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DE RUEHJL #0245/01 1101333
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O 201333Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6594

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANJUL 000245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 
TAGS: PGOV EAID ECON PHUM KDEM PREL GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: FURTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR ESF PROJECT 
 
 
REF: A. BANJUL 231 
     ¶B. STATE 59002 
     ¶C. BANJUL 187 
     ¶D. BANJUL 233 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C)  We view our proposed ESF project with IFES as of 
vital importance for The Gambia's electoral process. The 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), charged with 
conducting The Gambia's 2006-7 Presidential and National 
Assembly elections, is an imperfect institution, but 
nonetheless has run elections deemed credible by the 
international community.  We are encouraged by opposition 
parties' professed determination to participate in the 
upcoming contests as well as other foreign donors' aid plans. 
 Despite President Jammeh's erratic behavior and clear 
distaste for the opposition, sources rule out his massively 
rigging the elections or so harassing the opposition that it 
cannot campaign effectively -- but the "Jammeh factor" 
requires careful monitoring of the electoral process and 
maintaining pressure for credible contests.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
OUR ESF PROJECT PROPOSAL 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ref a contains post's proposed $300,000 ESF project 
with IFES in support of The Gambia's preparations for its 
Presidential and National Assembly elections scheduled for 
October 2006 and January 2007, respectively.  As the deadline 
for submission of ESF proposals approaches (ref b), we wish 
to reiterate our view that USG assistance for The Gambia's 
electoral process here is of vital importance.  As we have 
previously argued (ref c), the coup plot thwarted  here March 
21 only highlights the fragility of the country's democratic 
process and the consequent need for assistance, in 
particular, to bolster the capacity of the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC), charged with conducting the 
2006-7 contests. 
 
THE IEC 
------- 
 
¶3. (C) The IEC itself is an imperfect institution, with 
limited staff and expertise.  It is headed by a Board of 
Commissioners composed of nominally non-partisan figures, 
among them, retired government bureaucrats.  Our sense is 
that chairman Ndondi Njie, a former educator, and his fellow 
commissioners recognize the need to address election-related 
concerns of the opposition parties as well as those of the 
GOTG/ruling APRC party -- but if there is a slant in a given 
IEC decision, it is likely to be in the latter's favor. At 
the same time, we also believe that the IEC commissioners 
recognize the importance of conducting elections that, at the 
end of the day, are seen as credible at home and abroad.  In 
this respect, it is worth noting that the IEC-supervised 
Presidential and National Assembly elections of 2001-2 were 
deemed credible by the international community (including the 
U.S.) as were the National Assembly by-elections of September 
¶2005. 
 
OPPOSITION'S DETERMINATION TO PARTICIPATE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) We are  encouraged by opposition parties' 
determination to participate in both the Presidential and 
National Assembly contests, unlike the previous round in 
2001-2, when the country's largest opposition party, the 
United Democratic Party (UDP), boycotted the National 
Assembly elections.  In April 14 conversation with 
pol/econoff, UDP head Oussainou Darboe reaffirmed his party's 
commitment to participating in both upcoming contests and 
asserted that all other opposition parties would do so as 
well.  Echoing other opposition politicians, Darboe 
acknowledged the IEC's imperfections, but judged that the 
opposition parties and their candidates would have sufficient 
opportunity to compete for office to warrant their 
participation.   He also opined that President Jammeh, in the 
aftermath of the failed coup plot, would refrain from a 
crackdown on the opposition parties that would rule out their 
being able to campaign effectively in the run-up to the 
2006-7 elections.  Darboe stressed the importance of 
international support, i.e., IFES, to the IEC. 
 
DECISION OF OTHER DONORS TO ASSIST 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) We are also encouraged by the professed commitment by 
other donors to provide election-related assistance. Ref c 
reports assistance plans by the UK's aid agency, Department 
for International Development (DFID), EU, and UN; we have 
also gotten indications that other donors may also step 
forward, e.g., the Japanese and the Commonwealth 
organization.  Most recently, in April 19 conversation with 
Ambassador, UNDP Resident Representative said the 
establishment of a donors "basket fund" for election-related 
assistance was on track. 
 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATION -- THE JAMMEH FACTOR 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) President Jammeh's penchant for erratic behavior and 
his distaste for the opposition parties -- as reflected in 
his harsh criticisms at an April 15 rally (ref d) -- raise 
the possibility of an abrupt move by him either to massively 
rig the elections or so harass the opposition that they 
cannot campaign effectively.  At this point, we are  inclined 
to rule out either scenario -- and we note that the 
opposition does so as well, judging from UDP head Darboe's 
remarks.  At this point, we note the assessment of various 
sources, none of them Jammeh supporters, that the President 
is confident that he will win in the 2006 election and that 
his party will win a majority of seats in the subsequent 
National Assembly ballotting  -- but also recognizes that 
contests seen as rigged or devoid of significant  opposition 
will deprive him and his party of the legitimacy he prizes. 
At this point, we have no basis for challenging the foregoing 
assessment, but the "Jammeh factor" only heightens the need 
for careful monitoring of the electoral process and 
maintaining pressure for credible contests. 
 
 
 
 
STAFFORD