This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002296 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL KN KS TH DPRK
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SIX NORTH KOREANS 
 
 
Classified By: SUSAN SUTTON, POLITICAL COUNSELOR, REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In an April 20 meeting, ROK Embassy 
officials expressed familiar concerns about U.S. resettlement 
of North Korean refugees but indicated that they would be 
prepared to help in accordance with commitments the ROKG has 
made to the United States.  In a subsequent UNHCR-ROK Embassy 
meeting, there was agreement that interviews of the North 
Koreans would be conducted at the UNHCR office.  UNHCR 
requested ROK assistance in nationality verification and 
resettlement interest, but the ROK Embassy said it needed to 
seek approval from Seoul.  UNHCR told Refcoord that after 
nationality verification is complete, UNHCR would issue its 
normal protection letter for North Korean refugees and then 
have the North Koreans sign a form stating their resettlement 
country preference.  End summary. 
 
ROK Response on Six North Koreans 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Embassy Political Counselor and refugee officers met 
with the new ROK Political Counselor and other officers on 
April 20 to discuss the six North Koreans who have approached 
the Embassy about resettlement to the United States.  Embassy 
Political Counselor opened by noting the high level of USG 
and Congressional interest in the six and the importance of 
working together quickly on their cases.  Political Counselor 
noted that the USG expected the ROK would provide assistance 
in determining nationality and performing background checks. 
The U.S. understood the sensitivity and complicated nature of 
the North Korean refugee issue and stated that the U.S. would 
work discreetly and in a manner that we hoped would not 
disrupt the existing pipeline that moves North Koreans to the 
ROK.  Political Counselor noted that we had been in contact 
with UNHCR and understood that UNHCR wanted to meet with the 
ROK Embassy as soon as possible to request ROK assistance 
with the group of six. 
 
¶3. (C) ROK Embassy officers responded by noting that they had 
received instructions from Seoul and that the ROK hoped the 
USG would assume a major role and responsibility in handling 
the cases of the six North Koreans.  The ROKG cared very much 
about the existing pipeline and cooperation with UNHCR which 
worked quietly and efficiently.  U.S. resettlement of North 
Koreans could create a pull factor that might endanger the 
current system.  This greatly worried the ROKG. 
 
¶4. (C) ROK Embassy officers state that the number of North 
Koreans coming to Thailand had increased substantially this 
year.  It was unclear whether this was due to NGO activists 
anticipating the start of U.S. resettlement or a tougher 
Chinese policy that was making it harder for North Koreans to 
resettle to the ROK through China.  It was also possible that 
other North Koreans already in Thailand and headed for the 
ROK might change their minds if they learned of a U.S. 
option.  It was essential to avoid any publicity that might 
put the existing system in danger.  An ROK officer noted the 
case several years ago when a group of North Koreans had 
climbed over the wall of the the Japanese Embassy and sought 
resettlement to Japan.  The North Korean government had 
complained to the Thai government about that development.  It 
would be very hard to keep resettlement of North Korean 
refugees to the United States quiet.  The ROKG was very 
concerned about its relations with the DPRK and third 
countries such as Thailand. 
 
¶5. (C) The ROK side continued that it understood the United 
States may need some help with the six North Koreans and it 
was prepared to help.  At the same time, it was important for 
the United States to have UNHCR engaged on the issue.  Once 
UNHCR asked for help, the response would be favorable. 
However, an ROK Embassy officer, not the ROKG official 
seconded to UNHCR, would provide the assistance.  It would be 
best to conduct the interviews of the six North Koreans at 
UNHCR.  The ROK Embassy officer would help in verifying 
nationality but the United States should understand that 
there could not be complete certainty in a determination by 
the ROK Embassy officer that the six were in fact North 
Koreans and not, for example, Chinese.  The ROK Embassy 
officer would provide his best judgement, but the ROKG could 
not take responsibility or provide an assurance that its 
determination would be correct. 
 
¶6. (C) In addition, the ROK side stated that it would be 
prepared to provide any interpretation assistance that UNHCR 
might require.  Regarding background checks, the ROK Embassy 
officials stated they they would do their best to help but 
did not provide a time frame for when the background checks 
would be completed. 
 
Outcome of UNHCR - ROK Embassy Meeting 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) UNHCR officials subsequently met with ROK Embassy 
officials on April 20 to discuss the six North Koreans. 
UNHCR acting chief Giuseppe de Vincentis informed Refcoord 
that there was agreement that interviews of the North Koreans 
would occur at the UNHCR office.  De Vincentis said that, 
following instructions from Geneva, he told the ROK officials 
that UNHCR was seeking concurrence in using the South Korean 
secondee since that was existing practice but that any other 
official that the ROKG might deem appropriate in verifying 
nationality and resettlement country preference would be 
acceptable. 
 
¶8. (C) According to de Vincentis, the ROK officials responded 
by stating that they needed to seek guidance from Seoul on 
whomever was used and asked whether UNHCR had a preference. 
De Vincentis said he responded that since UNHCR thought 
existing practice should be followed, the preference was for 
the secondee.  De Vincentis said he pressed for approval in 
time to permit interviews on April 21.  The ROK officials did 
not make a commitment on when Seoul approval would be 
forthcoming.  Subsequently, UNHCR called the ROK Embassy at 
cob and was told that no approval had been received.  De 
Vincentis asked Refcoord whether the USG had any preference 
on the question of which ROK official would do the 
interviews.  Refcoord responded that we had no preference. 
 
¶9. (C) De Vincentis said that he foresaw that after the 
nationality verification is completed, the standard UNHCR 
person of concern letter for North Koreans would be produced 
and given to the North Koreans.  Then UNHCR would follow 
normal practice and ask the North Koreans to fill out and 
sign a form which asks them for their resettlement country 
preference.  (Comment.  This last form is for internal UNHCR 
purposes.  The Bangkok OPE would subsequently have the North 
Koreans sign the USG form regarding the U.S. refugee program 
that confirms interest in U.S. resettlement). 
BOYCE