VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #1241/01 1071001
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171001Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3921
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001241 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2016 
TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PGOV PHUM DOJ CRIM OPDAT
SUBJECT: MOI DETENTION FACILITY INSPECTED: OVERCROWDED, 
FILTHY, JUVENILES HELD, NO JUDGES 
 
 
Classified By: ROL SENIOR ADVISOR James Yellin 
for reasons 1.4 (a) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  On April 5, the Iraqi-U.S. 
Joint Inspection Detention Facility Team 
(JIDFT) conducted its seventh unannounced 
inspection of an Iraqi detention facility. 
The inspection took place at the Ministry 
of Interior (MoI) National Police Division 
Headquarters located at Forward 
Operating Base Justice. The facility 
was found to be overcrowded and filthy. 
A total of 657 detainees, including 17 
juveniles, are housed in four rooms. 
(NOTE: According to Iraqi law, juveniles 
are to be held in separate facilities 
managed by the Ministry of Labor (MOL) 
END NOTE.)  There were files for each 
detainee, but none of them contained 
judicial orders. We were told the 
judicial orders had all been temporarily 
sent to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) 
for accounting purposes relating to the 
fact that MoJ has recently taken the 
responsibility for the feeding of 
the detainees. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT. The majority of 
the detainees have been held in this 
facility for more than two months; 
many others have been held there for 
over eight months. The majority of 
detainees said they have seen a judge 
one time since their arrival.  However, 
neither of the two investigative judges 
assigned to the facility were on duty 
at the time of the inspection, despite 
it being a work day.  We were told 
the absence of the judges is a common 
occurrence. We surmise this may be a 
contributing factor to the high numbers 
of detainees languishing in this 
facility. 
 
¶3. (C) SUMMARY CONT. In terms of abuse, 
only a few detainees reported physical 
abuse at the police battalion facilities 
where they were placed immediately 
after arrest, and prior to coming to the 
Division facility.  None claimed to have 
been abused at the facility itself. 
However,  a number of detainees alleged 
to the team that the juveniles were 
being subjected to sexual abuse. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------- 
PRIMARY AREAS OF CONCERN 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Detention housing. The 657 detainees 
in the facility areheld in four separate 
rooms: three small rooms (approximately 
30 feet x 75 feet) held 137 each; one 
larger room (approximately 50 feet x 100 
feet)held 246.  Inside the three smaller 
rooms there is barely enough room for the 
detainees to sit together on the bare 
floor and there is not enough room for 
all of them to lie down at the same time. 
In the larger room the detainees sit 
in several orderly rows on the tiled floor 
but again, there is insufficient room for 
them all to recline at once. None of the 
rooms have running water or bedding. 
Detainees remain in these 
"holding pens" most of the time. 
They are only allowed outside 
once a day to visit a portable latrine. 
 
¶5. (C) Cleanliness.  The rooms are 
unswept,poorly lit, and lack ventilation. 
The odor in each room is vile. Detainees 
are only rarely allowed showers, and 
most said they have not showered in 
months. This was confirmed by the staff. 
The lack of showers has led 
to a deterioration of health 
 
conditions. Lice, skin rashes, and an 
overall unsanitary atmosphere pose 
ongoing problems. 
 
¶6.  (C) Food and water. It appears that 
detainees are sufficiently fed. 
They receive food, which is provided 
by MoJ, twice daily. Provision of 
drinking water appears to be insufficient. 
 
¶7. (C) Medical Care. The facility has one 
on-site physician's assistant who was present 
at the time of the inspection. Many detainees 
appear to be in need of routine medical care 
for minor illnesses or pre-existing 
medical conditions. One of the detainees 
currently being held lay on his back 
in a separate room.  He was 
very weak, thin, and despondent. 
The JIDFT was told he is separated from the 
rest because he suffers from tuberculosis. 
A list of drugs he is currently taking 
to address the illness was provided. 
The team was told that when urgent 
medical care is needed detainees are taken to 
an Iraqi hospital for care. 
 
¶8. (C) Physical and sexual abuse. 
None of the of the detainees complained 
of recent abuse, although some alleged 
they had been subject to physical 
abuse when initially arrested by the 
police. Several detainees claimed that 
juvenile detainees are being sexually 
abused.  This was not confirmed or 
alleged by any of the juveniles 
themselves. 
 
¶9. (C) Juveniles.  The facility holds 17 
juveniles. According to Iraqi law, 
juveniles are to be detained in separate 
facilities managed by the Ministry of Labor 
(MoL). It seems at least some of the 
juveniles are being held merely because 
they were present in homes at which MoI 
units conducted raids.  When asked 
about one 16 year old boy who was seen 
crying throughout the visit, the JIDFT 
was told the only reason he is being held 
is because MoI unit went to 
arrest his "uncle" for kidnapping, and the 
boy was present in the house with him. 
When asked if the boy could be released, 
the facility manager responded that he could, 
the next time the investigative judge is 
on-site. (NOTE:  On April 9, Iraqi JIDFT 
members requested a status update 
on the boy. According to facility 
management, he was still being held, 
as neither of the two judges assigned 
to the facility had reported to work. 
END NOTE.) 
 
