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O 011413Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3644
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016 
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FALL-OUT FROM IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES RAID NEAR SADR 
CITY 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 1023 
 
Classified By: ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DANIEL SPECKHARD FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (S)  SUMMARY:  At approximately 1800 on Sunday, March 26, 
2006, Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) launched an 
assault on a target in the Ur neighborhood near the Sadr City 
area of Baghdad.  The raid was planned and executed by the 
Iraqi forces with the assistance of U.S. Special Forces 
advisors. Persons inside and near the target building reacted 
with gunfire and a firefight ensued.  The ISOF entered the 
target, killed 16, detained 18, and rescued one Iraqi hostage 
who had been kidnapped earlier in the day.  As a result of 
inaccurate media reporting public outcry was immediate and 
widespread, with scenes of the aftermath, including graphic 
shots of bodies, broadcast late into the night on Iraqi 
television.  Media reports spread the rumor that the building 
raided was a mosque, and that those killed were innocent 
worshipers gunned down in cold blood by American soldiers. 
Government and political leaders including the Prime Minister 
and Ministers of Defense and Interior quickly denounced the 
raid and claimed Iraqi forces were not involved.  Demands for 
an investigation and compensation were made. On March 27, 
Baghdad provincial officials boycotted planned meetings with 
Embassy officials, and the Shia Alliance walked out of 
government formation talks in protest. By March 28, local 
media interest in the event had died down.  Shia Alliance 
figures returned to government formation talks, but the 
Provincial Council was still boycotting Embassy officers. 
Ambassador and MNF-I Commanding General have been in frequent 
contact with Iraqi officials to convey the facts surrounding 
the operation and to calm emotions.  On March 30 the Baghdad 
Governor and Provincial Council chairman were talking to us 
again (SEPTEL.) Talks about the nature and scope of a 
possible investigation continue.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------- 
DETAILS OF THE RAID 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (S)  On March 14, three ISOF soldiers were sent in plain 
clothes to an area near Sadr City to reconnoiter a site where 
numerous executed bodies have been dumped.  They fell into 
hostile hands and were brutally tortured before being 
executed.  The ISOF unit began to gather intelligence to 
determine who was responsible.  The information they obtained 
pointed them to a school building complex in the Ur 
neighborhood, just northwest of Sadr City.  Their information 
indicated the building in which their suspects were located 
was a heavily defended structure no longer in use as a school 
building.  ISOF information also indicated the presence of a 
high value individual; a former Jaysh al-Mahdi commander 
wanted for attacks against Coalition Forces.  (NOTE:  Senior 
Iraqi military officers have subsequently told us that the 
building in question was used as an office by the Ba'ath 
party during the Saddam regime.  Following the fall of Saddam 
it was converted to use as a political office and as a 
husayniyah. A husayniyah, a facility unique to the Shia, 
serves as a religious and social function community center. 
END NOTE.)  The building was watched for several days and 
further intelligence was gathered.  Information available to 
ISOF and to their U.S. advisors indicated the building was 
not a mosque, a husayniyah, or sensitive site. Current MNF-I 
rules of engagement allow for entry into mosques or places of 
worship if there is a reasonable belief that the facility 
contains enemy forces. 
 
¶3. (S)  The raid was launched at 1800 hours on March 26. 
Approximately 50 ISOF soldiers participated, along with about 
25 U.S. forces.  The ISOF was in the lead.  Upon their 
arrival outside the target, they were immediately fired upon 
from several buildings across the street.  As they dismounted 
their vehicles, fire began coming from inside the target 
building.  The ISOF assaulted the building, gained entry, and 
killed all those they encountered who were shooting at them. 
A total of 16 people in the building were killed.  Eighteen 
occupants of the building who did not pose a threat (i.e., 
those who were not bearing a weapon) were detained.  In 
addition, the soldiers found an individual who was hog-tied, 
a dental technician who said he had been kidnapped earlier in 
the day and who was told by his kidnappers that they planned 
to kill him later that evening.  He subsequently identified 
two of the detainees as being among those who had kidnapped 
him. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Throughout the time the soldiers were at the target, 
those manning the outer cordon continued to be fired upon 
from positions on surrounding buildings.  Crowds of people 
 
BAGHDAD 00001055  002 OF 004 
 
 
began to arrive and were in a highly agitated state.  The 
ISOF determined the situation required them to leave the 
scene quickly, before they could secure the bodies of those 
killed.  Prior to departing, they did destroy on scene the 
weapons and bomb-making equipment they had discovered in the 
building.  These included 32 AK-47 rifles, five grenades, 
four rocket propelled grenades with two launchers, two RPK 
heavy machine guns, crush wire improvised explosive device 
detonators, and several sets of body armor.  There were no 
religious articles found. The only friendly casualties 
suffered by the assault force was a gunshot wound to the arm 
of an ISOF soldier.  The entire episode lasted approximately 
35 minutes. 
 
