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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MARR ER ET
SUBJECT: UNMEE Force Commander Cautions Against 
Restructuring That Undercuts Demarcation 
 
CLASSIFIED BY:  AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an April 3 meeting with DAS Don 
Yamamoto, UNMEE Force Commander Major General Rajender 
Singh offered a clear and comprehensive technical strategy 
for the demarcation process.  Operating on the principle 
that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed", Singh 
also argued that there was a critical need for political 
discussions to occur in conjunction with demarcation. 
Singh also voiced his serious concerns that UNMEE 
restructuring not be approached so hastily that the 
resulting entity would lack the resources to perform its 
most important task; supporting demarcation.  If that 
happened, any cost savings in the short term would be 
likely be lost in the long-run.  We found a number of 
Singh's arguments to be well-considered and hope that his 
concerns will be carefully considered as we consider 
UNMEE's reconfiguration.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
DEMARCATION: THE FIVE STAGES 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto and 
Ambassador, joined by AF/E's Bill Schofield, Poloff and 
DATT, called on soon to be departing UNMEE Force Commander 
General Rajender Singh April 3.  Focusing on the key issue 
of demarcation, Singh suggested to DAS Yamamoto, a five 
stage process and a possible, but very tentative, time 
frame.  First, reconnaissance and surveying must occur 
along the border before a single pillar is placed in the 
ground. UNMEE must know exactly the location of each pillar 
before the process begins.  Second, during the actual 
pillar placement, Singh recommended having a minimum of two 
task forces supported by a reserve company and the deminers 
in order to "sanitize" the border.  Singh believes that the 
border could be demarcated at two places simultaneously 
either in the same sector or in different sectors, yet the 
border must be constantly assessed for landmines. Over nine 
months, these task forces would engage in the surveying, 
demining, and pillar installation. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Turning to his third point, Singh said that once 
the pillars are in the ground, the change of control and 
population shifts will need to be closely monitored for 
approximately three months with the support of both the 
Eritrean and Ethiopian military forces.  Fourth, 
consolidation supported by UNMEE to ensure that populations 
are safe and have come to terms with their new realities 
would need to occur for five to six months.  And finally, 
the former-temporary security zone would be returned to the 
full control of Eritrea, Eritrean Defense Forces would be 
reintroduced and most likely the Ethiopian troops would 
return to areas adjacent to the border as well.  Only after 
this is complete would UNMEE completely withdraw. 
 
UNMEE'S IMPORTANCE DURING DEMARCATION 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Acknowledging the upcoming UNSC consideration of 
UNMEE's mandate and possible reconfiguration, Singh 
strongly advised against any changes to the current 
structure, forcefully promoting UNMEE's importance to 
ensuring security for the demarcation process.  According 
to Singh, in some areas a public outcry is anticipated, 
particularly in the Irob, Badme and Tserona.  In these 
areas Singh expects the population may agitate or engage in 
demonstrations.  Others, miscreants and those opposed to 
the GSE or GOE, may engage in surreptitiously increasing 
mining or in attacking the deminers and demarcators.  Also, 
after demarcation some may be resistant to the handover or 
re-occupation and may try to remove or deface the pillars 
or undermine the border. 
 
¶5. (C) In Singh's view, a reduction in UNMEE presence in 
the TSZ at this key time could have disastrous 
consequences.  Reconfiguring UNMEE as an observer mission 
would significantly decrease troop levels and, despite a 
 
small increase in the number of observers, it would reduce 
the total eyes and ears in the TSZ and the resources 
available.  The troops here know the terrain and the 
people, to remove them and ask the observers to move 
forward with only the protection of the blue UN flag may be 
foolhardy.  They would have neither the numbers, nor the 
show of strength that Singh believes will be needed. 
While saving money, the observer mission option would not, 
in his view, provide the necessary security for 
demarcation.  Cautioning against drawing down if we think 
that ultimately we would have to reintroduce forces to 
assist with demarcation, Singh noted, "it takes four months 
to deinduct troops and six months to induct."  Singh urged 
that any decision on reconfiguration be put off until the 
future of the demarcation effort was clearer.  At a 
minimum, Singh recommended a minimum of 2500 infantry 
troops, with 1 reserve company, 1 engineering company, 2 
demining companies, a helicopter team and medical staff to 
support the demarcation process. 
 
POLITICAL ISSUES WILL ARISE DURING DEMARCATION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (C) While the EEBC and UNMEE can between them manage the 
technical aspects of demarcation, Singh reiterated that 
political issues will also inevitably arise during the 
process.  A means for addressing issues such as access to 
the sea, trade and normalized relations must be in place 
before proceeding.  While the issues themselves need not be 
completely addressed before the pillars are placed, both 
parties must be participating in political talks while 
demarcation occurs.  He argued that both sides would need 
to consent to political talks and to the specifics of 
border demarcation, stating "nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) We believe Singh raised a number of thought 
provoking points about what the demarcation process 
could/should look like.  We also think that Singh is on 
target when he urges that any decisions regarding UNMEE's 
reconfiguration be carefully assessed to ensure that the 
resulting entity is capable of performing its most 
important job - demarcation.   END COMMENT. 
 
DeLisi