¶10. (C) Time in detention.  The 
majority of detainees said they 
have been in this facility 
for more than two months and 
some for over eight. No judicial 
orders or records were available for 
review.  JIDFT was told that the 
detainees' paperwork had been sent 
temporarily to MoJ for accounting 
purposes.  They also conveyed that 
about 60 detainees had recently been 
transferred from a different detention 
center without judicial orders. 
During the inspection 56 detainees 
were released.  According to the 
MoI staff this was a pre-planned 
event that had not been staged for 
the benefit of JIDFT. 
 
¶11. (C) Lack of investigative judges. 
There are two investigative judges 
assigned to this facility.  Neither 
was present at the time of our visit. 
(NOTE: In the seven inspections 
conducted thus far, only once did we 
 
find a judge on-site. Investigative 
judges are supposed to be assigned to 
detention facilities throughout 
Iraq and are to report to duty 
throughout the work week. END NOTE.) 
Despite the fact that the majority of 
detainees reported they had seen a judge 
once, it appears that the sheer volume 
of detainees has overwhelmed the ability 
of judges to process the cases 
expeditiously.  The fact there are no 
judicial records or judges at this 
facility makes it impossible to process 
any cases at all.  Moreover, according 
to facility officials, given overcrowded 
conditions at Iraqi MOJ prisons, some 
detainees were ordered to remain at this 
MOI facility even after having 
been convicted at trial. 
 
¶12. (C) Lack of Family visits. There 
is no official visitation day. 
However, some detainees reported 
having a family visit approximately 
3-4 months ago.  When confronted, the 
staff stated that they would, in the 
future, allow visits one day each month. 
JIDFT understands MoI headquarters has 
ordered all facilities to allow 
visitation at least once a month. 
 
¶13. (C) Ethnic-Sectarian Issues. In 
an informal poll conducted during the 
inspection, it was found that the 
overwhelming majority of the detainees were 
Sunni Arabs from the Baghdad area. 
 
---------------- 
FOLLOW UP ACTION 
---------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Iraqi and MNF-I JIDFT 
representatives will draft separate 
findings to submit to the Office of 
the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Interior. 
 
¶15. (C) The commander of the U.S. 
Special Police Training Team that 
is located at FOB Justice indicated 
that he had discussed with Iraqi General 
Mahdi(the commanding general of the 
facility) plans to use existing 
and newly constructed outlying 
buildings (utilizing MNSTC-I 
funds that have already 
been authorized) to expand the 
amount of living room available 
for detainees. Additionally, 
he and Mahdi had discussed 
plans for an outdoor shower and 
&recreational8 space.  While 
these tentative plans 
would have a positive impact 
on detainee living conditions 
if carried out, the plans did 
not envision expanding the facility 
to accommodate greater numbers of 
detainees.  JDFIT should 
follow up to check the status 
of these plans. 
 
¶16. (C) The JIDFT member from the 
Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights 
will send staff to the 
facility next week to follow up on: 
the status of individuals detained 
without personal files; the progress 
made by the detention management to 
implement a family visitation policy; 
the status of the investigative judges 
assigned to the facility; and the 
status of juvenile detainees. 
 
¶17. (C) PolMil, DoJ, and 
MNF-I Task Force 134 representatives 
are working with members of the Iraqi 
judiciary including Chief Judge Medhat 
 
Mahmood to improve the capacity of 
the judiciary to address and adjudicate 
in a more timely fashion the number 
of detainees held in facilities throughout 
the country.  In that undertaking, 
TF-134 Commanding General of Jack Gardner 
and Acting Justice Attach are planning 
to meet with Medhat in the near future 
to present a proposal to ensure the 
assignment of Iraqi investigative 
judges to detention facilities on a regular 
basis.  In addition, Acting Justice Attach 
has arranged for three investigative 
judges to accompany and work with the 
JIDFT scheduled to conduct 
another inspection on April 25. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶18. (C) COMMENT:  The joint inspections 
conducted thus far confirm that the 
Iraqi detention system is overcrowded, 
underfunded, mismanaged, and inherently 
abusive.  Iraqi commitment to making the 
necessary systemic improvements is lacking, 
if it exists at all, and instead of 
working to improve conditions, the 
relevant ministries trade accusations 
about who is to blame for the problems. 
Real reform of this sector will take 
Iraqi commitment, Iraqi resources, 
Iraqi time, and Iraqi coordination 
across several ministries. 
 
¶19. (C) COMMENT CONT. Perhaps most 
daunting, it will also take 
a fundamental Iraqi change of 
mentality and outlook toward the 
whole issue of how to humanely treat 
detainees and prisoners. As commented 
upon previously, detainees are regularly 
left to languish in substandard "warehouse" 
situations without access to families 
or legal counsel, under the 
supervision of poorly trained 
guards operating without clear authorities. 
Many detainees lack complete case 
files; intimidation and bribery of 
judges and forced confessions present 
serious issues.  Further, limited judicial 
capacity mandates long waits for detainee 
hearings and trials.  To the Iraqi 
authorities, and perhaps to the 
public at large, all this is 
considered to be "normal." 
MNF-I and Embassy officials will 
continue in our efforts to assist the 
Iraqis with detention reform. However, 
the new Iraqi government, once established, 
must make reform a priority. 
 
KHALILZAD