the security problems would not 
be found.  He foresaw militia activity continuing to be a 
 
BASRAH 00000048  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
problem in Basrah through provincial elections, saying that 
losing parties would take their anger out through their 
militias.  When the RC pushed the security issue, noting that a 
four-year-old boy had been killed in a drive-by shooting in the 
central marketplace in Basrah on April 2, Hakim said that it was 
dangerous everywhere in Iraq and blamed the deteriorating 
situation in Basrah on the British for not coordinating their 
moves with Iraqi security. 
 
Internal Displacement Due to Sectarian Violence 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Hakim estimated that since February about one hundred 
Shia families had arrived in Basrah province from the north due 
to sectarian violence (Note: An April 2 International Office for 
Migration report puts the number of displaced families in Basrah 
at 230.  End Note).  He said a committee was investigating the 
issue of refugee Shia families on April 3 and were registering 
them.  Most of the displaced families originated in the "hot" 
zones of Fallujah and Ramadi, he said, and were re-settling 
throughout the province, but in the cities of Basrah and Safwan 
in particular.  He said that the BPC had considered offering 
special assistance to the families but decided against it out of 
concern that doing so would attract unmanageable numbers of 
people.  Instead, families were receiving assistance through 
various humanitarian non-governmental organizations and through 
the Ministry of Migration and Displacement (Note:  Poloff has 
received reports of Red Crescent delivering food and supplies to 
displaced families throughout the southern region.  End Note). 
Hakim said that he had no knowledge of Sunni families fleeing 
Basrah (Comment: Other REO contacts report that "hundreds" of 
Sunnis are leaving Basrah because of increased violence. End 
Comment). 
 
Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Hakim, knowledgeable about specific issues, offered no 
helpful suggestions as to how to bring the two-month long 
boycott on the British and Danish to an end.  The meeting was an 
important opportunity, however, to deliver the message to a 
council member that the REO would mediate negotiations, but that 
the BPC itself would have to resolve its differences directly 
with the British and Danish.  The dysfunctional BPC, identified 
by nearly all other REO contacts as contributing to the security 
problem in Basrah, was glaringly absent from Hakim's list of 
reasons why security in Basrah was deteriorating.  Hakim's 
defensive stance toward Basrah's security crisis and unworkable 
strategy for resolving the boycott on Coalition partners in 
Basrah point in the direction of a further decline in local 
government performance until the provincial election takes place. 
GROSS