-------------- 
MEDIA REACTION 
-------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Because the ISOF were required to depart the scene 
before securing the bodies, people with video cameras were 
able to enter the building and take photos of the bodies and 
the condition of the building.  These scenes immediately made 
it into the hands of the local media, who began showing them 
on television in reports claiming that those slain were 
innocent worshipers gunned down by American soldiers. 
Al-Iraqiya reported that U.S. forces attacked a husayniyah in 
the Ur neighborhood of Baghdad killing an unspecified number 
of people.  Other Iraqi and pan-Arab networks including 
al-Massar, al-Furat, al-Sharqiya, al-Arabiya, al-Jazirah, and 
others, quickly picked up the story.  Iraqiya's Sunday 
evening coverage focused on images of corpses, reported to be 
the victims of a U.S. attack on a mosque.  Al-Jazirah showed 
similar images, but also reported comments from a CENTCOM 
spokesperson emphasizing that U.S. forces played an advisory 
role to the ISOF who had conducted the raid. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Hostile commentary from Iraqi political figures 
continued on Iraqi broadcast media on Monday.  Iraqi 
officials, including Interior Minister Bayan Jabr and Hadyar 
al-Abbadi, advisor to the Prime Minister, demanded 
explanations and investigations into the incident.  Defense 
Minister Saadoun al-Dulime, a Sunni, denied Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) involvement in the operation, while Jabr also 
denied involvement of his forces, claiming that the MOD and 
MNF-I had control of the area in which the incident occurred. 
 Furat reported that U.S. forces "broke into" the husayniyah 
and quoted Iraqi parliamentarian and leader of Hezhollah 
movement in Iraq, Hassan al-Sari, who blamed U.S. Ambassador 
Khalilzad for the attack.  By Monday evening, Arabiya was 
reporting that President Talabani announced the formation of 
a committee, which he would head, to investigate the attack. 
Iraqiya's evening broadcast showed images of Ur neighborhood 
residents mourning those killed on Sunday. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  While the story broke in the print media on Tuesday 
morning, it had lost steam in the broadcast media and was 
eclipsed on the pan-Arab networks by the Khartoum Summit and 
Israeli elections.  Iraqi networks shifted attention back to 
government formation talks with a press conference as 
President Talabani's house.  The Coalition views of the 
incident was further clarified at a press conference, whose 
presentation included video and slides of the incident.  By 
Tuesday afternoon, the story was no longer the focus of Iraqi 
media attention. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
SHIA LEADERS STONGLY CONDEMN THE MILITARY OPERATION 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) After the operation in Ur concluded and the 
aftermath was televised, but before all of the facts were 
known, Shia leaders took to the airwaves to condemn the 
operation and call for an investigation.  Sadrist spokesman 
Shaykh Abd al-Hadi al-Darraji told al-Arabiyah that "U.S. 
troops went in and opened fire on the worshipers." He added 
that there was "no justification" and claimed that "going 
into mosque or husayniyahs on the pretext that there were 
weapons inside them was a grave mistake."  Haydar al-Abbadi, 
advisor to Prime Minister Ja'afari, told al-Arabiyah March 27 
that "there should not be death squads working alongside the 
U.S. troops which execute people while they are praying 
without any reason," adding that "most of these death squads 
may have connections with the multinational forces."  That 
same day, again with al-Arabiyah, senior Da'wa leader Jawad 
al-Maliki deemed the attacks "an ugly crime" and "an 
organized crime that has serious political and security 
dimensions which seek to trigger civil war to serve political 
ends aimed at manipulating current political formulas during 
critical political circumstances." Da'wa Tanzim leader 
 
BAGHDAD 00001055  003 OF 004 
 
 
Khudair al-Khuz'ai told western media March 26 that U.S. 
forces raided their party office, "tortured" the men, dragged 
them out and "executed" them. 
 
¶9. (C) Khudair al-Khuz'ai angrily claimed to PolCouns March 
27 that Da'wa Tanzim used the same building as the husayniyah 
that was attacked, but the building is a duplex, and the 
Da'wa Tanzim space was separate and has a separate entrance. 
He claimed that Da'wa Tanzim was holding a cultural meeting 
marking the death of the Prophet at the time of the raid - 
and that American and/or Iraqi forces burst in and shot 13 
Tanzim members dead. He underlined that these people had no 
relation to the Jaysh al-Mahdi ("we're Da'wa Tanzim!  You 
know who we are!")  He said he could not understand the 
timing of the raid and asked why it was conducted during 
prayer times. PolCouns emphasized that the raid was conducted 
against an illegal armed group, but Khuz'ai would have none 
of it. 
 
¶10. (S) Moqtada al-Sadr called a meeting late on March 26 
with his clerics and sercurity forces.  During this meeting 
he insisted that all JAM members show restraint, but maintain 
vigilance.  Sadr placed these forces on "high alert." He also 
ordered members of the JAM to travel north to help secure 
Sadr City and roads likely to be used by pilgrims headed 
south to Najaf to mark the death of Mohammed.  Sadr also said 
that it was time to apply pressure to the national government 
to condemn the acts of aggression against his followers and 
to act to stop such attacks. 
 
