This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

210853Z Apr 06

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, S/CT 
PACOM PASS FPS (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH SNAP
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAIS TO BEGIN TALKS WITH PULO 
 
REF: A. 05 BANGKOK 7573 
 
     ¶B. 05 BANGKOK 7527 
     ¶C. 05 BANGKOK 2062 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1.  (S)  SUMMARY: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) 
has facilitated talks between the RTG and purported leaders 
of southern Thai separatist groups.  The talks, scheduled for 
June, will take place in Geneva and reportedly have the 
support of key parts of the Thai government.  Talks are 
positive, but it will be difficult to translate a dialogue 
into a reduction in the violence as the separatist 
"leadership" has questionable control over militants in the 
South. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (S)  On April 20, Michael Vatikiotis (strictly protect), 
regional representative for the Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue, told they Ambassador the HDC had brokered an 
agreement to establish a dialogue between the RTG and the 
exiled leadership of the Pattani United Liberation 
Organization (PULO) and other southern Thai separatist 
groups.  The talks are scheduled to begin in June and will 
take place in Geneva.  The Thai government will be 
represented by NSC Deputy Secretary-General Jiraporn Bunnag, 
NSC Director of Strategic Security Somkiat, and prominent 
academic and National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) member 
Mark Tamthai (reftel C).  PULO members Katsuri Mahkota and 
Shamsuddin Khan will likely represent the southern 
separatists.  Vatikiotis hinted that leaders of other 
southern militant groups would also attend, including BRN-C. 
 
¶3.  (S)  HDC has been quietly meeting in northern Malaysia 
and in Europe over the past year with purported leadership 
figures from southern Thai separatist groups in an attempt to 
facilitate a dialogue (reftel B).  Vatikiotis and other HDC 
staff have reportedly had high-level contacts in Thailand and 
Malaysia including Thai Prime Minister Thaksin, NRC Chairman 
Anand Panyarachun, and Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi. 
(NOTE: Vatikiotis said that Malaysian external intelligence 
had identified, and was in contact with, many of the senior 
separatist leaders in Kelantan. He claimed that Malaysian 
intelligence had facilitated a February meeting between 
former Prime Minister Mahathir and Thai separatist leaders on 
Langkawi Island. END NOTE) 
 
¶4.  (S)  Vatikiotis said that the dialogue -- which has been 
quietly supported by the Thai political leadership -- had 
received buy-in from crucial members of the RTG, including 
Supreme Command and the National Intelligence Agency.  There 
is a growing consensus within the RTG that PULO is organizing 
itself into a credible political organization that can 
legitimately engage in a dialogue with the government. 
Vatikiotis believes PULO is modeling itself on Indonesia's 
GAM. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Vatikiotis said HDC had been meeting in Malaysia's 
Kelantan State with purported separatist leadership figures 
who claimed they provide logistical support to the loosely 
organized group of militants who are carrying out the attacks 
in southern Thailand (reftel A).  These leaders reportedly 
admitted that the militants who actually carry out the 
attacks were "difficult to control."  Vatikiotis believes 
that separatist leaders in Kelantan do not enjoy operational 
control over all the militants operating in the South.  Cells 
appear to be organized into districts and act autonomously 
for the most part.  However, he believes they have enough 
influence over the militants in the South to be credible 
interlocutors. 
 
¶6.  (S)  Vatikiotis was confident about the timing of the 
talks.  According to him, there is a real chance for dialogue 
and compromise now that Thaksin has stepped down; Thaksin had 
allowed exploratory talks with purported separatist leaders, 
but was not sincere about pursuing a substantive dialogue. 
The NRC, which has completed its report, also feels 
emboldened by Thaksin's political demise.  Anand believes a 
new government may provide the opportunity for positive 
change to take place in the South.  The NRC final report will 
also recommend dialogue between the government and militants. 
 
¶7.  (S)  COMMENT: Talks are good -- and Thaksin's retreat 
does open the possibility for changes in Thai policy towards 
the South -- but the direct impact the envisioned dialogue 
will have on the violence is questionable.  As Vatikiotis 
acknowledged, the exiled separatist leaders probably do not 
have operational control over those who are actually carrying 
out attacks.  These "leaders," who fled Thailand in the 1970s 
and 80s, are from an older generation than the angry ethnic 
Malay youth who appear to be behind the majority of attacks. 
It is interesting that the RTG apparently believes that PULO 
can credibly represent the separatists.  Most observers -- 
ourselves included -- view PULO as a highly factionalized 
purveyor of web-site separatist propaganda rather than a 
credible political organization.  It will be difficult to 
translate talks in Europe into a reduction of violence on the 
ground in the South, but it is a start. END COMMENT 
BOYCE