¶11. (C) Shia Independent and Council of Representatives (CoR) 
member Muhammad Izz al-Din al-Khateeb told PolOff and PolFSN 
March 27 that the force used at the Ur building was 
excessive, even if the people were armed.  What happened is 
unexplainable, he stated.  He stated his disbelief that Iraqi 
soldiers were in the lead.  He then complained that the 
Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) and Sunni mosques harbor 
insurgents and weapons, but there are no operations against 
their mosques like what happened in Ur. Fellow Shia 
Independent and CoR member Dr Dr. Haider Karim al-Suweidi 
added at the meeting that the Shia street is saying that 
Americans sensed the political process was moving ahead and 
wanted to hinder the process.  Shia Independent and CoR 
member Haider Subkhi al-Jurani told PolOff and PolFSN March 
28 that there should not be attacks on militias while hotbeds 
of insurgents/terrorists exist. 
 
¶12.  (C)  As a result of the assault, Shia coalition members 
angrily boycotted government formation talks scheduled for 
Monday.  However, the meetings resumed on Tuesday.  The 
Baghdad Provincial Council which on March 27 had declared it 
would no longer meet with U.S. officials on March 30 sent the 
Baghdad Governor and Provincial Council Chair to meetings 
with U.S. officials in the International Zone. (See SEPTEL.) 
Shia parliamentarian and frequent media commentator Abbas 
al-Baati told us March 30 that the raid struck a raw nerve 
among the Shia.  However, he recognized the utility of 
putting the incident behind us. 
 
------------------- 
ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY 
------------------- 
 
¶13. (S) Since Monday, Embassy and MNF-I officials have been 
engaged at the highest levels with Iraqi counterparts to 
clarify the facts of what really took place. On Monday 
afternoon, GEN Casey met personally with Minister of Defense 
Dulime, Minister of Interior Jabr, and National Security 
Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie and provided a detailed 
briefing of the operation.  Dulime and Jabr expressed 
satisfaction with the outcome of the raid, but made it clear 
they could not speak out in public for political reasons. 
Jabr and Dulime also said they had known for some time that 
the building in question was a site used by kidnappers to 
torture and execute people, with Jabr saying that eight 
intelligence officers had been killed several months earlier 
in the same building.  This was confirmed by Dulime, who 
later told Acting PolMilCous that the building housed an 
illegal Sharia court. Both, along with Rubaie, said the 
decision about how to handle the media and political aspects 
of the operation would have to be taken by Prime Minister 
Ja'afari. Dulime counseled that it would be best to say 
nothing to the press, predicting that after a few days the 
matter would be forgotten.  Following his meeting with the 
three, GEN Casey provided a similar briefing to Ja'afari. 
This was followed by a meeting between Ja'afari and the 
Ambassador. (REFTEL)  Following demands by Ja'afari, 
Talibani, and others for an investigation, Embassy and MNF-I 
are exploring with Iraqi counterparts possible options. 
 
BAGHDAD 00001055  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) While senior Iraqi officials are willing to admit in 
private that the operation was a tactical success, they are 
unwilling for political reasons to support it in public.  In 
addition, in Dulime's case, the fact that he did not know 
about it in advance and rushed to condemn it in public now 
makes it impossible for him to admit that MOD forces were 
involved.  To do so would make him look foolish and 
uninformed about what his own soldiers are doing.  Even if he 
had known about it, Dulime is extremely averse to taking any 
action against Shia militias by what are considered - rightly 
or wrongly - to be "Sunni-controlled" forces. 
 
¶15. (C) Sadr's muted reaction and calls for restraint 
reinforces the message provided to the media that the raid 
was unjustifiable, while providing cover for JAM actions that 
continue to be used against its opponents as well as 
potential action against CF.  It is also likely that Sadr 
will use the opportunity to leverage the Iraqi Government to 
provide permission to expand JAM operations in Baghdad. 
 
¶16. (C) From a political standpoint, the operation came when 
important elements of the Shia Islamist Coalition were 
dissatisfied with American pressure against Prime Minister 
Jafari in the government formation process and suspicious of 
American motives in our discussions with Sunni Arabs.  For 
some, the operation confirmed their worst suspicions that the 
U.S. would not remain a neutral party in Iraq's sectarian 
conflict.  For others, the operation provided a golden 
opportunity to burnish their credentials as Iraqi 
nationalists by bashing the U.S.  However, we sense the 
turbulence is subsiding slightly.  Public denunciations about 
the attack were fewer on March 28 and the Shia Coalition was 
back working on the government talks.  The anger, and the 
political opportunism, are not gone, however, and another 
operation against a Shia militia element very likely will 
cause another uproar. 
 
 
KHALILZAD